Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1988



Declining Fortunes of the French CP
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A. James McAdams

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KGB and Soviet Reform
Amy W. Knight

Books
Joan Barth Urban
Luba Fajfer

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Problems of Communism

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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1988 VOL XXXVII

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A poster from the 1988 French presidential campaign of André Lajoinie, candidate of the French Communist Party. The appeal for votes on the first round of balloting reads: "Millions of You Lack Liberties. Make Yourself Heard!" Photo by Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Declining Fortunes of the French Communist Party

Ronald Tiersky

The 1988 presidential and legislative elections in France confirm the growing marginalization of the French Communist Party (PCF). In the June balloting for the National Assembly, the party registered a modest recovery from its abysmal 7 percent showing in the April-May vote for president by running popular incumbent mayors. In doing so, it made the party center vulnerable to the emergence of strong local power bases, ones that are more inclined than the Paris leadership to make pragmatic electoral deals with the Socialist Party, i.e., to resurrect the "Union of the Left." With its revolutionary image destroyed in 1968, its viability as a governing party discredited, its role as a tribune of the downtrodden undercut on both the Left and Right, and its traditional worker core increasingly beleaguered by economic change, the PCF seems doomed to wither away.

The New Logic in Soviet-GDR Relations

A. James McAdams

Comparison of two Soviet-East German contre-temps—in 1970-71 and 1984-85—reveals both significant parallels and important signs of change. In 1970-71, a politically weak Walter Ulbricht vainly attempted to prevent a strong Leonid Brezhnev from turning to a policy of détente, and in the process soon lost his job. In 1984-85, Erich Honecker was unable to prevent a weak Soviet leadership from assuming a more confrontational posture toward the West, yet he survived to see his views validated and to make his postponed trip to West Germany. The episodes suggest a growing capability of East European states to pursue their own interests as long as they remain within the consensual framework of the Warsaw Pact alliance.

Leadership Change and Crisis in Hungary

George Schöpflin, Rudolf Tőkés, and Iván Völgyes

In May 1988, three decades of rule by János Kádár came to an end in the midst of a gathering crisis in Hungarian life. The successor to Kádár turned out to be 57-year-old Károly Grósz, who less than a year earlier had been given the thankless post of prime minister in charge of a faltering country. Although Grósz and a rejuvenated Politburo speak of the need for major reforms, early evidence suggests that the May events were a "coup of the apparat" rather than a major turn toward reform in Hungary.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Note

The KGB and Soviet Reform

Amy W. Knight

Mikhail Gorbachev has yet to establish his dominance over the Soviet secret police. In September, KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, moved into the party Secretariat, a shift that has often meant upward mobility for ambitious policemen. Although *glasnost'* has subjected the KGB to unprecedentedly open criticism, the organization has countered with a publicity campaign stressing the dangers of subversion and the dedicated competence of the KGB in dealing with it. If popular discontent over nationality issues and economic stagnation grows more assertive, Gorbachev may feel forced to choose between perpetuation of party control and the launching of wider reforms. There is little question that the KGB would lend its weight to the former course.

Essay-Reviews

Gorbachev and World Communism: Collapse or *Perestroyka*?

Joan Barth Urban

Moscow continues to look to the international communist party system as an important asset of Soviet foreign policy and a source of legitimacy for its Marxist-Leninist regime. A reforming China likewise appears to sense that participation in the international communist party system is a useful counterweight to reform at home and expanding contacts with the non-communist world abroad. Interestingly, given the manifest concern in Moscow and Beijing with preserving an international communist movement of some sort, the recent decline of the nonruling communist parties in the West could increase the chances for a reconciliation between the Chinese and Soviet parties.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Documents

Luba Fajfer

The histories of anti-Soviet insurgencies during and after World War II are relatively little known. However, over the past ten years, numerous volumes in a collection of documents relating to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) have been published in the West. This fundamental work constitutes the largest accessible collection of primary sources on the UPA, the military arm of the Ukrainian liberation movement; it documents as well Soviet political and military conduct in a conflict situation involving a Soviet nationality.

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Declining Fortunes of the French Communist Party

Ronald Tiersky

Despite a modest recovery in the June 1988 parliamentary elections, communism in France continues to wither away. Its decline—in 1956 the French Communist Party (PCF) had been France's largest political party and the largest West European communist party—is an historic shift in French political life. The PCF has been unable to sustain itself in the face of the long siege of French capitalism and liberal democracy; instead it is now haunted by their specters and has become the epitome of the dilemmas of West European communism. Charles de Gaulle was evidently right in saying that France was created either for great triumphs or else exemplary failures!

The Larger Context

The determinants of French communism's fate, as well as of the problems facing other Western European communist parties, lie both in the parties themselves and in the political environment.

Since the end of World War II, communist parties in Western Europe have been riveted to the war's territorial consequences. The division of Europe locked Soviet domination onto the Eastern states, forcing the communist parties in Western Europe to become a kind of hostage to Soviet power in Eastern Europe, in the sense that self-limiting communist ambitions in the West became one condition of American nonintervention in East European power struggles between communist regimes and hostile peoples. Moreover, the militarized East/West standoff and the buildup of nuclear forces left the Red Army with no viable role in the dreams of Western communist parties about coming to power. And finally, over time, the sheer successes of postwar West European societies and political systems, juxtaposed to what had been built in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, has gradually discredited the myths of socialist revolution, "real, existing socialism," and even, as we are seeing today, the very idea of socialism.

Strategically speaking, there have of course been a few moments of enormous potential for communist leaders in Western Europe since the war. The earliest came in 1947–48 in Italy, in Greece, and also to some extent in France. Two decades later, the May 1968 general strike in France clearly put the Gaullist Republic in danger. But despite an overwhelming uprising of society against the state, the PCF did not grab for power. To the contrary, it and the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) feigned support for the strikers' revolutionary slogans in order to co-opt them, and then acted surreptitiously to negotiate a return to work. From a revolutionary's point of view, the PCF had at best tried to harness the popular movement to its gradualist strategy of a "peaceful transition to socialism" through a left-wing party coalition. At worst, the PCF had demonstrated the bankruptcy of its vanguardist rhetoric and its pretension to be a revolutionary party.

Only the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) of all the West European communist parties once actually tried to seize power. During the 1974–75 revolution that overthrew the Salazar regime, the PCP leadership tried to take over the newly installed military provisional government from the inside. Portugal, a small and strategically marginal country, was apparently even written off

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as "lost" in 1975 by some high American officials. Nevertheless, the surprising resilience of Portugal's Socialists, helped generously by other West European socialist parties, withstood the Communist pressure. Today the archaic PCP, although still mustering 15 percent of the national vote, is isolated in Portuguese politics, and has been so for a decade.

Altogether, the West European communist parties have not been able to escape the elemental geostrategic facts of their political existence. They face hostile political environments, which they have little hope of changing; they have few or no domestic political allies; and their Soviet comrades and the Soviet model will, as ever, be of little use to them, even if Gorbachev's *perestroyka* and *glasnost'* prove to be successful. Moreover, for hidebound, "Brezhnevite" party leaderships—such as the French Communist Party's—it is far from clear whether Mikhail Gorbachev, *perestroyka,* and *glasnost'* are going to be assets or liabilities.

Of the big West European countries only Italy has a communist party that remains a substantial force in electoral and parliamentary politics (although it, too, has recently declined). It is noteworthy that much of the relative success of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) derives precisely from the fact that over two decades it has gradually shed communist organization and ideology.[1] Elsewhere, communist parties have been reduced to small or marginal political positions. At times, as in Scandinavia, they are temporarily relevant to parliamentary majorities, but they never are politically decisive. In Spain, the Communist Party (PCE), despite having briefly been the "point" party of Eurocommunism, failed to maneuver to its advantage that country's return to democracy after Francoism. It was marginalized and soon split into three, then seven separate parties. Today, it is of little consequence to Spain's future.

History has thrown all the West European communist parties into crises of political identity. And these issues of *raison d'être*—what to propose, whom to ally with, what to be—have largely broken West European communism's back.

National and International Imperatives

The PCF, during its long career as the premier loyalist party in the Comintern and Cominform, was appropriately nicknamed the "eldest daughter of the Church." When Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin in 1956, the top French Communist leaders were shaken and disoriented—both because of an ideological commitment to Stalinism and because their own careers were being threatened. Maurice Thorez and a few other comrades important in the PCF's international networks even sided secretly in the next few years with the Maoists, accusing the Khrushchevites of revisionism. (How far a Chinese/French communist alliance would have gone, or mattered, is open to speculation.) Thorez was bought off politically in 1960–61 by Khrushchev, who helped Thorez turn back the so-called Servin-Casanova reform group (which in a sense was Khrushchevite) inside the PCF. The result was to solidify the PCF's Soviet loyalism until the middle 1970's.

In 1958, the French Communists were the only party to oppose abandonment of the Fourth Republic. But they were completely isolated in parliament, and were politically and logistically in no position to organize an opposition to General de Gaulle's return to power. Nor were they able to prevent consolidation of the Fifth Republic and the 1962 constitutional reform that created a directly elected presidency. In any case, NATO and the division of Europe prevented, as always, any serious thoughts of an insurrectionary strategy.

In the early 1960's, although still operating from a cold war position of exclusion and isolation on the French political scene, the Communists began tentatively to remake electoral linkages with the Socialist Party as well as with other minor left-wing groups. By 1965, the Communists had moved so far as to support François Mitterrand's maverick left-wing unity candidacy for president against de Gaulle, which produced a promising, though not winning result.

However, the totally unexpected general strike of May-June 1968, which initially had the appearance of a powerful, classic left-wing popular rebellion against the regime, ended in an electoral rout of the left-wing parties, and in an ideological and political catastrophe for the PCF. The PCF's cautious and distrustful behavior when unexpectedly confronted with the largest strike movement in French history destroyed what remained —after 50 years—of the French Communist Party's reputation as a genuine revolutionary party. The CGT's secret role, soon widely suspected, in negotiating the Grenelle Accords and in ending the strikes on a successful "trade union" basis rather than rejecting compromise to help the push to overthrow Gaullism, raised

[1]For my own analysis of the PCI's evolution, see *Ordinary Stalinism: Democratic Centralism and the Question of Communist Political Development,* Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1985. Most recently, a journalist's report on the *L'Unità* festival stresses the PCI's de-communization: "From the fair's 140-page official program some clear hints emerge about what the party no longer wants to be. The party's hammer-and-sickle symbol does not appear once, perhaps in deference to a lively dispute over proposals to dispose of it permanently. The word 'communism' is not used once." *The New York Times,* Sept. 8, 1988.

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even more questions about what the Communists really were after in France.

In 1968, a young-factory-worker-become-middle-aged-apparatchik named Georges Marchais was chosen to be party leader. For the next decade, a leadership group composed of his friends and some of the old guard searched for a route through the perilous passage between the Scylla of opening up the party to "Eurocommunism" and to the "Union of the Left" with a revitalized Socialist Party now led by François Mitterrand, and the Charybdis of relapsing into a fortress policy—neo-Stalinist democratic centralism inside the party and a go-it-alone strategy in the political system.

For several years in the 1970's, the "Marchais clique" leaned first toward Eurocommunism then toward sectarianism, never abandoning either policy, yet never firmly adhering to either. Finally, in 1977, caught off guard by an unanticipated Socialist electoral surge large enough to threaten the Communists' traditional dominance on the French Left, the PCF leaders maneuvered a rupture in the "Common Program" alliance with the Socialist Party (PS). As a result, the Left, which had a year earlier seemed sure to win, lost the 1978 parliamentary elections.

Although the Socialists and Communists made a show of cooperating in these elections to gain the most seats for each of the two parties (this the Communists permitted since their sabotage had already ensured the Left's defeat), relations between the two left-wing parties were very distant over the next few years. In 1978–81, the Communists were basically isolated in French politics once again and were expected to remain so.

Yet history (specifically, Mitterrand and the PS) again surprised them! Mitterrand's unexpected 1981 presidential victory caught the Communists off guard. Believing that Mitterrand would be defeated,[2] they had not laid the groundwork for refusing to join the "United Left" government formed after a snap parliamentary election that netted the Socialists alone an unprecedented 38 percent of the vote and an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly. The Communists, whose showing had slipped abruptly in these elections from the 21 percent registered in 1978 to 16 percent, were obliged, from fear of the consequences of alienating their electorate—which still wanted "unity" with the Socialists—to join the government of Pierre Mauroy, a social democrat of deep conviction and a firm supporter of left-wing unity. Thereafter, the Communists staggered through a remarkably tame though torturous three-year stint as the junior partner (four ministers) in a government coalition with the Socialists. Co-responsible for government policy, the PCF thus shared the political consequences of the government's financial disasters and the massive increase in unemployment during 1981–83. The Communists then quit the government in 1984, just as austerity policies launched in 1982 and 1983 were beginning to stabilize the French economic situation.

From 1984 to 1986, the Communists opposed the all-Socialist government of the young, "modernist," and not very socialist Laurent Fabius, who had replaced Mauroy. They accentuated their contradictory policy of attacking the Socialists while still claiming they were for left-wing "unity," gaining little in tactical or strategic terms, and further disheartening their supporters, among whom dissent, brewing for a decade, was now endemic.

The Conservative victory in the 1986 parliamentary elections brought on a two-year period of so-called "cohabitation" between Premier Jacques Chirac—leader of the Rally for the Republic (RPR)—and President Mitterrand. The Communists, again using sectarianism to try to profit from any Socialist voter disillusionment with Mitterrand, took a ferociously anti-Socialist position toward "cohabitation." They minimized Mitterrand's efforts to resist Chirac with the few constitutional tools available to the President (such as delaying the signing of decrees, and once even refusing to sign) and harped on the unavoidable broad collaboration between the Socialist President and the neo-Gaullist Premier even when Mitterand's compliance was simple constitutional necessity, such as the president's duty to promulgate laws voted by parliament.[3] The main object for the Communists was, as it had been since 1977, to attack Mitterrand and the Socialists as objective allies of the Right, while still falsely proclaiming the Communists' own desire for "unity."

The Communist leaders had decided, for better or

[2]Pierre Juquin, a Politburo member in 1981, who has since become a leading dissident and has run as an independent Communist presidential candidate in 1988, said in an interview: "I assert that in the Politburo a majority thought Mitterrand would be beaten (in 1981) and that we should help beat him." (From an interview in *Libération* [Paris], Jan. 15, 1988, cited in *Est et ouest* [Paris], February 1988, p. 19.) The PCF leaders publicly asked their voters to support Mitterrand on the second ballot, since they could not endorse Giscard d'Estaing and did not want to risk calling for abstention following the *bonnet blanc—blanc bonnet* (six of one and half a dozen of the other) tactic they had used in 1969, when they had run their own candidate (Jacques Duclos) in the first round and in the runoff had opposed Georges Pompidou and Alain Poher, the President of the Senate, by calling for abstention. To the Communist voters and to the party rank-and-file, François Mitterrand had come to symbolize left-wing unity. The Marchais group at the top of the PCF thus had to work surreptitiously, to try—even if ineffectively—to weaken Communist second-ballot support for him.

[3]See Marie-Hélène Bruère, François Hincker, and Francine Simon-Ekovich, "Strategy and Tactics of the PCF: July 1986-September 1987," in *Communisme* (Paris), Nos. 15–16, 1987, pp. 166–68.

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Figure 1: French Communist Votes, 1924–1988



SOURCE: "The 1988 Presidential Election," *Dossiers et Documents*, Paris, *Le Monde*, June 1988, p. 380.

worse, to take a position of splendid isolation (*seul contre tous*), hoping they could win new support, as in the old days, by posing as the only serious anti-government or protest party. That they had miscalculated was apparent with the rise on the far Right of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front (FN), which received protest votes based on rejection of high unemployment—traditionally a Communist issue—as well as on more sensationalized racist feelings about immigrant workers and their families. In fact, the electoral map of Le Pen's presidential vote in 1988 corresponded not so much to concentrations of immigrants as to the geography of unemployment. That the Communist Party has lost its leverage on the issue of unemployment is a remarkable change in French politics.

In May 1988, Mitterrand was massively re-elected president, with 53 percent of the vote. For the Communists, the election continued a downward trend observable since 1981 (see Figure 1). In the first ballot, the PCF's candidate for president, André Lajoinie, fell below the "double digit" threshold, with less than 7 percent of the vote (that is, less than half of Marchais's showing on the first ballot in 1981). This was the worst Communist electoral showing since 1924. Not only was Lajoinie beaten roundly by the "gang of three" composed of Mitterrand, Chirac, and Raymond Barre, but his showing was doubled by Le Pen, who had 14 percent. In addition, Pierre Juquin, a high-level party dissident running against the PCF as an unofficial Communist candidate, finished with 2 percent of the vote; and the ecologist candidate Antoine Waechter, had 4 percent. The Communist Party, de Gaulle would have said, is approaching the abyss.

Fresh from his hugely successful re-election, Mitterrand once again called snap parliamentary elections. The Socialist Party emerged from these June 1988 elections again as the largest party, but it fell 12 seats short of the absolute majority it had enjoyed in 1981. Although the Communists rebounded to just over 11 percent of the vote in these elections, an analysis of this gain gives little reason to think the PCF began a genuine electoral renewal between May and June. To the contrary, the gain seems to have been largely circumstantial and achieved by means that are likely to exacerbate existing divisions within the French Communist Party. The PCF remains a party in permanent opposition with no even remotely convincing program and no promising alliances.

The PCF's eventual complete marginalization could be hastened as a result of the political strategy of "*ouverture*" adopted by President Mitterrand and the new prime minister, Michel Rocard. This strategy aims at altering the strict Left/Right pattern of French party alliances by "opening" the Socialist Party toward the political center. The first step, awkwardly and narrowly achieved in June, was to bring several centrist ministers into Rocard's government. The longer-term goal is a general "recomposition of the political landscape," which means (among many other things) creating a new independent centrist party with which the Socialists (or, eventually, also a conservative party or coalition) could ally in government. This could create a French version of the West German party system, and would be a further step toward Europeanizing the French party configuration.

Not surprisingly, the PCF has declared ideological war on these ideas. But since the key Communist leaders are vehemently against even the Socialists (their only potential allies), almost no one (including the Communists themselves) takes seriously either the party's ostensible pleas for alliances—as an "alternative" to monopoly of national government by the Socialists, the Union for French Democracy (UDF), and the RPR—or the vague new project for "socialism in French colors" (the first new party program since *Changer de cap* in 1971) adopted at the 26th Congress of the French Communist Party in December 1987.[4]

Party ideology is peddled with less conviction today than ever before. The PCF's only potentially genuine rallying cry is its ostensibly socialist, but really more nationalist, opposition to "the Europe of 1992." The PCF

[4]See Marchais's report to the 26th Congress and the Party Resolution in *Cahiers du communisme* (Paris), December 1987-January 1988.

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(like the National Front) protests the Single European Act as a sellout of French national independence and sovereignty to a supranational capitalist conglomerate of states and big corporations. The most pertinent French Communist strategy today is, once again, totally defensive: the PCF's main role in French political life is to protest.

The once-mighty French Communist Party has thus in 1988 been reduced to a *force d'appoint* of the Socialist Party, bitterly hostile to it but also without any alternative to making deals with it. The PCF is no longer very intimidating, and it is not much listened to. It must negotiate its prices from a position of weakness, and the variety of political goods it can offer is rather limited. The French Communist movement as a whole, as we shall see, still has several points of leverage, particularly in the CGT and in Communist local governments. Nevertheless, the postwar Communist veto power in French politics is gone—no longer can PCF behavior decide whether the Left has a chance to govern, and if not, which part of the Right will control power.

The PCF is riven with internal opposition, open factionalism, and massive defections. Even the brutal wielding of democratic centralism by the Marchais group has been unable to stem the decade-old inner-party rebellion against the party's decline and against the leadership itself. The surprising thing really is that orthodox democratic centralism has worked well enough, despite all the internal and external challenges, for Marchais and his cronies to keep private control of what could be a public good: a dubious achievement.

Gone are the halcyon days of the 1970's, when the party membership was said to have exceeded 700,000 and the goal of a "party of one million" was proclaimed. Every observer agrees that party membership has declined drastically since then. Pierre Juquin, who, as a Politburo member, would have known a lot (if not everything), spoke in 1985 of "a greatly reduced membership, falling subscriptions, an endangered press that is read less and less, a reduced member activity."[5] At the 26th PCF Congress in December 1987, Marchais claimed that the party had 604,285 members at the end of 1986.[6] Most observers estimate the true PCF membership at 200,000–300,000 members, with a militant *actif* of 80,000 at most, perhaps today as few as 25,000. This last is, of course, the most important part, and declines relatively less rapidly than the outer corona of the party, both because of more intense commitment and because so many jobs and careers (particularly in the PCF municipal governments and in the CGT) are at stake. Thus, a serious loss in the 1989 municipal elections would not only further damage the party's public stature, but would also mean a decline in the jobs and money available to sustain the party apparatus.

And finally, by way of concluding this overview, there is the question of how Gorbachev's Soviet Union is affecting the PCF. There is not much direct data thus far, but some analysis can be attempted further on. For the moment, just one remark.

Historically, French Communism's strategic dilemma used to be both domestic and external. The PCF was for decades a pariah in French politics, due to its Sovietized policies and organization. And even when the Communist Party advanced, its gains could be shattered by the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy, as in 1939 and again in 1947.

Today, the relation between French Communism's domestic and international worlds is much less intense. On the one hand, French Communist decision-making is basically autonomous, even if the PCF's self-interest requires endorsing Soviet foreign policy around the world and paying enthusiastic lip service to Gorbachev's domestic reforms. But the time is past when radical changes in Soviet policy could have decisive effects—even for the better, as Gorbachev's innovations once might have—on the political fortunes of French Communism.

The presidential and parliamentary elections of 1988 are good studies of French Communism's current condition. They reveal much about the essential elements of the PCF's struggle for survival against the outside world and against its own internal inconsistencies.

The 1988 Presidential Election

Presidential elections in France always disadvantage the Communist Party. First, public opinion in these elections tends to focus on leadership character and capacity to govern—areas where Communist candidates are weak—more than on programs or ideology, where the Communists, at least theoretically, should be stronger. Second, the majority principle on the runoff ballot means a Communist could never be elected president, even in the unlikely circumstance of beating the Socialist candidate in the first round. Thus, the Communist Party sees the first round as the important one for it, the moment when the Communist leaders can count their troops.

However, even this round has yielded increasingly discouraging results (see Table 1), because more and more Communist voters "vote usefully," i.e., from the

[5] *L'Humanité*, (Paris) Jan. 10, 1985.
[6] See *Cahiers du communisme*, December 1987-January 1988.

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Table 1: First-round Votes for Main Parties in French Elections

(in percent)

	1974 Presidential	1978 Parliamentary	1981 Presidential	1981 Parliamentary	1986[1] Parliamentary	1988 Presidential	1988 Parliamentary
Socialists	43.2[2]	24.7	25.8	37.5	32.7	34.1	37.5
Mainstream right	47.7	46.5	49.2	42.2	44.7	36.4	40.5
Communists	n.a.[2]	20.5	15.3	16.1	9.8	6.8	11.3
National Front	0.8	0.2	— [3]	0.4	9.7	14.4	9.6

[1]Single-round election.
[2]Not applicable; Communists supported the Socialist candidate.
[3]Ran no candidate.

SOURCE: *The Economist* (London), June 11, 1988, p. 49.

start support someone with a real chance of defeating the Right. This habit began in 1965 and 1974, when the PCF decided not to run its own presidential candidate and many Communist voters turned to Mitterrand as the incarnation of left-wing unity and as a candidate who actually stood a chance of winning. Marchais emphasized this phenomenon after the first ballot in 1981, when the PCF leader won only 15 percent, although his poor showing was surely a case of voters punishing him for failing to maintain the "Union of the Left" in 1977–78. Clearly, Communist voters, unlike the Communist leadership, are deciding increasingly that the "Union of the Left" is of greater value than the Communist Party. In the long run, in other words, the "Union of the Left" is being effected by the "masses"—against the PCF!

Leftist voters similarly decided to "vote usefully" in the first round of the 1988 presidential election. The PCF put up not Georges Marchais but the little-known leader of the Communist group in the National Assembly, André Lajoinie, against the three major presidential candidates (Mitterrand, Chirac, and former prime minister Raymond Barre) and the far rightist Le Pen.

Why such a lackluster candidate? First, Marchais's personal domination at the top of the PCF has prevented any other major personality from emerging. Second, Marchais may have wanted to pass up the drubbing the 1988 candidate was likely to take. Most important, the Lajoinie candidacy, decided upon a year earlier in an unusual move, seemed to be an attempt to conciliate the *renovateur* internal opposition to Marchais himself and head off an independent Communist candidacy (although, in the end, it did not dissuade Pierre Juquin from running).

Lajoinie was hardly a candidate to draw the enthusiasm of the reformists inside the party. Originally from the rural Corrèze department, Lajoinie is a career party bureaucrat who came up through party ranks ostensibly as an agricultural specialist. But, he had the usual party education given high officials—in particular, training at the PCF central school in Choisy-le-Roi and the international Lenin school in Moscow in 1966–67. Always known for his determined admiration of the Soviet Union, Lajoinie has given pro forma support to the Gorbachev reforms. He went with Marchais to Moscow in May 1987, where he was introduced to Gorbachev as the PCF's candidate-to-be for the French presidency. The Soviets accepted this, and Lajoinie himself and seemed enthusiastic about Gorbachev's dynamism and congeniality. But at home, Lajoinie has been part of the Marchais clique, whose orthodox democratic centralism is opposed by the genuine French Communist "Gorbachevites" (see below).

Lajoinie's 1988 presidential campaign was particularly dull and old-style. Next to the "gang of three," to the unofficial Communist candidate Juquin, and to the shouting Le Pen, he often appeared almost mournful. Evoking the usual Communist themes of social problems (his electorate was only slightly less concerned—51 percent to 53 percent—with "immigrants" than Le Pen's), and criticizing the Socialists as objectively "right-wing," Lajoinie failed to draw serious consideration outside the PCF's usual electorate. And since Juquin took several hundred thousand votes from that, Lajoinie's 6.7 percent on the first ballot was not unexpected. It could easily have been worse.

Yet this unquestionably was the worst electoral result in the PCF's history, even below the 8.4 percent received in 1932 in the midst of its disastrous "class against class" campaign during the depression. Lajoinie's 2 million votes were less than half Georges Marchais's total on the first ballot in 1981. Worse, the PCF had become a marginal electoral force in nearly all parts of France: in 81 of 96 departments, Lajoinie got less than 10 percent of the vote; in 30, he got less than 5 percent. (In 1978, the PCF got more than 25 percent of the vote in 24 departments).[7] The few centers of relative PCF strength that remain are located in the traditional Communist electoral zones—parts of the Paris sub-

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André Lajoinie, presidential candidate of the French Communist Party (PCF), with PCF General Secretary Georges Marchais at an April 1988 campaign rally in Marseille.

—Raymond Depardon/MAGNUM.

urbs, the North and the Pas-de-Calais, the northern and western borders of the Massif Central, and a few Mediterranean departments. In Alsace (where the ecologist Waechter beat Lajoinie's scores) and in the west, the Communist vote is now negligible.

Overall, the Lajoinie disaster completed what might be called the "denationalization" of the French Communist electorate over the past ten years, the origins of which French political sociologists now trace back to social tendencies arising in the late 1960's or even the 1950's, when the PCF's electorate was generally considered to be a kind of unassailable rock pregnable only to General de Gaulle's prestige. François Platone makes three important observations about the contemporary sociology of the PCF electorate: (1) the movement of womens' voting toward the Left in France has not benefited the Communist Party; (2) Communist losses are greatest among young voters—remarkably, the greatest PCF vote concentration today is among people over 65; and (3) workers are the only category to give the PCF more than 10 percent, but Le Pen got as many working class votes as Lajoinie, and Mitterrand won an absolute majority of workers' votes.[8]

The Communist explanation of Lajoinie's terrible showing was depressingly orthodox. The big three candidates are depicted as having been objectively allied in seeking to crush the PCF. The party's poor showing, thus, "did not reflect the Communist party's real influence," because many voters were fooled into wanting to "vote usefully."[9]

For the second ballot, the Communist leaders unenthusiastically supported Mitterrand (whom they accused of turning his back as early as 1982 on his 1981 socialist promises) only in order, they said, to block "the victory of Chirac and Le Pen." Mitterrand's "obsession is to weaken the Communist Party," they astutely observed. Mitterrand's acceptance of the 1992 Single European Act was said to be contrary to French national interest. In short, the Communists—in advance—disclaimed any responsibility for a second Mitterrand presidency. His victory thus emphasizes that, despite occasional PS/PCF deals in parliamentary business or local elections, the PCF—barring a general policy change—has become a party of permanent opposition as it was during the cold war period, only this time without the special support (mainly Soviet) it then enjoyed.

1988: The Legislative Elections

President Mitterrand dissolved the Chiraquist National Assembly almost immediately after his own victory. There was a brief Rocard *ouverture* government (called "Rocky I" by the *Canard Enchainé*), but this opening to the Center was not met by the immediate consolidation of a Centrist party ally for the Socialists, so Mitterrand provoked elections, perhaps unwisely, even before Rocard had made a general policy declaration or asked the Assembly for a vote of confidence (neither being, in any case, absolutely required by the Gaullist constitution).

For the Communists, these parliamentary elections threatened yet another disastrous defeat. Lajoinie had been beaten by Mitterrand in the first presidential ballot even in many Communist strongholds. The worst forecasts, taking into account the effect of majority two-ballot voting, saw less than 10, perhaps as few as 5 PCF deputies in the next parliament compared to the 35 that

[7]See François Platone, "PCF: The Canker" in *The Presidential Election of 1988, Dossiers and Documents*, Paris, *Le Monde*, May 1988, p. 45.

[8]Ibid., pp. 45-46.

[9]See Marchais's report to the Central Committee in *L'Humanité*, June 28, 1988.

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Supporters of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his right-wing National Front at a rally in Marseille during the 1988 French presidential election campaign. The banner reads: "With Le Pen. France for the French. Europe for the Europeans."

—Richard Kalvar/MAGNUM.

the PCF had in the outgoing Assembly.

As Stanley Hoffmann observed, the results of the June elections for a new National Assembly—combined with the results of the April and May elections for president—"confounded all advance predictions . . . virtually every political leader and expert in France claims that something of historical importance happened, but few agree on just what it was."[10] The PCF won an unexpected 11 percent, up from Lajoinie's 7 percent only one month earlier (see Table 2). Because of this gain and Socialist help, the PCF elected 27 deputies (24 from metropolitan France, and 3 from overseas departments). Although a good showing, this left the PCF still short of the 30 deputies required to form a "parliamentary group," which has considerable prestige and practical advantages (e.g., the authority to deposit a motion of censure against the government, participation in organizing the Assembly's agenda through membership in the Commission of Group Presidents, and various office space and staff privileges).

How did the Communist Party manage this modest resurgence? First, President Mitterrand unwittingly helped. Confident—after his own huge 53 percent victory—of a PS landslide that would assure an absolute Socialist majority in the National Assembly (the polls even suggested that this victory would be larger than the PS triumph of 1981 following Mitterrand's first victory), the President made public comments encouraging a centrist opening, even saying outright that he did not think it "healthy for one party to rule."[11] Some Socialist voters and also some "Mitterrand Communists" became confused or discouraged by the President's apparent lack of partisanship, while others decided (as Mitterrand himself probably thought) that the Socialists had no new program to offer, and that the main task therefore was party realignment (the "recomposition" strategy). This combination of developments led to re-

[10]See Stanley Hoffmann, "The Big Muddle in France," *The New York Review of Books*, Aug. 18, 1988, p. 52.

[11]*Le Monde*, May 24, 1988.

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Table 2: French June 1988 Legislative Elections

	First ballot, percent of vote	Second ballot, total seats
URC,[1] of which:	40	
RPR		126
UDF		129
Various other Right groups		16
FN	10	1
PS and various Left groups	38	276
PCF	11	27

[1]Union of the Rally and the Center.

cord abstentions for any Fifth Republic election—34 percent—and a swing of some votes back to the PCF. (Indeed, the abstentions combined with the votes for the PCF and the National Front amounted to 50 percent of the votes cast by registered voters.)

Perhaps most important in the PCF rebound was the risky decision to run popular PCF mayors as candidates to the National Assembly in those districts where a Communist had a chance to beat a Socialist on the first ballot and thus become the left-wing candidate in the run-off election. The Socialist Party organization mobilized weakly for these elections, partly because it was overconfident and partly because of Mitterrand's conscious effort to lower the partisan temperature. The Socialists also put up complaisantly weak or unknown candidates in many districts (sometimes to give a bit of dubious glory to Parisian "personalities" who have recently joined the PS) in order to save the PCF from ignominious defeat, since Mitterrand apparently did not want the Communist Party to disappear completely (at least not yet) from parliament.

The decision to run mayors clearly paid off for the PCF, saving the party from "single-digit" disaster. Of the 24 metropolitan deputies, fully half are first-time deputies, and of them ten are mayors. Altogether, 13 of the 24 deputies are incumbent mayors.[12]

Until the 1988 legislative elections, as Stéphane Courtois points out, the combining of mayoral and deputorial functions had been virtually taboo in the PCF for 50 years, because it poses the threat of the emergence of local power centers that might resist central party control.[13] The taboo embodies the democratic centralist principle that Communist Party deputies are under strict party control. Communist parliamentary candidates have thus usually been worthy party apparatchiks whom the PCF has decided to reward with prestige and a sinecure, whereas Communist mayors, at least in the important bastions, have usually been hardworking, successful militants who are genuinely popular in their terrain.

To have overridden the traditional separation of deputy and mayoral functions is a significant indication of how desperate the PCF's electoral situation has become. The Communist Party seems to have few, if any, remaining strongholds at the department level. The cumulation of elected positions by mayor/deputies will encourage resistance by popular local leaders to the damaging orthodoxy of central party control. This trend is all the more likely since Communist mayors have run "Union of the Left" municipalities with the Socialists for ten years. These Communists know that their own positions, not to mention the future of the party itself, depend on left-wing unity, which the party's national leadership has done so much to discredit. These mayors have already been, and may become even more, the "breeding ground of internal opposition and *'renovateur'* activity in the PCF."[14]

The PCF electoral "upturn" in June 1988 must be measured against the all-time low of a month earlier and against the long-term curve of PCF decline. If the percentage rise seems considerable, it is exaggerated by the high general rate of abstention, which affected the PCF less than other parties. In gross terms, there were only 12,000 more Communist votes in metropolitan France than in the 1986 legislative elections. Moreover, in June most of the party's "stars"—e.g., Charles Fiterman, Maxime Gremetz, Paul Laurent, and Giselle Moreau—were defeated.

It is unlikely that the current parliament will last the full term of five years. Many observers think that the need to have a more solid basis for governance than the foreshortened Socialist opening to the center has thus far achieved will require elections again as early as 1989. However, President Mitterrand is constitutionally prohibited from dissolving parliament until a full year has elapsed since the previous dissolution. The next really important electoral test will be the municipal elections in March 1989. Once again the electoral law imposes majoritarian, i.e., Left and Right coalitions. The Socialists, who cannot hope to get 50 percent by themselves, will need the Communists, in a certain sense, almost as much as the Communists will need the Socialists. Leaders of both parties have already indicated that, in spite

[12]See Stéphane Courtois, "PCF: The Mayors to the Rescue," *Journal des Elections* (Paris), No. 3, June 1988, p. 14.

[13]The party has not forgotten the lesson of the "Doriot affair," in which Jacques Doriot, who had in the early 1930's become a deputy/mayor and Politburo member, turned coat and became leader of a fascist party.

[14]Courtois, loc. cit. For a recent examination of PCF "municipal communism," see Martin A. Schain, *French Communism and Local Power: Urban Politics and Political Change*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.

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of their fundamental hostility, they will make many bargains. Some Communist mayors have in any case already announced that they intend to lead left-wing unity coalitions. By thus jumping the gun, they have put pressure on the Marchais clique, as Courtois's analysis suggested was increasingly likely to happen.

It is worth noting that the conservative RPR and UDF parties will also make a certain number of distasteful, if expedient, alliances, in their case with National Front local organizations. As *Le Monde* pointed out, based on results of the presidential first ballot (in which Le Pen made such a strong showing), in 206 of the 333 cities with UDF/RPR governing coalitions, the coalitions would need Le Pen's support to win.[15] Le Pen's recent gaffes and a drop in support for the FN could, however, reduce this dependency sharply.

"Comrade Taboo" and Internal Opposition

The 1988 candidacy of Communist dissident Pierre Juquin, nicknamed "Comrade Taboo" by Marchais, raises interesting questions. How does this phenomenon fit in with other PCF internal opposition tendencies? Was his attempted "Red-Green" presidential campaign and two percent showing a success or a defeat for the *renovateur* tendency within the PCF? The facts are ambiguous enough to be interpreted many ways.

The son of an SNCF employee but also an École Normale graduate and an *agrégé* in German, Juquin joined the Communist Party in 1956. Parallel to his teaching career, he had a long career as a militant in the PCF apparatus. He became a full member of the Central Committee in 1967, having already been associated politically with Marchais for several years. He was a deputy in the short-lived 1967–68 parliament, and was again a deputy in 1973–81. He became a candidate member of the PCF Politburo in 1979 and a full member in 1982. At that time, because of his reassuring public style and agile mind, he was put in charge of the party's press and information service. Responsible for party propaganda, he often served as the party's spokesman.

Juquin was one of the most visible high-level enthusiasts of the "Union of the Left" and "Eurocommunist" tendencies of the 1970's. Early on, he had grave doubts about breaking off the alliance with the Socialists and was a private dissenter, we now know, from the "fortress PCF" line. However, defending orthodoxy in the name of party unity, he chose not to support internal party protests—such as that led by Henri Fiszbin and the dissident RCH group in the late 1970's and 1980's—against disruption of left-wing unity and shutdown of the Eurocommunist reforms. He apparently hoped a reformist line would win power inside the party, perhaps with himself at the head.

Juquin finally became a public dissident during the preparation for and the holding of the 25th PCF Congress in 1985. Subsequently, the Marchais clique progressively isolated him, eventually having him officially excluded from the party in October 1987. He began his independent presidential campaign immediately thereafter. His candidacy became the focus for small minority national and international left-wing movements. In France, it was supported by the unofficial and largely unorganized *renovateur* tendency within the PCF's own organization, as well as by the "old-new-left" Communist League (headed by Alain Krivine) and the Unified Socialist Party (PSU). Internationally, a statement of support was signed by seven deputies of the Italian Proletarian Democracy Party, by three members of the West German Green Party, and by Spanish, Dutch, Greek, and Danish deputies on the Left and far Left.

Juquin's electoral appeal did not rely on a program or even a coherent set of policies but rather on the fact that he provided a way for the rank and file to protest the failure of the official PCF leadership to initiate party reforms. Also, a successful Juquin campaign would reinforce within the PCF such "New Left" themes as ecology, womens' rights, and the reform of educational institutions and programs (themes that are also important to PCI policy today). Third, Juquin heavily emphasized the highly charged issue of immigrants' rights in France, making provocative proposals for automatic naturalization of all foreigners who ask for French nationality and can meet minimum residence requirements, the granting of dual nationality immediately to any foreign child born in France, and the right for foreigners to vote in *all* elections, after three, or at most five years of residence. (Mitterrand himself once suggested during the campaign that immigrant workers be allowed to vote in *local* elections. This was a controversial position, which some observers thought was maliciously conceived by the President as a way to help Le Pen and therefore damage Chirac's first-ballot score.)

Juquin's presidential campaign was run through unofficial "Juquin committees," which combined PCF dissidents both outside and inside the party with various other Left and New Left elements. Juquin did just a bit better than the now veteran far Left workers' candidate Arlette Laguiller, and he was clearly beaten by the ecology candidate. Juquin's candidacy appealed to a minority of a minority, so to speak, and never really coalesced dissatisfactions with the Marchais leadership.

[15] *Le Monde*, Apr. 28, 1988, cited in Hoffmann, loc. cit., p. 55.

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It could be said rightly that *both* Communist candidacies in 1988 were failures—their *combined* total of 9 percent was below the previous party low reached in 1986. Perhaps the remarkable point is that Juquin's unprecedented breaking of ranks (he was, after all, a former Politburo member with a significant personal following in the party) did not hurt the PCF more.

Yet, with minimal organization and money, Juquin did get nearly one-third as many votes as the official party candidate, who benefited from the PCF's still significant campaign resources. Juquin's failed dissenting campaign had had, as the French say, the merit of existing—it demonstrated that the official party apparatus had lost another measure of control over the various dimensions of French Communism.

Today, what the "ordinary Stalinist" Marchais clique cannot prevent, it has to accept. The democratic centralist ban on factions continues to exist within the PCF, but increasingly, various parts of the French Communist apparatus escape the ordinary Stalinist laws of self-censure. Dissent is endemic within the PCF, despite democratic centralism's attempts to shore up the old fortress. The mythology of the leadership's infallibility is dying in the PCF as it is almost everywhere in communist parties.

In 1980, Henri Fiszbin's *Les bouches s'ouvrent* chronicled and justified the wave of anti-leadership dissent following the Marchais clique's two-faced game that ruptured the Union of the Left in 1977–78. That internal party conflict, Fiszbin wrote perceptively:

illustrates what I would call the decline of consensus within the party. I knew a very long period during my service in the leadership when the militant core of the party, from the section level to the Central Committee, reacted spontaneously in a common reflex to important political events. From the cell secretary to the federal-level secretary, everyone knew more or less what the policies of the national party leadership would be. Today the trouble goes very deep. Be-

Pierre Juquin, dissident Communist candidate for the French presidency, campaigns in front of the Renault auto factory in April 1988; on the wall behind him, a poster of the French Communist Party's official candidate, André Lajoinie.

—Raymond Depardon/MAGNUM.

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tween the party's policy, set at the congresses, and the way leadership reacts to a given event—the margin of uncertainty keeps getting larger. A bizarre situation has thus been created: Communist militants are often surprised by the positions of their own party.[16]

This analysis, for all the ingenuousness of Fiszbin's own "long march" to clarity, is a decisive statement of what has happened inside the body of French Communism. Five years after Fiszbin's book, Pierre Juquin could not be stopped from uttering heresy from the rostrum of the 1985 Congress itself. As Edward Allen wrote in the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* "Juquin disparaged simplistic theories [i.e., those of the party leadership] that blamed the party's marginalization on a dearth of awareness in the masses and charged the outgoing leadership with self-serving amnesia of its own mistakes and responsibility. He framed the seminal questions facing the congress in dissident terms: 'Why and how was the leadership wrong? Who decides that it is now right?' "[17]

After the 1988 presidential election, the "Juquin committees" split up. One minority group, which tongue in cheek calls itself *les conviviaux décalés,* has called a meeting of small left-wing groups in November to form the sort of Red-Green movement announced by Juquin. The *renovateur* majority among the dissidents will also meet in the fall of 1988, as will yet another "Movement of Communist Renovators." Still another grouping of reformers has decided to seek independent direct relations with the Socialist Party.

Furthermore, in prominent official leadership positions inside the party one can distinguish those with "reconstructionist" leanings, sympathetic to those dissidents who have quit, and a newer group with "Gorbachevite" leanings, in which several well-known party leaders—including two former Communist government ministers from the 1981–84 Mauroy cabinets—are prominent. Both groups seem to be vaguely trying to wrest control from the Marchais clique. However, as one journalist put it, the General Secretariat, the Politburo, and the Central Committee are still mired in the "swamp of orthodoxy."[18] But orthodoxy's hold is less firm than ever, and has less reach in the organization.

The CGT and La Question Syndicale

Historically, the CGT has served as the Communist party's refuge when the latter was isolated in French political life. It has provided party members with a place to ride out storms and, by functioning as the famous "transmission belt," helped to provide the human basis for PCF recovery. Today, though Communists still dominate leadership positions, the CGT is less thoroughly controlled by the party than previously. Internal disagreement, as in the PCF, is now more open, and Socialist and other influences within the CGT seem at once more vocal and less instantly rejected. The CGT qua labor union is, after all, a powerful defensive force for workers' interests in many situations.

The CGT has in recent years suffered considerable reverses due both to the long-term decline of trade unionism in Europe and to the political reverses suffered by the PCF. Unions over much of Western Europe have been losing power for a decade. Unemployment in the region has basically doubled, and union membership has declined dramatically, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of employed workers. In addition, the very goals and rationales of unionism in Western Europe have been re-examined as part of a rethinking of the premises of the welfare state. The welfare state has not been abandoned, but its dimensions (i.e., what benefits workers are to expect) have been redefined and the mix of welfare goals has been enlarged in some ways and rebalanced in others.[19]

In France, all trade unions have suffered serious erosion of membership and influence. The three major trade union confederations—the CGT, the *Force Ouvrière* (FO), and the French Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions (CFDT)—have each lost a significant number of their dues-paying members. (Unemployment which was just over one million a decade ago is now projected to reach three million in the first years after the Single European Act becomes operational in

[16]Henri Fiszbin, *Les bouches s'ouvrent* (The Mouths Open), Paris, Grasset, 1980, p. 208.

[17]Edward A. Allen, "France," in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1986,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1986, p. 488. Allen cited the Juquin quote from *L'Humanité,* Jan. 10, 1985.

[18]On this and the above analysis see Olivier Biffaud, "French Communism in All Its Moods," *Le Monde,* July 27, 1988. Among the "Gorbachevites" the article classes Charles Fiterman, Guy Hermier, Anicet Le Pors, Lucien Sève, and Roger Martelli. The essence of PCF Gorbachevism is to maintain faith in the party while going full speed ahead with inner-party *glasnost'* and verbal *perestroyka.* The hope is that somehow renewal can be achieved while maintaining the basic ideas that the party is a necessary instrument of change in the country and that the party must have strict rules of internal operation. Since a PCF *perestroyka* could only be a set of policy promises the party is unlikely to have to carry out, the keypart of French Communist "Gorbachevism" is genuinely liberalizing internal reform, i.e., thoroughgoing *glasnost',* while retaining some sense of the party's supposedly unique role and some genuine political links with the Soviet Union and the CPSU. This Gorbachevite tendency in the official upper levels of the organization would ultimately have both to win inside the party and to make some accommodation with other internal opposition tendencies as well as with former party members to rebuild the organization. For the moment, therefore, the PCF's relation to Gorbachev's Soviet Union is filled with ambiguities.

[19]See, e.g., Pierre Rosanvallon, *La crise de l'état providence* (The Crisis of the Welfare State), Paris, Seuil, 1981.

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1992.) Indeed, the decline of the "big three" has been so sharp that the National Teachers Federation (FEN) has become a close fourth in general influence and membership.

The CGT probably has suffered the most (the FO the least). In 1983, the CGT claimed 1,622,075 members, of which 259,133 were retired workers (the organization's failure to publish any more recent data doubtless indicates that membership has continued to decline). Unofficially, observers estimate the CGT now has only about 800,000 dues-paying members, and a CGT source did admit that the federation had lost as much as 45 percent of the membership between 1976 and 1985.[20]

Recently, the CGT has scored a small upturn in its strength in professional elections, but the general tendency over the past ten years remains one of broad decline. The CGT's share of the vote in elections to enterprise committees has fallen from 34.4 percent in 1979, to 32.0 percent in 1981, to 28.5 percent in 1983, and 26.8 percent in 1987.[21]

The CGT was hurt by the demobilization of militancy in France after Mitterrand's 1981 election, and support for the "Union of the Left" government led to its further weakening. But the federation has also suffered because of its association in the public's mind with the Communist Party and also, to some extent, with the Soviet Union, which the French regarded very negatively in the years between the "Solzhenitsyn effect" of 1974–75 and Gorbachev's arrival. Moreover, the CGT did not share in the resurgence enjoyed by other union groups, particularly the "independent" FO, as a reac-

[20]In a controversial analysis, Pierre Rosanvallon argues that the decline in French unionism has been much more drastic than observers have estimated. According to him, the CGT in 1988 might have really had about 600,000 members; FO, about 400,000; CFDT, also 400,000; and FEN, 200,000. Rosanvallon claims that probably only about 9 percent of French workers are union members today, as opposed to 20 percent in the 1960's and 1970's. See *La Question Syndicale* (The Question of Trade Unionism), Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1988, pp. 13–19. *Le Monde*, Aug. 3, 1988, estimates that the CGT's dues collections will decline by about 10 percent in 1988, after a decline of 15 percent in 1987.

[21]*Le Monde*, July 23 and Aug. 3, 1988.

French coalminers, members of the General Labor Confederation (CGT), demonstrate in Paris on March 2, 1984, against plans of the government of Premier Laurent Fabius to close coal mines in the north and eastern districts of France.

—Jean Gaumy/MAGNUM.

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tion to the austerity programs of the Mauroy governments (1981–84). The CGT found itself in a self-contradictory position vis-à-vis the unpopular policies of a government that included a Communist minister of labor.

By mid-1989, all three major French unions are scheduled to name new leaders. André Bérgeron will be replaced as the head of the FO (which has challenged the CGT's dominant position among French unions in the 1980's), Edmond Maire will resign in November 1988 as head of the CFDT, and the Communist Henri Krasucki will be replaced as general secretary of the CGT.

Krasucki has served two terms as CGT leader, having replaced Georges Séguy in June 1982. He has been very much identified with Georges Marchais, and the public personalities of the two have had much in common. Krasucki used to be known as the "party's man" when he was second to Georges Seguy in the CGT. But as top leader, he has naturally developed his own interests, and lately it has been thought he was not as much a Marchais insider as before. For example, one rumor is that he has spoken too positively of Gorbachev's policies to suit Marchais's inner group.

A battle is developing over the succession, and it seems Krasucki may not be able to control the choice. His apparent *dauphin* François Duteil seems to be losing out to Louis Viannet who in May 1985 publicly disparaged the Krasucki-Duteil "line," alleging an overly complaisant CGT attitude toward the Socialist government of Laurent Fabius. A few months later Viannet launched a broad denunciation by the CGT of the Fabius government, in effect initiating a rupture with it and thus taking a step Krasucki had seemed hesitant to take.[22] Obviously, the Communist Party's problem of deciding on policy is carried over into the CGT. The Marchais leadership's hard-line instincts usually win out, but not before tactical zigging and zagging has produced much confusion among unionists who seem to prefer left-wing unity.

Neither Italianist nor Gorbachevite

The PCF has found itself beset from various directions in ways that threaten its own self-perception. Fifteen years ago the challenge was from the Italians and "Eurocommunism"; now it is from the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Italian connection. The French and Italian Communist Parties have often been treated as a single subject of analysis since they are the two major communist movements in Western Europe. Yet even when both parties were still unquestionably Soviet loyalists in 1949–56, there were fundamental sociological, political, and even ideological differences between them.[23] Indeed, relations between the two party leaderships have always been tenuous, both because of personal antipathy (in their time Maurice Thorez and Palmiro Togliatti were incompatible mastodons), and because of cultural conflicts between the dogmatically proletarian French Communists and their often bourgeois-intellectual Italian counterparts.

During the mid-1970's, the two parties arrived at a certain rapprochement in the various Eurocommunist negotiations, in which the Spanish Communist Party and certain smaller parties were also involved. But in hindsight, it appears that the Italian Communist Party was really the prototype and, in the end, the only significant and consistent example of "Eurocommunism." The French Communists, after several years of mixing liberal-sounding proto-*glasnost'* reforms with "Marchais-communism," in 1977–78 finally broke with the French Socialists and thus also with Eurocommunism, re-emphasizing Communist identity above any alliance.

The Italian Communists were understandably enraged over the PCF's break with the PS. For one thing, the French Communist return to sectarianism undermined the attempt to establish a broad, reformed West European communist movement, whose influence might extend into Eastern Europe as well. For another, the PCF's bad behavior indirectly damaged the PCI's strategy of gaining acceptance from the Christian Democrats as partners in a governing coalition in Italy—the enemies of Berlinger's "historic compromise" found the Italian Communists guilty by association.

Faced with the PCI's own electoral decline over several years and failure to surmount the so-called "K-factor" (i.e., the perception of others that it was illegitimate as a national governing party) in Italian politics, the PCI's leaders chose to make the PCF's big defeat in the 1986 French legislative elections the occasion for a public confrontation. Several Italian Communist spokesmen, including the top leaders of the PCI, portrayed the PCF's accelerated decline as a cautionary tale for all West European communist parties. They argued that the PCF's electoral disasters were "only the most visible symptom" of a fundamental crisis of the French Communist movement. The basic problem was, they said, the PCF's "extremist positions" and its "sectarianism." Particularly self-sabotaging was the French

[22]Ibid, Aug. 3, 1988.

[23]Of the many books on the French and Italian parties, it is still useful to consult Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Eds., *Communism in Italy and France*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975.

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party's miscalculation in betting that attacks on the Socialist Party would benefit the Communists.

The PCI maintained that the only hope for West European communist parties lay in a broad-based "Euroleft" coalition because, as the former PCI leader Alessandro Natta himself once put it, many people obviously "are still frightened" of communists and communism. Giorgio Napolitano, one of the PCI's Euroleft ideologists, drew the conclusion that "historical differences between Communists and Socialists" in Western Europe were "no longer sustainable" politically.

The French Communists naturally rejected the criticisms by the Italian Communists, first by taking refuge in the sacred and hypocritical communist principle of non-interference in another party's affairs. (The Italians replied, not unreasonably, that the French situation already affected the Italian situation.) More important, the French Communists argued that the Italians were putting "Communist identity itself" into question (also not an unreasonable reply, because that is exactly what the Italian Communists are doing). The PCF has asserted that the PCI is running the risk of changing the PCI from a revolutionary communist party (whatever that now meant, the French Communists themselves cannot explain) into a "simple modern reformist party." Gerardo Chiaromonte, an Italian Communist leader, replied that if the PCI were to follow the PCF's example it would soon disappear.[24]

The PCF has not, it is clear, substantiated its temporary "Italianist" poses of the 1970's, and the PCI, following its "Euroleft" strategy, has linked up with the West European social democratic parties wherever possible—for example, in the European Parliament, where it has little to do with the PCF's Euro-deputies. Yet the PCI's own decline—despite reforming and, one could even say, largely de-communizing itself—hints that communism, so long as it is still called "communism," may have only a marginal future in West European political life.[25]

The Soviet connection. Mikhail Gorbachev has had the PCF's public endorsement from the beginning. Since 1985, real reformers within the PCF have been hoping for the best in the Soviet Union while the Marchais clique, which is unquestionably "Brezhnevite,"[26] has clung to the idea that Gorbachev was really trying only to make the Soviet system work better and to make communism less of an anathema.

However, the radicalization of Gorbachev's program in 1987–88 forced both groups to re-evaluate their positions. The Marchais group was suddenly faced with the question of how to respond to a Soviet line that had suddenly outflanked French communism, putting into a new perspective not only the orthodox French party center, but several kinds of internal reform tendencies as well. And Gorbachev's proposals were much bolder than what even some of the French Communist reformers had been talking about.

The Marchais group has tried to take advantage of the PCF's domestic political marginality in at least one way. Since the party will never have occasion to undertake anything like the Gorbachev *perestroyka* reforms (which are genuinely threatening to some elites in power in Eastern Europe), it can enthusiastically, even if hypocritically, endorse them. This Marchais did, for example, at the December 1987 PCF Congress, where he endorsed Gorbachev's policies—including some, such as independence of trade unions, electoral reforms inside and outside the party, etc., to which he has in the past given only the merest lip service—and termed them "proof of socialism's superiority." They were, he claimed, exactly the sort of thing that was implied all along in the "socialism in French colors" slogan that the PCF has pushed for a decade. He concluded with false bravado: "It is because this is our conception of socialism that we have pronounced such an irrevocable condemnation of that monstrous perversion of socialism which was Stalinism."[27]

Conceivably, Gorbachev's successes—not only in domestic reform but also in East/West relations and in solving regional conflicts—could marginally benefit the Communist Party in France, by improving the French public opinion's very negative image of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Marchais's speech at the 26th PCF Congress tried to exult over the new life in international communism:

Only a few years, even a few months, ago in the eyes of millions of people—and, as we well know, of nearly all the French—socialism seemed to have lost the historical initiative. The most obscurantist Reaganite viewpoints were triumphant. All these givens are now overturned.[28]

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[24]For some details on the PCI-PCF polemics, see the "Introduction" to the West European section by Dennis Bark, and the entry on "France" by Edward A. Allen, in the 1987 *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*.

[25]See Tiersky, op. cit.

[26]Continued stagnation in the CPSU under Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko meant little interference or counter-example as Marchais sought to stamp down dissent within the PCF, first by experimenting unskillfully with government participation and then by returning to rough attacks on the Socialists.

[27]For Marchais's report, see *Cahiers du communisme*, December 1987-January 1988, p. 22.

[28]Ibid.

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Despite these efforts by the PCF inner group to wrap itself in Gorbachev's mantle, it is far from clear that Marchais is Gorbachev's favorite French Communist. To be sure, some traditional inter-party rituals are being maintained. Thus, Gorbachev has always met with Marchais on his trips to France, and Marchais's visit to Moscow in May 1987 was, besides serving as an occasion to introduce Lajoinie to Soviet officials, a traditional nod to Communist priority, in which the PCF general secretary visits Moscow just prior to the visit of a French head of government or state (Jacques Chirac was to arrive in Moscow shortly thereafter).

However, one gets the impression that the PCF/CPSU connection is not of much practical significance these days. For one thing, Soviet attempts to revive the international Communist movement, even on a new basis of no Moscow line, have not been successful. And Gorbachev, even more than his predecessors, understands that the Soviet state and the CPSU have little to gain from making puppets of weak communist parties in strong states with whose governments the USSR needs to reach important agreements.

Moreover, the disastrous PCF presidential showing in 1988 brought some unusual public Soviet "Gorbachevite" criticism of the French Communists. After the first ballot, a well-known *Izvestiya* journalist, Aleksandr Bovin, wrote that Lajoinie's very weak score showed the French Communist Party had not begun seriously to reform itself:

The communists [in Western Europe]—and this is true not only of the PCF—don't have adequate programs or slogans which might attract large sectors of the population, the working class first of all. Communist strategy and tactics are much behind the new conditions created by the restructuring of capitalism. . . .[29]

The French Communists replied sharply to this attack, which the leadership took seriously as a more or less official Soviet statement. Claude Cabanes, a chief *L'Humanité* editorialist, provocatively invoked the self-criticism of Soviet bloc countries that had been uttered by Anatoliy Dobrynin at a recent Prague meeting of communist parties that discussed new initiatives in the international communist movement.[30] Dobrynin was quoted as saying that "socialism . . . has not yet in fact entirely revealed its advantages, has not yet given the Western masses a convincing example of a thorough democratization of society and of a radical and priority solution of economic problems." Cabanes said that the French Communists were "especially well-placed" to agree with Dobrynin's criticism, having themselves been, since the 1970's, on the firing line of the "ideological war" waged in:

capitalist countries in the name of "human rights." [The French Communists] have stood their ground, refusing to follow the pack. They have suffered many repercussions as a consequence. And they did not await Leonid Brezhnev's demise and the recent changes in the Soviet Union before stating their opinions concerning the serious problems assailing the socialist countries and the major harm resulting to the struggle of all communists.[31]

Citing the various past criticisms of the Soviet Union by the French Communists (limited though they have been), Cabanes concluded that Soviet deficiencies—"which [the Soviets] themselves now admit"—were partly responsible for holding back reform in other parties. Altogether, said Cabanes, the journalist Bovin seemed to be "totally ignorant" of the French situation. And he added that in the past, Soviet media often have given the Soviet public an overly rosy picture of French society, one that was "more respectful of the diplomatic desires of [the USSR] than of the truth." Noting that Bovin had complimented President Mitterrand's "Cartesian-clear thinking" in the very *L'Humanité* editorial that criticized the PCF, Cabanes asked: "Who is this article supposed to please?" Indeed . . . .

From this incident one can discern nuances in the Marchais group's current attitude toward the Soviet Union and in its still-dominant philo-Sovietism. It is blaming the CPSU's Brezhnevite past for much of the PCF's stagnation (i.e., turning the Gorbachev line back against Soviet criticisms of French Communism's laggardness). It is also enthusiastically endorsing *perestroyka* while emphasizing that the French Communists had years before begun to reappraise the Soviet model and to declare their independence from Moscow. (Both points are correct, so far as they go, the second more

[29]Cited in *L'Humanité*, May 4, 1988. Bovin is, among other things, the author of a brochure called *L'impératif du siècle nucléaire*, (The Imperative of the Nuclear Era), Moscow, *Novosti*, 1986. There were also unconfirmed rumors of some sort of "Gorbachevite" Soviet contact with Pierre Juquin early on in the internal PCF struggle over naming a presidential candidate.

[30]Representatives of 93 communist, workers', and revolutionary-democratic parties met in the Czechoslovak capital on April 12–15, 1988, to mark the 30th anniversary of the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. Dobrynin's address was carried by Prague Domestic Service in Czech, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC), Apr. 14, 1988, pp. 15–16. The Italian Communists seized on the occasion to announce their resignation from the journal's membership. See *World Marxist Review*, June 1988, pp. 5–6, which lists the attending parties (the PCI was not listed).

[31]See the Cabanes editorial in *L'Humanité*, May 4, 1988.

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than the first.) The PCF reply to *Izvestiya* also indicated that the French Communists are fully aware that the Soviets are now permanently more interested in dealing with *any* French government than with a marginalized, uninspired party of opposition.

Moscow's historical preference for dealing with conservative French governments has been widened to include the Socialists in large part because the PCF has demonstrated its incapacity to influence Mitterrand's domestic policy or, more important, his pro-NATO foreign policy, either while the Communists were part of the Mitterrand government or since. The PCF also failed to affect even marginally the "cohabitationist" Mitterrand-Chirac struggles of 1986–88. Thus, except insofar as French Communist influence plays a role in social struggles (through the CGT) or in the French peace movements (not of great consequence, it was seen, during the Euromissile crisis), Moscow is likely to be disinheriting this eldest daughter of the old church.

Signatories of the Common Program at a March 13, 1978, press conference, from left to right: Georges Marchais of the French Communist Party, François Mitterrand of the Socialist Party, and Robert Fabre of the Left Radicals.

—Gamma/Liaison.

The Face of French Communism Today

Why has the PCF declined so badly? The Communists reject the standard analyses of various observers: that social change has dried up the bases of Communist support; that French opinion has condemned the old peacenik view of the Soviet Union; that French intellectuals have outgrown their dreamy conception of socialism as a veritable transformation of human relations. The current French Communist "line" instead emphasizes four reasons for what it characterizes primarily as an "electoral" decline.

- The mass media are unfair to the PCF. The Communists are demonized and caricatured, and the party is wrongly equated with the National Front: communism and racism tend to be lumped together as equivalent extremisms.
- The Communist Party has been ravaged by "the dictatorship of the opinion polls" in electoral campaigns. Masses of politically "immature" Communist voters have been lost to the Socialist argument concerning the "useful vote," reinforced by the majoritarian principle in French electoral law.
- The "Common Program" and the "Union of the Left" alliance were programmatic and strategic mistakes. The Common Program (signed with the Socialist Party in 1972 and abandoned in the negotiations of 1977) was implicitly the basis for Mitterrand's "110 Proposals" of the 1981 campaign, and of the Communist justification for joining the government. Communist voters came to believe that the Program and the "110 Proposals" offered solutions to all problems, through measures such as nationalization and the social welfare and workplace laws. In addition, great numbers of Communist voters became accustomed to voting for Mitterrand as the natural leader of left-wing unity.
- The Communists paid a high price for their government service in 1981–84. "We should have left in 1982," they now say, when the first "pause" was declared in the midst of a financial runaway, and when Mitterrand, Mauroy, and Jacques Delors initiated the first tentative steps in the shift from Keynesian deficit-spending to austerity.

Mitterrand has certainly damaged French Communism. He has won the audacious wager he announced to the Socialist International in 1973, justifying signing the Common Program, i.e., that through the "Union of the Left" the Socialists could win three million of the PCF's five million votes.

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Electorally, the two most effective French anti-Communists have been General de Gaulle and Mitterrand. De Gaulle took 20 percent of the Communist electorate on his return to power in 1958; Mitterrand has taken half, and more, of what was left. Yet it is always superficial to impute significant long-term changes in political sociology to great leaders. Leaders require a situation, and their successes and failures will endure or not depending on a context beyond their own making.

Fifteen years ago in a book on French Communism, I suggested that one could think of the PCF as a political/cultural/social organization built on its four distinctive "faces," or roles: as a political vanguard, as a counter-society, as a government party, and as a tribune for the disadvantaged—the last a combination of protest party and, mainly through the CGT, genuine defender of the interests of workers. By seeing the simultaneous complexity, the internal supports and contradictions of the whole, I argued, one could understand both the lines of strength and weakness and the genuineness and pretense of the PCF without resorting to one or another caricature of the party fixed in one or another role, according to one's preconceptions or political premises.[32] The French Communist Party was neither simply a two-faced insurrectionary party *in maschera,* nor a satisfied counter-power in "splendid isolation," nor a somewhat misunderstood peoples' tribune with a heart of gold under a tough exterior.

Looking back, one can see that the years 1945–58 constituted a kind of golden age of French Communism. It was a time when great organizational success combined with the satisfactions of deep political commitments at a time of ideological cold war, when being in "splendid isolation" in society was more than compensated for by the partisan warmth of close comradeship. "It's good," Maurice Thorez would say to crashing applause, "to be together." (These sentiments of the 1950's were recently recalled by Henri Fiszbin, Louis Althusser, Philippe Robrieux and others, in their memoirs to make the point that the party today lacks comradeship.)[33] In this period, the French Communist movement—built during the Popular Front, the Resistance, and the Liberation epochs—had reached across the nation, socially and territorially, even if, as advertised, workers and working-class families constituted the movement's core.[34]

French political sociologists today see the beginnings of turbulence for the PCF in the late 1950's or early 1960's. Close analysis of this period reveals what certain keen observers guessed at the time—that the movement had already started to have difficulty reproducing its levels of membership and its voting and mobilization support from year to year.[35] The shocks arising from May 1968 produced contradictory tendencies, some of them damaging to the PCF and the French Left generally, although the PCF did not suffer visibly.

Indeed, 1974 seems to be the moment when the Communists had the best image in French public opinion polls: the Common Program had been signed amid popular left-wing enthusiasm in 1972; Mitterrand had run a good race as the joint left-wing presidential candidate against Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1974; and the Communist Party, near or at its membership zenith, had begun its flirtation with Eurocommunism, openly criticizing certain Soviet "mistakes" and making a declaration of independence in party decision-making. In 1974, equal parts of a SOFRES public opinion sample had a "good" or a "bad" opinion of the PCF—40 percent. By 1985, however, the split was 70 percent negative and only 20 percent positive.[36]

Jean Ranger has estimated the high point of PCF membership at about 450,000 genuine members in 1978.[37] Included in this count are people who not only had party cards but had some material link with the organization—that is, they paid dues at least irregularly and attended some party meetings. After 1978, membership began to decline as members quit in droves in reaction to the Marchais leadership's continuation of the wholesale anti-Socialist campaign begun in 1977. The departure of these "Union of the Left" Communists in 1978–81 prepared the way for them to vote for Mitterrand in the 1981 presidential election, and thus to slip permanently out of PCF control, announcing the Communist electoral catastrophe of the 1980's.

An analysis of Communist voters through 1988 (i.e., through the first ballot of the parliamentary elections) shows that the PCF has been declining in *all* categories of the population, except for two: people over 65 years of age, and those classified sociologically as "inactive," namely, those retired or not working. Remarkably, the PCF—like, but even more than, the PCI—has become the party of old people and nostalgics. Furthermore, this aging of the party's electorate correlates well

[32]Ronald Tiersky, *French Communism, 1920–1972,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1974. See also the important works cited therein by Professors Annie Kriegel and George Lavau.

[33]See, e.g., Fiszbin, op. cit.

[34]See Stéphane Courtois, "Working-Class Identity, Communist Identity: The Construction and Deconstruction of French Communism," in *Communisme,* Nos. 15–16, 1987, esp. pp. 68–69.

[35]See, e.g., Jean Ranger, "The Decline of the French Communist Party," *Revue Française de Science Politique* (Paris), February 1986, pp. 46–63.

[36]Ibid.; and see also Gérard Le Gall, "X-Ray of the PCF: A Double Split with the Society and the Sympathizers," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire* (Paris), January-February, 1985.

[37]Ranger, loc. cit., p. 57.

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with the geography of Communist decline in the most economically dynamic cities and regions.[38] (A very recent and as yet unexplained marginal growth has, however, occurred in the PCF's Youth Movement).

Where does all this leave the deployment and the role structure of the French Communist Party?

Political vanguard role. The role of the French Communist Party as a revolutionary vanguard had consistent validity from the 1920's through the 1950's. In the early years, the French Communists were a small but feared and growing power in French politics, a power whose links with the Comintern and the Soviet Union were convincing evidence that the PCF was indeed a revolutionary organization that would not hesitate to take power if the chance arose. In the postwar golden-age decade, cold war fears of the Soviet threat gave credibility to the PCF's revolutionary rhetoric, although some observers had by then begun to see the PCF as a bureaucratized drone of Soviet foreign policy that had lost the capacity to think strategically for itself. In the 1960's and 1970's, the idea of a Communist seizure of power lost credibility, and by the 1980's, opinion polls no longer even asked the old question: "If the Communist Party found a good situation, do you think it would try to seize power?"

Gradually in the 1950's, the PCF's strategy for winning power became the fuzzy idea that as Soviet socialism proved its superiority over capitalism, the French Communist Party would somehow be ushered into power, probably through the "peaceful transition to socialism" strategy of temporary alliance with other parties, but possibly in a more radical crisis setting, should the "movement of the masses" so decide. Vague, but it seems to have dawned only slowly on the French Communist leaders, who desperately wanted to believe otherwise, that the division of Europe, NATO, and the true nature of Soviet policy had, strategically speaking, left them in the lurch.

The PCF's dependence on a supposedly nascent Soviet superiority was one premise of the "peaceful transition to socialism" strategy. But in the 1970's, Soviet domestic stagnation was masked only by the USSR's military buildup and Third World expansion. The image of the Soviet Union in French opinion turned sharply negative during these years, as a result, we have noted, of the so-called "Solzhenitsyn effect," the Brezhnev government's adventurism, and other factors. Table 3 shows the measured decline in Soviet prestige.

More striking even than the degradation of the Soviet image in French opinion generally is the worsening of this image among French Communist sympathizers. In 1982, only 35 percent of them had a favorable impression of the Soviet Union, as opposed to 62 percent in 1972. Of Communist voters in 1972, only 11 percent had a negative judgment of the Soviet system; in 1982, 35 percent expressed negative opinions. Obviously the "Solzhenitsyn effect," the invasion of Afghanistan, the crackdown in Poland, Soviet proxy imperialism in Angola and Mozambique, etc., damaged Soviet prestige in France, particularly among that "third-force" tendency in French opinion that had imagined the USSR to be a force for peace in world politics, as opposed to an American capitalism that was believed to be necessarily imperialistic and bellicose. The sharpest change occurred among Socialist Party sympathizers: 40 percent had a favorable opinion of the Soviet system in 1972; in 1982, only 15 percent did. Their negative opinion level jumped from 34 to 67 percent in the same time period, a complete reversal.[39]

Table 3: Shifting French Attitudes on Socialism, 1972–82

Responses (in percent) to the question: If we draw up the balance sheet of socialism as it functions in the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, do you think it is rather positive or negative?

	1972	1980	1982
Rather positive	28	14	11
Rather negative	43	59	69
No opinion	29	27	20
	100	100	100

SOURCE: *SOFRES, Opinion Publique 1984,* pp. 247–80.

In more recent polling (1985 and 1986), two predictable changes are found. The Soviet Union's desire for peace is less contested with Gorbachev as its leader, and Gorbachev's own image is much better than that of his predecessors' (the least one could expect!). Still, 69 percent of the sample offered a negative judgment of the "global Soviet balance sheet" (an important reference to a Marchais-communism doctrine that the USSR, despite all its "errors," had a "globally positive balance sheet"); and only 12 percent had a favorable judgment. Among French Communist sympathizers, 40 percent had positive opinions, and 38 percent had negative opinions. The Soviet Union's image in French opinion is, in other words, far from supportive of the PCF's wish to be known as a party which could change

[38]See a table for the years 1974–84 in ibid., p. 50.

[39]*SOFRES, Opinion Publique 1984,* pp. 247–78. In a 1983 poll, the question was asked: "If you had to leave France, which country would you like to live in?" Of the French Communist sympathizers, 16 percent said the United States, 24 percent said Italy, and 13 percent said the Soviet Union.

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Table 4: Shifting French Opinion on the Capacity of the PCF to Fulfill Government Functions

Percent citing PCF as party most capable of:

	1977	1979	1983	1985
Reducing inequalities	18	18	10	8
Fighting unemployment		15	8	7
Defending the interests of people like you	16	16	9	6
Making the changes and reforms the French want	14	13	6	5
Protecting public freedoms	10	11	6	4
Managing the French economy well	9	11	5	3
Assuring French national security	8	10	4	3

SOURCE: *SOFRES: Opinion Publique 1986*, pp. 47–48.

French society in a useful way.

This all indicates a simple conclusion. The PCF's "vanguard" role is a pretense meaningful only to a tiny minority of the truest believers, a small historical rear guard that continues to think that history somehow will still return the Communists to center stage.

Government party role. The government party role of the Communist Party is a more complex story. In *French Communism, 1920–1972,* it was possible to synthesize several monographs which showed that French Communist local governments were often efficient and perceived to be so by local populations. However, in recent years, the old image of Communists as energetic providers of social services has been somewhat cracked by problems with immigrant populations, by *l'usure du pouvoir* common to all long-governing parties, and by certain cases of electoral fraud. In the 1983 elections, the number of PCF local governments—which had increased sharply in the 1970's, especially in coalitions with the Socialist Party—declined. They are expected to be cut again sharply in the 1989 elections, despite probable "Union of the Left" local alliances.

In terms of governing at the national level, the PCF was ill-served by its 1981–84 participation in the Mauroy cabinets. Not only did the Communists have to shoulder part of the blame for the government's failures; they never enjoyed more than the most minimal advantages that power is supposed to bring. The results of four opinion polls, taken in 1977–85, illustrate that French public opinion less and less considers the PCF capable of serving usefully as a government party (see Table 4).

The Communists seem to have fallen in public esteem by going into the government, fallen further while inside, then fallen yet more on getting out! This accumulation of political errors indicates a sclerotic leadership basically out of touch with political reality, a case of "creeping Brezhnevism."

The tribune role. The PCF is also failing to perform its tribune role effectively. In recent years, the party has lost a considerable part of its "tribune" clientele—those individuals who are disadvantaged or threatened in society. Some voters who would normally have been with the PCF or some other leftist alternative party, in the late 1970's and early 1980's moved to the Socialists, who were speaking out for various single-issue and minority causes such as ecology, womens' rights, and opposition to racism. Other protest voters have gone over to the racist National Front, attracted by Le Pen's demagoguery against immigrant workers supposedly taking French jobs and immigrant families living free on French social security benefits.

Recently, the Communists have been obliged to recognize that immigrant workers have become very important to the CGT and even to the party itself, even though the party has traditionally been chauvinist (especially anti-German) and racist (anti-Semitic and anti-Arab) despite its internationalist and humanist claims. The more the CGT and PCF become the union and party *des immigrés,* the more Le Pen's success with previously Communist voters becomes a new verification of the classic argument that a significant minority (perhaps one-fourth) of the PCF's old 20 percent share in the vote was basically a protest vote.

Georges Marchais's Central Committee speech of June 1988 in fact underlined the PCF leadership's awareness on this point:

[The 26th Congress's strategy] establishes a permanent link between unity in action to defend ourselves and unity in action for change. "Our protest role," we emphasized, is in our view no less "worthy" than our "proposing" role. How could this fail to be the case? There is no real desire for change which is not fueled by discontent, anger, and revolt against injustice. . . .[40]

[40]See *L'Humanité,* June 28, 1988.

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The Communist attempt to recapture the protest vote (which Le Pen's recent horrific *faux pas*—such as claiming that the Nazi death camps were just "a detail" of World War II and so on—may facilitate) is one aspect of the PCF's fight against "the sliding of French society to the right," which has, according to the Communists, been going on since the beginning of Mitterrand's presidency. But the race issue is a particularly difficult one, and the Communists will find it hard to keep the usual two irons in the fire. Their old reputation limits their gains among immigrants, while their partial success, above all in getting immigrant workers to join the CGT, puts off the return of some former "French-French" PCF voters who have gone over to Le Pen.

Counter-society role. Finally we arrive at the issue of the decline of the famous French Communist counter-society, first analyzed in depth by Annie Kriegel.[41] The counter-society rested on a workerist core, which supplied both the cultural milieu in which French communism flourished most successfully and the militants who became the cadres and the apparatchiks of the Communist Party's apparatus. Here we are talking about the fate of French Communism itself.

The resilience of the PCF for decades in French politics derived from the fact that French Communism was a true political and cultural community. The party was the political arm of a mass movement of militant enthusiasm. Although French Communism certainly received its original impulse from the radiation of Bolshevik influence, and was long controlled by its own fealty to the Soviet Union, it was simultaneously a genuinely national phenomenon, a counter-culture of Soviet-thinking French people whose dual loyalty constituted the last great partisan challenge to the legitimacy of the French republican system.

A group of researchers under the direction of Stéphane Courtois and Annie Kriegel recently published, in the journal *Communisme,* a series of analyses of the evaporation of French Communism's dogmatically proletarian, *ouvrièriste* identity.[42] Courtois points out that while observers for years saw signs of instability in the PCF's political sociology, the actual disastrous decline began only in 1981. Some part of the PCF's decline, he states, has been due to strictly political and ideological factors, which we have already analyzed: a Socialist challenge largely underestimated in 1962–75; the "Union of the Left" strategy itself, which is appropriate for majority voting but where the gains, coming from the center, are likely to disadvantage the more extreme partner; the presidential elections' emphasis on the individual candidate's attractiveness rather than on party charisma or program; the collapse of the Soviet Union's prestige in French political opinion in the 1970's—all of which are in some sense challenges unmet or errors committed by the "Marchais clan."

But the decline of French Communism must also be understood, in Courtois's opinion, as the product of deeper problems that affect all the West European communist parties to a greater or lesser extent. These factors Courtois sums up as a "crisis—perhaps definitive—of the heart of the French Communist phenomenon, that is to say, communism's working class identity."[43]

Courtois focuses on three key moments when the PCF's traditional base was eroded. First, in the early 1960's, there appeared a growing gap between French Communism's principal working-class social bases (old smokestack industrial cities and industrial suburbs, especially around Paris) and the general movement of a modernizing society toward service industries, cultural individualism, modern comforts, leisure time and new educational tracks for professional and social advancement. Courtois argues that a large part of the working class refused a social advancement that would have meant leaving behind one's class and accepting geographical mobility, and chose instead professional promotion, which is to say greater rooting in the working class socially and territorially.[44]

This trend, when combined with a working class strategy of leaving school after the first diploma (the CAP), produced a cultural gap between working class communities and the rest of French society. While most sectors of French society prospered in the 1960's boom years, the old working class, in relative social isolation, paradoxically encountered economic crisis and social handicaps. The generalization of television and the automobile, which created leisure and mobility, also weakened the old sociability of the Communist neighborhood or suburb. The wide spread of lower-income (HLM) housing in these years also reinforced an emphasis on nuclear family life as opposed to collective sociability and solidarity.

Second, the economic recession which hit France hard in 1974–75, a year after most other advanced economies, accentuated these tendencies. The classic Communist industrial worker, hit often by dequalifi-

[41]Annie Kriegel, *Les communistes françaises* (The French Communists), Paris, Seuil, 1968, now in its 4th edition.

[42]See *Communisme,* Nos. 15–16, 1987, a special issue called *Sociétés ouvrières et communisme française* (Working Class Communities and French Communism).

[43]See Courtois, "Working-Class Identity, Communist Identity: The Construction and Deconstruction of French Communism," loc. cit., p. 69.

[44]Ibid., p. 70.

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cation or unemployment, was attacked in his very professional identity—that part of his personality and personal culture which linked him with pride to the Communist sub-culture. In this same sense, entire regions—Lorraine, Seine-Saint-Denis, the North and Pas-de-Calais—were shaken in their social psychology, destabilizing long-established "Communist eco-systems," as Courtois puts it.[45]

And finally, the *children* of the classic French Communist generations of the 1930's through the 1960's more and more began to reject life in the counter-society. They rejected the culture of collective solidarity in favor of personal strategies, and, contrary to their parents, chose social mobility against the older generation's preference for professional qualification.

The French Communist Party in the 1960's and 1970's tried to straddle both its old militant communities and a new generation whose attitudes had much to do with bringing on the events of May 1968. During the 1970's, the issue was decided when the Eurocommunist flirtation and the "Union of the Left" were abandoned by a party leadership that decided to head back politically into the fortress and socially into that "splendid isolation" they thought of as Communist identity. The leaders were in fact condemning the party not only politically, but also sociologically. Yet, as Courtois says, it could be added, though not in justification, that they were merely showing themselves incapable of "fostering any other identity but that which they had always known themselves, and which had provided for their own upward mobility."[46]

Communism, absent some unforeseeable event or person, will continue to be a fading face on the French political scene.

[45]Ibid., p. 71.
[46]Ibid., p. 72.

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Leadership Change and Crisis in Hungary

George Schöpflin, Rudolf Tőkés, and Iván Völgyes

On May 22, 1988, a remarkable event occurred in the political life of the ruling Hungarian communist system: János Kádár, leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP) for more than 31 years, and his closest supporters were removed from office by the top echelon of his own party in an abrupt but peaceful transition of power. Watching the pained expression on Kádár's face as he gloomily announced the news to a stunned TV audience, one had the feeling that the party conference that accomplished this feat was perhaps one of the most momentous events in the last three decades of Hungarian political life.

The succession came in the midst of what was widely perceived to be an impending crisis, a crisis that Kádár, at the age of 76, seemed incapable of managing. Although much of the criticism (official and unofficial) centered on the sad state of the Hungarian economy, the pathology of Hungarian life had, as we shall see, equally important political and social ramifications.

The nonviolent nature of the Hungarian succession has attracted the attention of many observers, who see a promise of reform under the new leadership. The purpose of this article is to assess how real the new leadership's prospects are for solving Hungary's pressing problems. In doing so, it will examine the crisis setting in which the change in leadership occurred; explore the development and culmination of what appears to have been a coup undertaken by a coalition of radical reformers, the political apparat, and party intellectuals; and examine the political agenda and policies of the successor leadership during its first 100 days.

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The Crisis

In the waning years of the Kádár era, Hungary faced a broad set of critical economic, social, moral-ethical, and, ultimately, political problems, as failure of Kádár's consumerism put in question the whole communist system. Christian Schmidt-Häuer put it succinctly: "First there is no goulash, and then no Marx either?"[1]

Economic problems. Hungary's economic difficulties stem from two distinct sources: systemic failures and ill-advised policies. The Hungarian economy, burdened by centralized planning and ideologically motivated resource allocations that favor labor-intensive heavy industry, as well as by close ties to the USSR and other socialist countries through the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), has proven incapable of competing in the modern economic world. Even with an unusually active private sector, the mixed Hungarian economy has been unable to produce goods and offer services of sufficient quality and quantity to

[1] *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), May 26, 1988.

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On the rostrum at the May 1988 conference of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party: from left to right, György Aczél, Károly Grósz, András Gyenes, and János Kádár. The slogan in the back reads: "With the Party's Leadership, We Pursue Democracy and Reforms on the Road to Socialism."

—Alain Keler/Gamma-Liaison.

satisfy expanded export requirements and domestic demand. In 1987, some 200 billion out of a total state budget of 700 billion forints went to support exports and subsidize products sold at a deficit.[2]

Hungary's dependence on Soviet raw materials and energy resources plus the imperatives of geopolitics have dictated that the country be part of the CEMA organizational structure. Soviet demand in return for products that are already outmoded when compared to similar Western goods and that are traded at prices set on the basis of five-year moving averages has compelled Hungary to maintain inefficient, out-of-date industries and inhibited it from producing advanced goods at world market prices. Despite many claims to the contrary, current patterns of integration within CEMA lead Hungary's economy away from technological advancement, whether through the import of the latest high technology or through the rapid sharing in scientific breakthroughs.[3] They also reportedly result in the conversion of dollar imports into transferable ruble exports at a rate that is highly unfavorable to Hungary.[4] Finally, Hungarian investments in Soviet infrastructure (e.g., in the Yamburg oil fields) or Soviet-designed developmental projects are not cost-efficient and allegedly serve as instruments of Soviet economic exploitation.[5]

The unreliability of economic statistics is also a severe systemic problem. As one observer put it, statistics in Hungary and other socialist states tend to be "forgeries, politically desired, consciously [ordered] from above."[6] Moreover, the economic structure is totally skewed by an artificial price structure, which distorts even the prices charged in the unofficial second economy. Finally, there is the ever-present borrowing from one sector to make up scarcities in another, i.e., "robbing Peter to pay Paul."[7]

There also have been glaring errors of economic policy. The decisions to import about one-half of Hungary's energy requirements for hard currency and to finance growth and to support an inflated level of living

[2]"Back to the Foundations!" *Heti Világgazdaság* (Budapest), May 14, 1988.

[3]Zsuzsa Gál, "We Must Integrate with the Whole of the World Economy," *Népszabadság* (Budapest), July 7, 1988.

[4]Mária Petschnig, "The Limits of Adaptation of Our Economy," *Valóság* (Budapest), No. 8, 1987, p. 20.

[5]Gál, loc. cit.

[6]László Lengyel, "Diary and Critique," *Valóság*, No. 9, 1984, p. 91.

[7]János Kornai discusses what he call Hungary's "economy of scarcity" in *A hiány* (Scarcity), Budapest, Kösgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1980.

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from Western loans resulted in a doubling of the country's net foreign debt—from $US6 billion to $US12 billion—between 1981 and 1988, raising Hungary's per capita debt to the highest level among the socialist states. As a result, between 65 and 70 percent of convertible export earnings must be spent on debt service; the percentage is expected to rise to more than 80 percent by 1990.[8]

As a result of the debt burden and failure to invest in productive sectors, Hungary's growth rate dropped to 1 percent in 1985 and may well have turned negative by 1988. With inflation running at anywhere from the officially admitted 17 percent to a more likely 25–30 percent, the real purchasing power of the citizenry has been drastically declining since 1985.[9]

To offset budget pressures, Hungary introduced on January 1, 1988, the most restrictive personal-income and value-added taxes to be found in any of the socialist states. Yet, by mid-1988, the deficit in the state budget already exceeded that anticipated for the entire year. Although the reasons advanced for that deficit all sound plausible—e.g., the continued growth of price supports for ruble exports and delays in collecting the income tax—the reality of Hungary's economic crisis is clear.[10] Hungarian economists are in surprising agreement that inefficient industries produce non-competitive goods, whole sectors remain unproductive, price-support activities foster production inefficiency, and the price of labor is so static that there are no real incentives to use it efficiently in the state economy.[11]

In an on-again-off-again pattern beginning in 1968, Hungary's communist authorities have attempted to alleviate the country's economic situation through a degree of reliance on private enterprise that has been unparalleled elsewhere in the socialist camp. This has included the privatizing of significant parts of agriculture, the service industries, and retail trade; the establishment of small-scale economic cooperatives; the opening of a limited bond market; the altering of the traditional socialist ownership categories through the integration of private and state/public productive organizations; and the tolerance of a price structure for a wide range of consumer goods that is generally freed from central intervention. As a result, some 30 percent of Hungary's national income originates in the private sector.[12] This positive development has, however, entailed extensive self-exploitation by those participating in the second economy: half of all people employed averaged 67 hours of registered work per week, in two or more jobs.[13]

Until recently, Hungary's mixed economy provided stores with consumer goods in quantities unimaginable anywhere else in Eastern Europe or the USSR. But it proved increasingly incapable of coping with Hungary's overall growth and debt problems. Moreover, even in its prime, Hungary's "goulash communism" did not face up to major social problems, and the benefits failed to trickle down to large segments of the society.

Problems of medical care and health. Foremost among Hungary's social ills has been a frightening deterioration in the delivery of medical services. For decades, Hungary has been spending minuscule amounts—4 percent or less—of its annual state budget on public health; this marked the second smallest share (after Romania) in Eastern Europe.[14] Even these exceedingly modest sums for health services were cut by more than 7 percent in the 1988 so-called austerity budget.[15] Despite Hungary's significant exports of pharmaceuticals, one observer predicted that the country's hospitals will—for the first time since the early 1950's—run out of medical supplies before the end of the year (by November). Said the commentary, "one can expect such a drop in the level of providing medical services [that] the consequences are unfathomable, and sooner or later, society will demand an accounting for these failures."[16]

According to the former minister of health, László Medve, approximately 90 percent of the entire population suffers from some medical disability due to poor nutrition, smoking, alcoholism, or chronic nervous strain.[17] Alcoholism is rampant: more than 500,000 men (equal to 25 percent of all working-age men) and

[8]Béla Csikós-Nagy, "The Position and Future of the Hungarian Economy," *Valóság*, No. 6, 1988, p. 41.

[9]Imre Kovács, "The Present and Future of the Hungarian Economy," *Figyélő* (Budapest), July 21, 1988, p. 3.

[10]Iván Petö and István Rév, "What Is the Deviation?" *Heti Világgazdaság*, Sept. 17, 1988, pp. 50–55.

[11]Kovács, loc. cit.

[12]Csikós-Nagy, loc. cit.

[13]The figures are arrived at from data in *Statisztikai Évkönyv* (Statistical Yearbook), Budapest, Statisztikai Kiadó, 1987, Tables 5.2 and 5.3; and "Labor Market without Capital," unpublished manuscript of the Institute of Economics, Budapest, 1988, p. 5.

[14]See *World Health Statistics Annual*, Geneva, WHO, 1985, p. 467; and Radio Budapest, Sept. 8, 1986, translated in Radio Free Europe Hungarian Monitoring (the RFE monitoring service is henceforth the source for Radio Budapest citations unless otherwise indicated).

In the relatively good year of 1984, the combined expenditures for medical, educational, and cultural and scientific activities accounted for only 14.9 percent of the government budget, while a comparable amount went to defense, and nearly 20 percent went to state subsidies. *Statisztikai Évkönyv*, 1984, p. 72.

[15]Radio Budapest, June 17, 1988.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Radio Budapest, Sept. 8, 1986.

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100,000 women (5 percent of working-age women) are classified as alcoholics.[18] Between 1970 and 1980, the death rate from cirrhosis of the liver among men engaged in physical labor rose from 17 to 42 per 100,000 deaths; today, this disease is the second largest killer, trailing only respiratory ailments.[19] High death rates due to cardiac ailments, high blood pressure, strokes, and other circulatory ailments are coupled with an astonishing increase in nervous disorders.[20] In 1988, about one-half of the working-age population was reported to have a dependence on sedatives, uppers or downers.[21]

When coupled with Hungary's "traditional forte"—its absolute leading position in suicide—these medical statistics have alarming, if predictable demographic consequences.[22] Among the 33 developed countries examined in World Health Organization statistics, Hungary's life expectancy at birth is the lowest—69.5 years. Among men, Hungary places last, while among women, it is a mere notch above Romania.[23] Although life expectancy has either remained stagnant or decreased in other socialist states as well, no other such state has had as dramatic a decrease in longevity as Hungary.[24] As a result of all these factors, Hungary's population is no longer reproducing itself: over the last five years, the country's net population had decreased by 125,000.[25]

Housing shortages. Contributing to the deterioration of the people's physical and mental health has been a severe and chronic shortage of suitable housing. In 1949—partially to cure a historical deficit vastly exacerbated by the ravages of World War II, but also for ideological reasons—Hungary adopted the Soviet model of nationalized urban housing. At first, the state confiscated and redistributed existing housing units at will, without having to seriously invest in housing development. By 1980, maintenance costs on this aging housing stock had become a serious drain on already stretched national budgets. The size and gravity of this burden is evident in the fact that by 1988, the budget of the Real Estate Holding Company (IKV), in charge of maintenance of state-owned urban housing units, or "council apartments," was 10 billion forints, i.e., about the same amount as the state spent on education and scientific research and development.[26]

By the very act of nationalization, the state undertook to become the major provider of housing. By the early 1960's, it set a goal of building some 100,00 housing units annually during a ten-year period. This was expected to furnish 80 percent of all housing units during that period. This scale of construction proved unattainable, and as the 1970's dawned, the state beat a hasty retreat from the housing market. By 1987, it was providing less than 15,000 housing units a year for state—i.e., local council—distribution.[27] And even these scarce state-subsidized apartments often were allocated for purposes other than the improvement of the lives of the general population. In 1987, for example, of 5,000 "council apartments" built in Budapest, 4,800 were allocated to members of the military, security, and party/state administrative apparats.[28]

With the state's rapid withdrawal from the housing market, privatization took over in every housing sector. Since the mid-1970's, current occupants have been permitted to purchase their apartments in public housing units. And the state began to help the population build their own residences by offering loans at reasonable rates. While these measures greatly benefited the rich and entrepreneurial, an ever larger group of people were condemned to live in truly substandard housing: sublet rooms, workers' dormitories, or an apartment shared by two and three generations of the same family. The average cost of an apartment has risen sharply. A 50-square-meter apartment that cost 600,000 forints in 1975 cost 1,500,000 in 1985 and 2,500,000 in 1988. A young married couple with average earnings of 10,000 forints per month would have to put every penny of earnings away for 21 years in order to afford an apartment—if one were available through the state at all.[29]

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[18]Zsuzsa Válkai, *Miért isznak a nök?* (Why Do Women Drink?), Budapest, Magvetö, 1986, p. 28.

[19]Julia Szalai, *Az egészségügy betegsége* (The Ills of Health [Delivery]). Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1986, pp. 189–90.

[20]Iván Gyárfás, Julia Kishegyi, and Péter Makara, "Cardiac Illnesses—Risk—Society," *Társadalomkutatás* (Budapest), Nos. 3-4, 1986, pp. 15–37; László Z. Antal, "Health and Lifestyle," ibid., No. 4, 1987, p. 43; Mária Novák and Jenő Duba, "Heart Attack and Classification of Handicap," ibid., No. 2, 1987, p. 299; and *World Health Organization Statistics Annual,* for the relevant years since 1980.

[21]Medical data are derived from the various reports in *Egészsegügyi statisztika* (Health Statistics), Budapest, Ministry of Health, 1987–88.

[22]Mihály Gergely, *Röpirat az öngyilkosságról* (A Flyer on Suicide), Budapest, Medicina, 1971, p. 15. Szalai, loc. cit., p. 189, lists suicide as the fourth most frequent cause of death; see also, Rudolf Andorka, "Potentialities and Limits of Demographic Policies," *Valóság,* No. 1, 1987, pp. 1–21, for the impact on demographic trends.

[23]*WHO Statistics Annual,* 1987, p. 84.

[24]Antal, loc. cit., p. 43; and László Levendel, "Health Maintenance, Illness Prevention," *Valóság,* No. 7, 1987, p. 2.

[25]*Statisztikai Évkönyv,* for the years 1983–88, Table 1, p. 1.

[26]Figures are found in Tables 6.16 and 22.5 in *Statisztikai Évkönyv;* also authors' interviews on May 22, 1988.

[27]*Statisztikai Évkövnyv,* 1987, Tables 4.8, 4.14, and 4.25.

[28]Interview with Budapest housing authorities, May 23, 1988.

[29]Gabriella Ernst, "Stalemate in the Battle for Apartments," *Valóság,* No. 7, 1987, pp. 83–84.

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When the regime purchased Soviet licenses for factories to produce mass-construction housing, it committed itself to providing small-sized units (of 34 to 52 square meters). As the generation that moved into these "human silos" bore children, severe overcrowding resulted, which contributed significantly to human stress. Hungary's leading place in divorce and near bottom place in live birth statistics are visible results of this failed housing policy of the regime.[30]

Re-emergence of poverty. Inflation in the last five years has halved the disposable income of people, and the 1988 value-added tax on consumer goods and personal income taxes have further cut severely into real earnings. The average per capita monthly wage today—6,000 forints—is merely 10–15 percent above the poverty level of some 5,200 forints a month.[31] From one-fourth to two-fifths of the people are estimated to live below the poverty level.

The poor are visible everywhere: from the streets of Budapest to shanties in the villages. A large part of the new poor are retired men and women whose penurious, inflation-ravaged pensions are proving increasingly inadequate. Others include female single parents, unemployed workers, men and women without convertible skills, Gypsies in mud huts, and families with a large number of children crowded into small apartments.[32] They are conspicuous as they wait in lines figuring out what their meager earnings can buy, as they search in garbage cans for discarded food, as they attempt to hide their poverty by mending and remending their worn-out clothes.[33]

The poor are not entirely without protectors. The National Union of People with Large Families, the Foundation to Support the Poor, church charities, and other foundations for the handicapped and the indigent such as that established by Dr. (Mrs.) István Kovács—all attempt to alleviate the most glaring cases of suffering.[34] But these institutions barely scratch the surface of the problems and find themselves hindered by the moral indifference of a calloused society.[35]

These social and economic ills have caused noticeable malaise, demoralization, and hopelessness among Hungarians. By the fall of 1986, as Hungary was experiencing the eighth of its "seven lean years," a survey found that 61 percent of the population polled described their position as hopeless, continually worsening, losing ground.[36] Amidst abundant evidence of corruption and crime (both violent and white-collar),[37] people are short-tempered and generally disgusted with the system. As writer Ferenc Karinthy described it through one of his characters:

We're sitting on a keg of dynamite, he thought. Is he afraid of it exploding? Of course, for he is scared for his position, his house, his [wife], his nice apartment, his famous library, his car, his tiny vacation house, he's afraid for Budapest lest it crumble to bits once again, and afraid for his country. But, [at the same time], he also desires [these horrors to happen], he's up to his teeth with the lies, with the intrigue and treachery, promises that sound hollow, with the whole amateurish, two-faced system; he can scarcely wait—even if all is in vain, if it is useless, if it is hopeless—for the whole thing to perish, to disappear, to be torn to shreds . . . .[38]

It was in this setting that a younger generation of leaders within Hungary's ruling apparat staged a successful coup against Kádár and took upon itself the challenge of coping with the country's innumerable problems while perpetuating communist rule.

The Succession

The events surrounding the "coup of the apparat" can be seen as falling into four phases, occurring in overlapping periods from November 1986 through the May 1988 conference of the MSzMP. These can be designated "preparation for restructuring" (from December 1986 to June 1987), "the Grósz campaign" (July 1987 to March 1988), "the conservative rearguard action" (November 1987 to March 1988), and "negotiating the deal" (August 1987 to May 1988).

The outcome of the process of political succession

[30] *WHO Statistical Annual*, 1988, p. 84.

[31] Ágnes Bokor, *Szegénység a mai Magyarországon* (Poverty in Contemporary Hungary), Budapest, Magvetö, 1987, p. 44; Zsuzsa Ferge, "Concerning Employment Policy," *Valóság*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 25–28; and Zsuzsanna Vajda, "I Am Poor . . . ," ibid., No. 7, 1987, pp. 64 ff.

[32] György Falus, "Concerning Survival—In Numbers," *Népszabadság*, June 30, 1986. It should also be noted that the Hungarian government seems unconcerned about the growing number of homeless who now congregate in the periphery of the underground sub-culture—not by choice, but by necessity. In Budapest proper—a city of 2.5 million people—in 1988, there were only 16 beds for homeless males, and 8 for females in shelters. See János Dobozy, "A Dialogue Concerning the Homeless," *Ötlet* (Budapest), Aug. 1, 1988.

[33] R. Julianna Székely, "Compared to What?" *Élet és Irodalom* (Budapest), Aug. 14, 1987.

[34] *Ötlet*, July 16, 1987, p. 2.

[35] *Székely*, loc. cit.

[36] *Jel-Kép* (Budapest), No. 2, 1987, p. 155.

[37] The growth of crime can be traced through a careful reading of Table 27.1 in *Statisztikai Evkonyv* for successive years.

[38] Ferenc Karinthy, "Schizophrenia," *Uj Tükör* (Budapest), Feb. 28, 1988, p. 19.

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in Hungary was shaped by a combination of internal and external forces. Internal forces having a decisive impact upon the outcome included János Kádár and his inner circle of trusted political allies, members of the central party apparat and the senior government bureaucracy, the provincial party apparat and the regional administrative-economic power elites, institutional and non-institutional policy lobbies, and the would-be successors—the party's reform gadfly Imre Pozsgay, János Berecz, and Károly Grósz. Other politically-aware segments of Hungarian society—particularly the intellectuals and the party rank and file—contributed to, but did not, in and of themselves, decisively influence the outcome.

The Soviet Politburo and, certainly, Mikhail Gorbachev also played some role in the succession process, although the precise nature of this influence is still unclear. (As we shall see below, Moscow apparently had some say in determining or at least endorsing both the planned and the actual line-ups of the MSzMP Politburo and Central Committee established in May 1988.)

Phase I: Preparation for restructuring. In the resolution of the November 1986 meeting of the Central Committee (CC) and in his radio/TV interview of December 12,[39] Kádár staunchly defended his record, basing his regime's claim to legitimacy on its suppression of the revolution of 1956 and on the correctness of his economic and social policies. He attempted to paint the party's efforts on behalf of economic restructuring and related reform measures as entirely successful, but he also voiced a formulation—"We consumed more than we produced"—that would come back to haunt him in the next 18 months.[40]

At this point in time, the central party and government bureaucracy still seemed hostage to Kádár's unyielding stance. As a result of his desire to maintain control, an exchange of membership cards was undertaken in order to tighten party discipline. Kádár also out-lined new cadres policies that appeared designed to appease an increasingly restive apparat, pressured by local cadres to change old policies, on the one hand, and by the Kádár leadership's quest for "order," on the other. These policy concessions included some democratization, in the election of new middle- and lower-level party officials by secret ballot and in the promise of periodic rotation of all incumbent lower-level officials.[41]

None of these measures yielded any immediate results, except a loss of certainty among the members of the professional apparat about Kádár's ability to control events. Although the regime's policy managers and networks of political influence remained in command, those with keen survival instincts began to prepare for a post-Kádár era by looking for new political patrons. This was particularly true for members of the provincial apparat, who were beginning to have to appease workers and managers of nearly bankrupt enterprises, demoralized miners, and the first groups of newly unemployed workers created by the Kádár leadership's latest reform efforts. Not coincidentally, members of certain county caucuses in the National Assembly, particularly from the economically depressed northeastern area, began to press for emergency relief programs.[42]

Policy lobbies in agriculture and heavy industry, the Trade Union Federation, the Young Communist League, the Chamber of Commerce, the Academy of Sciences, the Association for Science and Technology, and other similar groups all began to issue position papers and declarations. All of them demanded immediate changes and concerted action to end the political drift that had characterized the polity since the early 1980's.[43]

In the uncertainty attending the twilight of Kádár's rule, three principal contenders for the succession emerged—Pozsgay, Berecz, and Grósz. The three shared many similarities. They were all about the same age, born around 1930—i.e., a generation later than than the "mummies" in Kádár's Politburo. All three had

[39]"Resolution of the MSzMP Central Committee on Tasks to Improve Economic Work, and on the Guidelines for the 1987 National Economic Plan and State Budget," *Népszabadság*, Nov. 22, 1986; and "With Our Historical Exeriences and Achievements We Are Confidently Trying to Solve Current Tasks—János Kádár's Interview on Television and Radio," translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), Dec. 18, 1986, pp. F/1–10.

[40]As Grósz pointed out a year later, it was not the people of Hungary, but the inefficient economy of the country that consumed more than it produced. See "We Must Redefine the Meaning of Unity. Interview with Károly Grósz," *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), Jan. 2, 1988.

[41]"The Decision of the CC MSzMP of March 18, 1988, Concerning Cadre Policy in the Party," *Pártélet* (Budapest), April 1986, pp. 12–17; "The Decision of the CC MSzMP of June 23, 1987, on the Exchange of Party Membership Cards," ibid., August-September 1987, pp. 3–4; and János Lukács, "On the Experiences of Cadre Work in the Party," ibid., December 1987, pp. 22–27.

[42]On the grim economic prospects of Hungary's endangered counties, see "Szabolcs-Szatmár in Numbers," *Figyelő*, Sept. 15, 1988, p. 5; for an overview of bankruptcies in Hungary, see Mihály Gálik and József Veres, "The First Years of Bankruptcy Laws: The Crisis of Crisis Management," ibid., May 26, 1988, p. 11; on unemployment, see Csaba Vértes, "The Unemployed—The Numbers Are Growing," ibid., Jan. 21, 1988, p. 1.

[43]"CC Young Communist League, Proposals for the CC MSzMP and for the Council of Ministers, *Ötlet*, June 25, 1988; "Resolutions of the National Trade Union Council," *Népszava*, July 11, 1987; Iván T. Berend, "Some Questions of Our Scientific-Intellectual Life," *Magyar Tudomány* (Budapest), June 1987, pp. 432–34; István Matkó, "Interview with the President of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce," *Verseny és Vállalhozás* (Budapest), No. 2, 1987; and "The Patriotic People's Front for Economic and Social Renewal," *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), Sept. 26, 1987.

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

Supervisors and workers at Budapest's Láng Machine Factory discuss a reorganization agreement concluded on November 27, 1987, with the Ministry of Finance under which 140 workers are to be dismissed and various production and social-welfare facilities are to be sold to pay off the factory's debt.

—Eastfoto.

been too young in 1956 to be blamed for the mistakes of Stalinism Hungarian style, although Grósz was in a position at that time—as a young cadre worker in Borsod county—to have made some errors of political judgment during the revolt.[44] All three spoke Russian well, having studied in the CPSU party school in Moscow, and all three had some contacts in Moscow among the younger generation clustered around Gorbachev.

But there were also major differences among the three. Pozsgay, backed by reform-oriented political liberals and social scientists who flocked to him under the auspices of the Patriotic People's Front (PPF), which he headed, sought power against Kádár and his coterie by advocating a program of radical political, economic, and social reforms. Though not a good administrator—as became evident during his rather undistinguished tenure as Minister of Culture in 1976–82—he was an excellent orator, a person of great personal charm, and a bookish enunciator of the goals of reform. It was Pozsgay who set in motion in December 1986 a national debate on the future of the reform.[45] He even managed to persuade some of Hungary's dissidents to

[44]In October 1956, Grósz was an editor of the city newspaper in Miskolc and agreed to print the political demands of students from the local university. Other accounts credit him with the sheltering of Soviet officers during the revolt. In any case, Grósz seemd to have had a difficult time gaining readmission into the "reconstituted" MSzMP in the spring of 1957. See Alfred Reisch, "An HSWP Politburo Member Wanted to Leave the Party in 1955 and 1956," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *RAD Background Report*, 158/86, Nov 6, 1986.

[45]Pozsgay's contributions to the party progressives' reform campaign consisted of several influential studies that he commissioned through the PPF's Social and Economic Policy Council and scores of boldly argued newspaper, radio, and TV interviews and articles between late 1986 and May 1988.

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accept him as a champion of liberalization and democratization of the outmoded system of governance.[46]

Berecz sought the office of general secretary by backing Kádár unhesitatingly until the very last minute and by betting on a conservative outcome of the political struggle in the USSR.[47] A prime ideological defender of the regime's position that the events of October 1956 did not constitute a revolution, he became a member of the Politburo in June 1987 and seemed to enjoy Kádár's backing for a bright political future.

However, Berecz suffered from a variety of personal and professional drawbacks. From the time of his wife's tragic death in a 1985 automobile accident until quite recently, he had a drinking problem evident to the public. Moreover, he mishandled various missions assigned to him. The most notorious example was the showdown between the party and the writers' union that Berecz provoked in November 1986, as a result of which the outraged literati voted to remove from the union's executive committee everyone who was a party member.[48] He also failed to achieve a new consensus between the party and intelligentsia at the February 1987 ideological conference, and he played down the significance of the demands for change in the Soviet Union voiced at the January 1987 CPSU CC plenum.[49]

[46]However, the Budapest-based members of the Hungarian democratic opposition—the so-called Urbanists clustered around the samizdat journals *Beszélő, Hirmondó,* and *Demokrata*—positioned themselves at a sensible arm's length from the Pozsgay campaign. For them a *reform* apparatchik was still an *apparatchik*.

[47]The alacrity with which the Berecz-controlled Hungarian media republished Yegor Ligachev's policy statements was worthy of note. So too was the foot-dragging and cuts involved in publication in the Hungarian press of the texts of Gorbachev's more daring speeches in the Hungarian press well into mid-1987.

[48]*Élet és Irodalom,* Nov. 21, 1986; for an analysis by István Eörsi, see ibid., Mar. 5, 1987.

[49]For Berecz's version of the ideological relevance of the January 1987 CPSU plenum for Hungary, see "The Reality and Development of Socialism in Hungary," *Népszabadság,* Feb. 21, 1987.

Imre Pozsgay, General Secretary of the National Council of the Patriotic People's Front (PPF) of Hungary, addresses a meeting of the PPF's Economic Policy Committee on December 3, 1987, on ways to renew the Front's work.

—Eastfoto.

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Still, Berecz was the conservatives' best choice among the younger contenders for power.

Of the three contenders, only Grósz seemed to have a thorough understanding of economics and of practical, hard-nosed politics. A former county secretary in Borsod and then a leader of the Budapest party organization, Grósz appeared to be a hard-liner on ideology—thoroughly orthodox when it came to the concept of rule by the communist party—and a strong supporter of Moscow in foreign affairs. Reputed to be an anti-intellectual and an anti-Semite, he has been known to employ demagogic slogans with success.

But Grósz was much more than a good public relations man. He was also a 14-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week workaholic, and he set out in a determined manner to succeed Kádár on the strength of a program designed to cope with Hungary's deep economic crisis. He criticized the inept handling of the economy by the Kádárists and also openly castigated Hungary's workers for their low productivity. He had more positive words for skilled workers, successful managers, technical elites, and frustrated bureaucrats—constituencies that felt slighted by Kádár and whose support Grósz needed.[50] Of the three contenders, only Grósz combined economic prescriptions and ideological orthodoxy in a blend promising both further decentralization and continued authoritarian leadership.

In June 1987, Kádár offered the premiership of Hungary to Grósz, ostensibly as the man most capable of getting Hungary out of its malaise. Kádár probably had an ulterior motive—to eliminate Grósz as a political competitor by making him the scapegoat head of a government whose program was bound to fail.

Grósz was equally calculating in accepting the unenviable assignment. First, he required that the post be offered to him with the unanimous approval of the Politburo. Second, he extracted several concessions on personnel appointments. On the government side, he secured the appointment of István Horváth, former minister of the interior, as deputy prime minister responsible for security affairs. On the party side, he demanded and obtained the appointment of György Fejti, a friend and county secretary from Borsod, as CC secretary for security affairs, and of Miklós Németh as CC secretary for the economy. Simultaneously, Grósz struck a bargain with György Aczél to place the latter's protégé János Lukács as secretary in charge of cadres. These three appointees were to be crucial allies of Grósz in the "apparat coup" of May 1988.[51]

During this first phase of the succession process, Kádár gave the appearance of retaining nominal control, although he was slowly forced to yield to pressures for change in policy and personnel. At the time, only the democratic opposition drew the appropriate conclusion from the June 1987 CC decisions; the first sentence of the samizdat pamphlet "The Social Contract" demanded: "Kádár must go!"[52] Yet, in choosing Grósz to shoulder the Sisyphean task of revitalizing the economy, the Politburo unwittingly made an open-ended commitment to a very ambitious politician, as would soon become evident.

Phase II: The Grósz campaign. As prime minister, Grósz had minimum prospects of success. He was saddled with the staff and cabinet of his predecessor, György Lázár; he was cut off from his Budapest and Borsod county party clients; and he could expect help neither from a skeptical Politburo, nor from a CC Secretariat dominated by Kádár supporters Lázár, Miklós Óvári, and Berecz.

Under the circumstances, Grósz had no choice but to mount what was essentially a one-man campaign to produce his own program of "stabilization" and "recovery." His objectives were to develop a realistic plan of action to halt the political drift that threatened the regime's survival; to establish the *government* as the one agency in the political system with the capacity to mobilize the country's human, political, and economic resources; and to establish his personal authority as a pragmatic leader, the only one capable of creating order and stability out of the chaos that the party left behind after the "counter reforms" of 1972–74.[53]

Grósz had a mere six weeks in which to prepare a new government program for presentation at the autumn 1987 session of the National Assembly. By early September, he had met and consulted with more government agencies, policy lobbies, and party organizations than had his predecessor in the previous seven years. This rush of activity bolstered his image as a concerned and well-informed political leader, as did his skillful use of the information media. The government daily *Magyar Hirlap* often "scooped" the party daily *Népszabadság* on news about government actions.

[50]For Grósz's first public statement in which he sought to distance himself from the policies of the Kádárist regime, see "Our Concerns and Opportunities. Interview with Karoly Grósz," *Siker* (Budapest), September 1986.

[51]On the June 1987 personnel changes, see *FBIS-EEU*, June 25, 1987, pp. H/1–3, and June 26, 1987, pp. H/1–4. See also "Resolution of the CC, MSzMP of July 2, 1987, on the Program of Economic and Social Recovery," *Népszabadság*, July 4, 1987.

[52]Printed as a special issue of *Beszélő*, June 1987, at p. 4.

[53]These policy priorities are well summarized in "Steps for Changes of Historic Magnitude. Interview with Prime Minister Károly Grósz," *Képes 7* (Budapest), Sept. 12, 1987.

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The effectiveness of Grósz's interviews and television appearances was enhanced by his plain, jargon-free, and grammatically correct use of the Hungarian language. To the population at large, he seemed to be—unlike the rest of the Politburo—both intelligent and competent.

Grósz's viability as an alternative to Kádár became obvious when both delivered nationally televised speeches to the National Assembly in mid-September.[54] Grósz gave a strikingly full and candid account of the regime's ideologically motivated mismanagement of the NEM (the New Economic Management reforms of 1968). Neither his speech nor the government's economic program, published two days later,[55] promised any easy or early solutions for Hungary's severe economic problems. Significantly, the text of the government program made only one reference to the party and said nothing about the party's possible role in implementing the program.

By contrast, Kádár's speech was a rambling, defensive, self-serving account. Two key statements—"Since I have served long enough in [policy-making] bodies, probably I, too, am responsible to a certain extent," and "On the Central Committee's behalf, I can state that we never intended to halt the reform process"—helped cut Kádár down to size and to demonstrate, for all to see, what he had become: a tired old man fighting for his political life. Kádár's advisers must have realized this, because he did not make another nationally televised speech for six months.

Grósz also began to use his influence as prime minister in the National Assembly; by advancing ideas of reform and restructuring via the parliament's committee structure, he gained increased publicity for his new programs.[56] This was a radically new approach to the

[54]The speeches were printed in *Népszabadság*, Sept. 17, 1987.

[55]*Magyar Nemzet*, Sept. 19, 1987.

[56]For Grósz's handling of the parliament, see the press conference reported on Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian, trans. in. *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 2, 1987, pp. 24–35; and his interview in *Magyar Hirlap*, Sept. 17, 1987.

Premier Károly Grósz presents his program to the opening session of the Hungarian National Assembly on September 16, 1987; from left to right, President of the Presidential Council Károly Németh, trade union chief Sándor Gáspár, Grósz, and General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party János Kádár.

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

A tired János Kádár at the May 1988 Party Conference.

—Alain Keler/Gamma-Liaison.

co-optation of non-party elites, a much-needed effort to build public confidence in the government. With Grósz, such terms as "renewal," "restructuring," and "dialogue" seemed to acquire operative substance. He raised widespread (if unrealistic) expectations of early and positive results. However, the Grósz program also called for real sacrifices and sought public toleration of unemployment and continued inflation. Although the news of Hungary's early withdrawal from an extremely costly Soviet Central Asian energy project and of a new 1 billion marks loan from West Germany were well received,[57] the prospects of personal income taxes and unchecked inflation triggered panic buying and caused shortages of durable consumer goods.

The particulars of the new income tax law were the most vulnerable aspects of the Grósz program. The legislation deliberately created an adversary relationship between the individual citizens and the regime. When the details of the law became public, it was clear that the government had given tax preferences to the agricultural sector, enterprise managers, and members of the scientific-technical elite at the expense of those with fixed incomes and without access to the second economy. The law was a hastily drafted instrument of "revenue enhancement," and the enabling regulations tended to penalize large families and the elderly, while also placing new economic disincentives on private entrepreneurs.[58]

Such new austerity measures as the tax reform were received by the population with skepticism and distrust. As dissident commentaries pointed out, neither Grósz nor the party deserved the people's confidence, let alone the contribution of "blood, sweat, and tears" that zealous government spokesmen now demanded from the citizens.[59]

To protect his political standing while still making his government appear responsive to public demands, Grósz designated proxies to bear the brunt of the increasingly acrimonious public reactions to his policies. These were senior cabinet officers, heads of government agencies, government spokesmen and media managers, expert policy advisers, and scores of university and Academy of Sciences specialists in economics, business, law, and public administration. Their task was to explain, justify, and sell to specific constituencies various components of the Grósz program. By the fall of 1987, government ministers could no longer merely deliver a speech, give perfunctory answers to timid questions from the floor, and then walk out of a meeting or a press conference. A new stress on "openness" required well-documented answers, facts and figures, and occasionally, the naming of organizations and individuals responsible for Hungary's current difficulties. A hidden agenda for them all was to distance the government and its functional agencies from the party. By early 1988, 95 percent of all interviews focused on "What went wrong and why?" ended with extremely pointed references to the "highest decision-making organs."[60]

Meanwhile, Grósz reserved his intervention as decision-maker, conciliator, and high-level troubleshooter

[57]*On the West German loan, see Magyar Hirlap,* Oct. 10, 1987, and *Heti Világgazdaság,* Oct. 17, 1987; on Hungary's withdrawal from the Yamburg project, see *Heti Világgazdaság,* Sept. 26, 1987.

[58]Official justification for the income and value-added taxes was offered by the then Minister of Finance Péter Meggyesi before the National Assembly on September 18, 1987, as reported by Budapest Radio, trans. in *FBIS-EEU,* Oct. 5, 1987, pp. 28–40. Since then, there has been an avalanche of mostly critical comment on these new taxes. For a scathing critique of the government's program of "stabilization and recovery" between September 1987 and September 1988, see Petö and Rév, loc. cit.

[59]Editorial in *Beszélő,* No. 22, November 1987.

[60]See, e.g., interviews with Pozsgay in *Heti Világgazdaság,* Oct. 24, 1987; with Grósz in *Magyar Hirlap,* Dec. 3, 1987; with Reszö Nyers in *Magyar Ifjuság* (Budapest), Dec. 18, 1987; and with József Bognár, Nyers, and Tamás Sárközi in *Figyelő,* Dec. 3, 1987. See also Gábor Halmai, "Leading Party Organs and Investment Decisions," ibid., Jan. 28, 1988.

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to a few specific policy fields and constituencies. These included foreign affairs, especially ties with the USSR and Hungary's Western creditors; matters affecting the major policy lobbies (heavy industry, mining, successful agricultural cooperatives, to name a few); and the plight of economically distressed regions. In most cases, including foreign affairs, the central topic of Grósz's well-publicized meetings and visits was economics: credits, budgetary priorities, rescue packages, unemployment, and social "safety nets." Although he operated with limited resources, Grósz somehow made it appear to the public that, as far as the government was concerned, progress was being made on all fronts.

The Grósz strategy pursued a controlled mobilization and radicalization of the elites to pressure the Kádárist leadership to act, or better yet, react in some way. Grósz stood to benefit from whatever the party's response to the mounting expectations for radical changes might be. If Kádár caved in, the party leader had little to offer other than his resignation. If Kádár stood fast and decided to crack down on his critics, it could have led to a reenactment of the March–October 1956 scenario and a political avalanche. In any case, whether Grósz was bluffing or not, his stabilization and recovery program mobilized a part of the society, creating new tensions and expectations for drastic changes that could be accommodated neither by the incumbent party leadership, nor by the existing structure of political institutions in Hungary.[61]

Phase III: The conservative rear-guard action. By the end of 1987, the Kádár leadership was under intense pressure from four directions. First, Gorbachev's vigorous efforts to achieve institutional restructuring and party renewal in the USSR constituted a political challenge that the Hungarian party could no longer ignore. The June 26, 1987, decision of the CPSU to call an extraordinary party conference for June of 1988 implicitly demanded a comparable step on the part of the Hungarian party. In December 1987, the MSzMP decided to set May 1988 as the date for its conference, thereby establishing a deadline for putting its own house in order and for addressing the ripe issue of leadership change.

Second, the party debates concerning the Grósz program had focused on the need to establish a new basis for party legitimacy based on principles other than economic successes. Third, the Pozsgay-led reform campaign had become a national movement in support of short-term goals that posed a threat to the manner in which the party's power and authority was exercised. And, fourth, the party's rank-and-file membership and full-time local officials were in revolt, demanding guidance and, above all, realistic solutions to the regime's policy dilemmas.

Yet, the regime stubbornly sought to cap or avert the impending blowoff. Its main efforts to this end were a November 11, 1987, CC meeting on ideology; an intraparty debate on ideology and party renewal (December 1987–January 1988); and attempts to restore stability and to silence critics (February–March 1988).

The November 1987 plenum of the Central Committee (CC)proved to be a disaster for Kádár and his allies. Though intended to reestablish party ideological orthodoxy, the plenum became a forum of revolt against the very relevance of ideology at a time of severe political and economic crisis.[62] Unfazed, Kádár (without Cen-

[61]On this, see the editorial "Of What We Should Be Afraid," *Beszélő*, No. 23, March 1988.

[62]János Berecz, "Our Ideology in a Changing World [an edited text of his presentation before the November 11, 1987, meeting of the MSzMP Central Committee]," *Pártélet*, December 1987, pp. 3–21.

János Berecz, made a Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee in 1985 and Politburo member in 1987.

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tral Committee approval) directed Berecz and his staff to distribute among all line party organizations the CC Secretariat's theses on ideology and on the leading role of the party. Rambling, irrelevant, and contradictory, these documents were a crude attempt to stage a controlled "debate" on Kádár's terms.[63] That the central apparat did not really want a substantive discussion of ideology and party renewal was evident when it gave local organizations a mere five to seven days in mid-January 1988 to "discuss" both documents—barely time to convene one brief meeting. Nonetheless, 200,000 members participated in or at least attended the discussions. This unusually high level of personal involvement by a normally apathetic party membership was not a positive phenomenon from the viewpoint of the conservative leadership.[64]

The stress on ideology must have seemed strangely out of place in an environment where the official news agency was estimating that the number of unemployed in Hungary had reached 30,000–40,000 by the end of 1987.[65] It became apparent, to paraphrase Bertolt Brecht, that the party membership did not deserve the leaders' confidence. There were many signs of rank-and-file disapproval: mass resignations from the party—amounting to 45,000 members or some 8 percent of the membership; written demands for the dismissal of Kádár, Lázár, Sándor Gáspár, Károly Németh, Óvári, and Aczél; and submission of lengthy "counter-theses" by several constituencies among the intelligentsia.[66]

Particularly galling to Kádár was Grósz's thinly veiled "declaration" of candidacy for the general secretaryship in the course of a New Year's Day television interview.[67] Personally incensed by this challenge, Kádár took to the road in early February on a campaign of county-by-county visits and consultations stressing the theme: "Trust me and the party; things will turn out right." Not to be outdone, Grósz went to the same counties and, as a self-appointed one-man truth squad, found himself openly contradicting or differing with his party's general secretary on many subjects.[68]

Faced with growing alarm within the apparat over the rapidly deteriorating situation and the specter of a remarkably high public turnout at an unauthorized public demonstration on March 15,[69] Kádár went on television on March 17 to attempt to assure everyone that he "had not (as some had alleged) been out of touch with the workers," and that "there was no crisis" in Hungary.[70] (For the record, there was no one else, in or out of the Politburo, willing to make the same statement—in March, or two months later.)

The conservatives' counterattack had three additional components. The first was the ominous establishment of a elite joint army-police crowd-control unit organized à la Poland's ZOMO.[71] A second measure was the supplying of party facilities and fire departments with small arms and the issuance of live ammunition to Workers' Guards units throughout the country. When some county fire officials balked at the prospect of using their water cannons against civilians, and the reliability of the "goon squads" appeared doubtful, the weapons and the ammunition were withdrawn.[72]

A third measure was the selective intimidation and silencing of internal critics within the party. At the end of February, Pozsgay received a written reprimand from the Politburo for having spoken out of turn once too often. A month later, Rezső Nyers was severely chastised by Óvári and Berecz for agreeing to lend his name to a new organization, the New March Front—a coalition of intellectuals primarily interested in carrying the process of democratization as far as it was possible to

[63]The two internal party documents involved were: "Theses of the MSzMP PB [Politburo] on Current Questions of Ideological Work and for the Discussions of Party Organizations and Social Science Workshops," Budapest, MSzMP Agitation and Propaganda Department; and "Theses of the CC-Designated Work Team on the Leading Role of the Party in Society and on the Further Development of the Structure of Political Institutions," Theses discussed and approved for discussion by the PB, printed mimeo, no date, confidential.

[64]"Party Debate on the PB Theses," *Pártélet*, February 1988, pp. 17–26; and "Discussion of the Editorial Committee on Ideology," *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), April 1988, pp. 18–32.

[65]Budapest MTI in English, Jan. 25, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 26, 1988, p. 16.

[66]Apart from samizdat accounts, the most candid coverage of the rebellion by the party rank and file was given in the weekly newspapers of the organizations of the Young Communist League at the Lóránd Eotvös University of Arts and Sciences (*Egyetemi Lapok*) and at the Karl Marx University for Economic Sciences (*Közgasdász*), both in Budapest.

[67]Transcribed in *Magyar Hirlap*, Jan. 2, 1988.

[68]There were repeated inconsistencies between Grósz's off-the-record statements at his appearances before provincial party organizations and enterprises and those made by the Kádár regime. On March 2, Grósz gave a provisional date of May 13 for the upcoming party conference (see Grósz interview in Vas country on March 2, as broadcast by Budapest Radio, Mar. 5, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 7, 1988, p.33). However, the Kádár Central Committee at its March 23–24 meeting announced the date would be May 20 (see Budapest MTI in English, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 25, 1988, p. 23).

[69]The unauthorized demonstration on the anniversary of the 1848 revolution has become an annual event; in 1988, a crowd of 10,000–15,000 people took to the streets on the occasion. This was the largest turnout since 1956; most of the demonstrators were university students. For them, the ideals of freedom and national independence as represented by the anniversary of 1848 hold a special significance. See AFP, Mar. 16, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 16, 1988, p. 40.

[70]Budapest Television Service in Hungarian, Mar. 17, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 18, 1988, pp. 18–21.

[71]The official organ of the Hungarian Army reported the joint unit to be readily deployable against terrorist acts or against threats to public order. See *Néphadsereg* (Budapest), July 8, 1987.

[72]Private interviews with officials of various defense units, May 1988.

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do in contemporary Hungary—and was sentenced to two months of "silence" on all controversial subjects.[73] And finally, in April, the Central Control Commission expelled four intellectuals from the party for having taken "positions that were contrary to the party's policies," whatever those were.[74]

However, the party conservatives' efforts to preserve party stability, restore confidence in Kádár's leadership, and silence the regime's critics were doomed to failure. Indeed, it proved to be a major tactical error to focus attention on the regime's ideological legitimacy, for this legitimacy turned out to be extremely fragile. The debates helped mobilize, radicalize, and fragment the party. Moreover, unlike Kádár and Berecz, Grósz went beyond ideology to seek the advice and support of party and non-party people alike and, in doing so, fatally undermined Kádár's authority as a national leader. Kádár's "road show," the conservatives' halfhearted preparations for a "civil war," and the disciplining of a handful of party critics were the last gasps of the "ancien régime."

Phase IV: Negotiating the deal. Kádár's ultimate political demise in May 1988 was the result of a negotiated "friendly takeover by insiders," rather than a "raid" by outsiders or hostile non-party forces. Because it was essentially an inside transaction (which took place with the approval of the Soviet overseer), the reconstruction of key events in the striking of the deal must, of necessity, be derived from our interviews, from indirect evidence, and from the (censored) public record.

In his quest for power, Grósz sought to enlist constituencies with demonstrated interest in radical economic reforms and institutional restructuring. His "natural allies" were the technical-scientific elites, pro-reform technocrats, senior government officials, the provincial party apparat, and Pozsgay's PPF. Grósz also had to approach, or wait to be approached by, those adherents of Kádár who had been Grósz political clients in the Borsod and Budapest party organizations (Fejti and Horvath), and who were not tainted by personal responsibility for the "counter-reforms" of the early 1970's, lacked confidence in Kádár, and were young enough to have career prospects in the party and the government (Pozsgay, Miklós Németh, Lukács, and, at the very end, Berecz); who had a chance to prolong their political careers by switching sides (Aczél and László Maróthy); or who hoped, with Grósz's help, to make a political comeback (Nyers, István Huszár, and Jenő Fock).

Although the precise sequence of alliance-building, interest reconciliation, and strategy coordination cannot be fully documented, one can tick off a series of key developments between mid-1987 and May 1988. (As indicated above, already prior to the June 1987 CC meeting, Grósz had come to terms with Aczél about Lukács's appointment as the new CC secretary for cadre affairs, and had won the Politburo's consent to Fejti's appointment as CC secretary for security affairs.)

In July–August 1987, in exchange for a "major voice" in policy affairs and the promise of a seat on the Politburo, Pozsgay gave his support and that of the PPF to the new government program of Grósz. Similar understandings were reached with Fock, Nyers, Maróthy, Iván T. Berend, and Huszár.[75]

In September, Grósz expressed his willingness to "consult with, and pay attention to" the views of everyone, including critics and dissidents. On the 27th, a group of 150 Populist radical reform intellectuals met with Pozsgay for a one-day conference.[76] Though the closing communiqué of the session was predictably harsh in its critique of the regime, Grósz conveyed his greetings to the participants through Pozsgay.[77]

During October and November, there were intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations with representatives of policy lobbies and interest groups about such aspects of the Grósz reform program as the new income tax law, industrial reorganization, bankruptcy procedures, and policies on unemployment, housing, and welfare is-

[73]Information on the party reprimands came from interviews in Budapest in May 1988. Nyers complied with his sentence and was promptly rewarded with a 100,000-forint State Prize on Liberation Day, April 4. See *Népszabadság*, Apr. 4, 1988. Six months later, Nyers was a signatory, along with 18 other reform intellectuals of the inaugural manifesto of The New March Front, "For the Intellectual Foundations of Socialist Renewal," *Élet és Irodalom*, Sept. 16, 1988. See also *Heti Világgazdaság*, Sept. 11, 1988, p. 10. The Front modelled itself on the popular-front type ad hoc alliance of young "Populist," "Urbanist," and socialist intellectuals of March 1937.

[74]See "Decision of the MSzMP Central Control Commission," *Népszabadság*, Apr. 9, 1987. The four were economist László Lengyel, TV reporter and parliamentary deputy Zoltán Kiraly, political scientist Mihály Bihari, and PPF senior staff member Zoltán Biró.

[75]Jenő Fock, former prime minister, was a victim of the leftist purge of 1974 and of the "administered" elections to the National Assembly of June 1985. A Central Committee member, head of the Association for Science and Technology, and "father of the NEM," Nyers was purged in 1974. Maróthy appeared slated to lose his Politburo seat and, possibly, Central Committee membership in 1988. Iván T. Berend is President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. István Huszár, a Central Committee member and prominent leader of the PPF, was purged in 1975. Both Fock and Nyers, however, remained members of the Central Committee.

[76]The Populists represent a group of dissident intellectuals that feel that Hungary's future lies in correcting the deformations of socialism and returning to "traditional," national based, fundamental Hungarian values and institutions. The group has a mildly anti-Semitic flavor to it.

[77]See Zoltán Biró, István Csurka, and Lajos Für, Eds., "Hungary's Chances" (a transcript of the Lakitelek conference of Sept. 27, 1987), samizdat, 1988. For the published text of the closing communiqué, see "The Grass Roots of Consensus. Interview with Imre Pozsgay," *Magyar Nemzet*, Nov. 14, 1987.

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sues. During December 1987 and January 1988, in connection with the 20th anniversary of the inauguration of the NEM, the print media controlled by the Pozsgay "reform network" (*Magyar Nemzet, Élet és Irodalom, Valóság, Heti Világgazdaság, Figyelő, Mozgó Világ, Ötlet,* and *Társadalomkutatás*) mounted a concerted and, by all appearances, coordinated attack on Kádár's policy record since 1957.[78] This was also the period of Grósz's New Year's Day interview.

In February 1988, preparations began for the May party conference. At this time, Soviet Politburo member Andrey Gromyko informed Kádár of Gorbachev's own political difficulties and was advised of Kádár's wish to continue to serve as MSzMP general secretary until the party's 14th congress in 1990.[79] However, fueled by reports of growing unrest among party cadres and reinforced by Kádár's unyielding stance, Grósz and his allies reached an informal consensus, and later an agreement, on the need for remedial action.

This consensus became clearer at the March 23–24 meeting of the MSzMP Central Committee, when Kádár's candidacy to chair the "operative committee" for the overall coordination of preparations for the May party conference was voted down. Anticipating Kádár's eventual defeat, Berecz assumed a neutral-to-supportive stance toward Grósz's candidacy for party leadership. The task of pre-conference coordination was divided between Lukács (election of conference delegates) and Berecz (drafting of theses for intraparty debate and amendment, and their ultimate presentation at the conference). This last assignment was partial payment for Berecz's middle-of-the-road stance on party reforms. The handwriting for the Kádár group was already on the wall: Lázár's report for the task force on party reforms was "heard," but not published or acted upon by the Central Committee.[80]

In an interview in early April, Pozsgay offered a radical reform program and declared his "candidacy" for a leadership position in a "reformed" party.[81] In the same period, Kádár's and Grósz's supporters in the central apparat were conducting intensive consultations with regional party officials with an eye toward influencing the selection of delegates and the discussion agenda for the May conference. Kádár himself engaged in a delaying tactic by withdrawing from the "battle field" (his sole pre-conference public appearance was a TV interview with the American NBC network, broadcast on Hungarian television on May 12).

In mid-April, there were nationwide party discussions of Berecz's draft theses for the policy statement to be adopted by the party conference. Party committees of Budapest and of Baranya, Komárom, and Borsod counties rejected or substantially amended these theses, as did the PPF, the Academy of Sciences, the Trade Union Federation, and the Young Communist League.[82] Pozsgay claims that 18 percent of the party members who spoke out on the substance of the draft theses favored creating a multi-party system as a solution to the political crisis.[83]

By late April, Grósz was using interviews with *Magyar Hirlap* and *Der Spiegel* to introduce the notion of the "biological factor" (i.e., age) as an important consideration necessitating a change of the MSzMP leadership at the highest level.[84] Visiting Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov was apprised of the status of conference preparations and was informed by Grósz that Kádár had lost the party's support and would be replaced at the party conference.[85]

On May 10, the CC met to take stock of the party membership's reaction to the conference draft theses. The plenum rejected Kádár's proposal that the conference replace no more than one-third of the CC. Instead, it adopted a motion introduced by István Tömpe,[86] and seconded by Aczél and Maróthy, requesting "complete renewal" of the Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat. However, as a concession to Kádár, the CC agreed to limit debate at the party conference to policy issues that had emerged since the 13th MSzMP Congress in March 1985.[87] According to Austrian news

[78]For Kádár, the most objectionable items were said to have been an article by Iván Berend, "The Fatal Turn of Hungarian Reforms in the 1970's," *Valóság,* January 1988, pp. 1–26, in which the author named *some* of those who had been responsible for halting the NEM between 1972 and 1974; and a 128-page symposium in the January 1988 issue of *Mozgó Világ* on the strange history of the Hungarian NEM.

[79]Interviews with well-informed insiders.

[80]The task force had been appointed in February 1985.

[81]"Reforms Are Our Only Chance. Interview with Imre Pozsgay," *Magyar Nemzet,* Apr. 2, 1988.

[82]The "theses" were published in *Népszabadság,* Mar. 31, 1988. The party newspaper acknowledged in its Apr. 25, 1988, edition that even a majority of party members viewed the document as "too general."

Of the party organizations, only the Budapest MszMP Executive Commitee, led by Ferenc Havasi, "leaked" some highly critical excerpts of its discussion. See *Heti Világgazdaság,* May 7, 1988. Disapproval by the PPF, the Academy of Sciences, and the trade union and youth groups surfaced in the "on the other hand" section of official commentaries by these organizations as published in *Magyar Nemzet, Népszava* (Budapest), and *Magyar Ifjuság.*

[83]From a talk by Pozsgay at the Interdisciplinary Conference of Social Scientists, Eger, Hungary, May 17, 1988, attended by the authors.

[84]"For a New National Consensus. Interview with Károly Grósz," *Magyar Hirlap,* Apr. 28, 1988; and *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Apr. 25, 1988, pp. 172–82.

[85]According to well-connected dissidents, as corroborated by relevant individuals in the party and state apparats.

[86]Tömpe had served as president of Hungarian Radio and Television when Grósz was party secretary there in the 1960's.

[87]"Communiqué on the May 10, 1988, session of the MSzMP CC," *Népszabadság,* May 11, 1988. See also the interview with Berecz broadcast by Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian, May 10, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU,* May 11, 1988, pp. 26–27.

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reports, younger CC members at this meeting demanded Kádár's resignation as general secretary.[88]

In the period May 11–16, Kádár and Grósz evidently each made their pitch to Moscow, and the CPSU communicated its approval of the replacement of Kádár by Grósz. Grósz also recommended for CPSU approval a new roster for the MSzMP Politburo, consisting of Grósz, Berecz, Judit Csehák, Gáspár, Csaba Hámori, Ferenc Havasi, Lukács, Károly Németh, Miklós Németh, Nyers, Óvári, Pozsgay, István Szabó, and Ilona Tatai.[89] On May 17, Soviet approval of the new line-up was apparently communicated to Grósz and Kádár. (Pozsgay advised close friends on that day that he, Nyers, Miklós Németh, and Tatai would be elected to the new Politburo; the next day Nyers confirmed Pozsgay's information and added that he, Nyers, might be asked to serve as Hungary's prime minister.)

On May 19, Kádár, recognizing his defeat, submitted his resignation as general secretary, which was accepted by the Politburo. This body also approved its new membership composition, as well as the line-up of the Secretariat, the Central Control Commission, and the Central Committee. As a concession to Kádár, it was envisioned that only 37 new members would be included in the 113-member CC.

At this point, there was still no guarantee of real leadership renewal, for the proposed new Politburo would still have included such Kádár stalwarts as Berecz, Gáspár, Hámori, Károly Németh, and Óvári. A minority reformist coalition would have consisted largely of acceptable opposition members such as Pozsgay and Nyers. And the team of Grósz, Lukács, Miklós Németh, and Fejti, along with three policy lobby "stand-ins"—Csehák, Szabó, and Tatai[90]—would thus have held a tenuous balance. In these circumstances, Kádár could conceivably pass his office to a surrogate, or alternatively, retain his seat on the Politburo and deadlock any future change.

However, Kádár was deserted by such key allies as Aczél and Maróthy, and he slowly came to realize that he would have to settle for what he could salvage. Thus, a deal was struck. Its main provisions were as follows:

- Kádár would yield his position as general secretary to Grósz and become the party's new "president" (duties unspecified). It was agreed that he would not be made a scapegoat for his complicity in the trial and execution of László Rajk, for the execution of Imre Nagy in 1958, or for allowing the forces of counter-reform to succeed in the early 1970's.
- The new Politburo line-up would comprise the coalition noted above, and thus combine the principle of political continuity with the reality of personnel change.
- The Secretariat's membership would remain unchanged, to facilitate continuity in party administration.
- Kádár's proposal to limit turnover in the Central Committee membership to only one-third, though defeated on May 10, was revived. However, it was clear that most of the 37 new members would be elected from the Grósz camp.
- The major concession to Kádár was to leave essentially unchanged the membership of the Central Control Commission, which is dominated by ideologically orthodox Kádár supporters under Chairman András Gyenes and Secretary Imre Somogyi. Since this body has jurisdiction over disciplinary matters—including the assignment of blame for past misdeeds—this concession was crucial for Kádár.
- With Kádár gone, Grósz would occupy the positions of both party general secretary and prime minister "for the time being." This seemed desirable in order to adopt a system of "unitary management" and to project the image of a strong leader at the helm in order to avert the imminent danger of total political collapse. It also seems likely that Grósz was aware in May of Gorbachev's own plan to make a bid for the powers of the top party and state positions in the Soviet Union by creating a powerful new post of Soviet president. The two projects are strikingly similar, and there is some evidence that Grósz's intention to hold both the post of general secretary and that of prime minister had already been approved in Moscow before the opening of the Hungarian party conference.[91]

Such was the deal agreed to by the time 986 delegates—selected by regional and local party organizations with considerable and perhaps conflicting guidance, one can assume, by Grósz and Berecz forces at the top—assembled in Budapest on May 21, 1988. The conference was planned to be a "well-crafted play" combining high drama, stimulating debates, a happy end for the designated protagonists, and a satisfied larger audience. However, this orderly scenario was disrupted by two unplanned developments: Kádár's refusal to exit gracefully and the ability of the Grósz forces to use this stubbornness as a pretext for rewriting the basic deal.

Kádár's defiant opening statement, which was an

[88] *Neue Krone-Zeitung* (Vienna), May 13, 1988.

[89] Interview in Hungary, May 1988.

[90] Csehák, as minister of health, is viewed as a spokesperson for the regime intellectuals. Szabó, manager of a successful agricultural cooperative, speaks for the commercial agriculture lobby. Tatai is the highly successful manager of a large rubber factory, and hence speaks for the modern managers.

[91] From interviews conducted by the authors in Hungary in May 1988.

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Table 1: Hungarian Leadership Change: May 1988

Old lineup	Date appointed[1]	May 1988 lineup
	Chairman	
		János Kádár
	General Secretary	
János Kádár	1956	*Károly Grósz*
	Deputy Gen. Sec.	
György Lázár	1987	—
	Politburo	
György Aczél (70)[1]	1970	—
János Berecz (57)	1987	János Berecz (57)
Judit Csehák (47)	1987	Judit Csehák (47)
Sándor Gaspar (71)	1962	—
Károly Grósz (57)	1985	Károly Grósz (57)
Csaba Hámori (40)	1985	Csaba Hámori (40)
Ferenc Havasi (59)	1980	—
		Pál Iványi (46)
János Kádár (76)	1957	—
György Lázár (63)	1975	—
		János Lukács (52)
László Maróthy (46)	1975	—
Károly Németh (65)	1970	—
		Miklós Németh (40)
		Rezső Nyers (65)
Miklós Óvári (63)	1975	—
		Imre Pozsgay (55)
István Szabó (64)	1985	István Szabó (64)
		Ilona Tatai (53)
	Secretariat	
János Berecz	1985	János Berecz
György Fejti	1987	György Fejti
János Lukács	1987	János Lukács
Miklós Németh	1987	Miklós Németh
Milkós Óvári	1970	—
Lénárd Pál	1985	Lénárd Pál
Mátyás Szürös	1983	Mátyás Szürös

[1]In parentheses, the ages of the Politburo members.
[2]Date of first appointment, unless May 1988.

SOURCE: Adapted from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Hungarian Party Conference: Mandate for Reform," *Analysis Report* (Washington, DC), FB 88-10011, July 19, 1988, p. 4.

epitome of ideological orthodoxy, resuscitated such code words from the late 1950's as "enemy" and "class struggle"—terms that were thought to have been buried by Kádár himself 25 years ago. Though in his closing speech Kádár seemed to have relented—or had been forced to relent?—his original address and his heavy-handed interventions during the non-televised portions of the conference alienated a large number of delegates.[92]

The delegates' adverse reaction to Kádár's opening statement—viewed as a conservative counterattack on the deal already struck—gave Grósz and his allies an opportunity to change, putsch-style, the terms of the May 10 deal on the makeup of the new Politburo. Between late Saturday evening (May 21) and the following morning, the Grósz forces contacted—either in person or by telephone—most of the delegates, and urged them to cross out the names of Lázár, Gáspár, Károly Németh, Óvári, and perhaps Havasi as well on the ballot for membership on the Central Committee. The majority of the delegates complied with this suggestion and denied a seat on the CC to these Kádár allies who had not had the foresight to jump early enough on the Grósz bandwagon.

After the stunning CC election results were announced at the closed Sunday (May 22) meeting, a recess was called in the proceedings. Assured of victory, Grósz requested the convening of the old, "lame-duck" Kádárist Politburo, from whose ranks all of Kádár's allies were to be soon excluded, in order to (1) vote on the new Politburo based on the results of the Central Committee balloting; (2) accept the nomination of Pál Iványi (a Grósz client from the Budapest organization) as the 11th member of a new Politburo; and (3) inform Moscow of the new line-up.

Somewhat embarrassingly for Grósz, the Soviet "approval" of the latest Politburo line-up was relayed to the Hungarian leadership about the same time as it was put on the TASS wires, at 8 p.m., May 22—10 minutes before Hungarian TV began its live coverage of the results of the "cadre renewal" in the MSzMP. For those "in the know" and, shortly thereafter for the entire country, the necessity to seek Moscow's approval was, yet again, demonstrated.

But what mattered to the delegates and to most Hungarians was that Kádár and his old cronies had been thrown out of the Politburo, to be replaced by a younger and apparently more reform-oriented generation of political leaders. As can be seen in Table 1, the new Politburo averaged just over 52 years of age compared to nearly 60 years for its predecessor. Gone were eight members of the conservative Kádár regime, and among the new members were Pozsgay and Nyers, the two men who were viewed as the reformers in the party hierarchy.

[92]The key speeches and principal resolutions of the conference may be found in *FBIS-EEU*, Supplement, May 23, 1988.

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Among the new members of the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party elected in May 1988 are, from left to right: Miklós Németh, Reszö Nyers, and János Lukács; these three, plus Imre Pozsgay head separate party commissions charged with charting MSzMP reforms.

—Eastfoto.

The Political Agenda

Suddenly, Kádár was gone. The new Grósz leadership, however, still faced the daunting task of deciding where to begin in setting Hungary's house in order, what reforms to enact, and how sweeping the changes should be. Among the many questions needing answers are: How much of the old, well-established Soviet-type system should be consciously retained? How much would unavoidably remain anyway? Should the shape and goals of the newly arising system be determined largely by external criteria or by Hungary's own, domestically generated ideas, insofar as these two can be separated? How should one balance the pressing current needs of the Hungarian economy against long-range considerations? What is the number one economic priority: to avoid debt rescheduling or to maintain some kind of social welfare system to cushion those worst off against the very hard times ahead? How much openness should be allowed, and how much play should be given to democratization and pluralism?

The May party conference approved a policy statement meant to provide some guidelines. It featured demands for immediate democratization of party elections (in 1988 rather than 1990) and imposition of limits on the terms of party officials; a modest expansion of allowable debate within the party framework; endorsement of "socialist pluralism" and relative autonomy for various social organizations such as the PPF, the trade unions, and the youth league; commitment to new economic reforms that would involve a reduction of party interference in the economy; and a promise of improved socialist legality. Although it was a much stronger statement than the original theses, it was still an imprecise guide.[93]

The conference also set up four working groups which it charged with various reform tasks. The first, under Pozsgay, was to sum up the lessons of the last 15–20 years and prepare the party's program for the next 20. The second, under Lukács, was to draft new party statutes. The third, under Nyers, was to develop a system of advisory groups through which the society could have input into decision-making. The fourth, under Miklós Németh, was to devise a new economic strategy.[94]

The guidelines aside, the post-Kádár political leadership has in its first 100 days been remarkably vague and slow to emerge with a substantive program of reform. This implies at the very least serious disagreements within the elite about the speed, direction, and nature of change. Indeed, while there seemed to be some consensus among Hungarian opinion formers

[93]For a summary, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Hungarian Party Conference: Mandate for Reform," *Analysis Report* (Washington, DC), FB 88-10011, July 19, 1988, esp. pp. 12–19.

[94]Ibid., p. 20.

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and the elite on which parts of the system needed attention—the steadily declining economy, the burgeoning foreign debt and prohibitive debt service ratio, the dilapidated infrastructure, and the costly and ineffective bureaucratic political system that has acted as a drag on the economy and an obstacle to change[95]—there remain considerable divisions over the causes of the deterioration and the appropriate cures. This has affected the scope and direction of reform.

Let us take as an example the July 9 Central Committee preparatory document on the economy and the work of the government.[96] The document, which makes reassuring if imprecise noises about improving Hungary's hard-currency balance, as well as cutting the country's domestic budget deficit, is rife with economy-centeredness. Instead of choosing to deal with political issues in political terms, the authors of the document opted to approach questions of power through the prism of economics, the besetting sin of Hungarian politics. This newest party statement was issued on the old assumption, prevalent during Kádár's time, that once the problems of the economy were solved, other social-political problems would disappear automatically. Moreover, the document outlined not one but two possible plans for the economy.

Meeting on July 13–14, 1988, the Central Committee adopted the more radical version of economic reform. The implication was that, as Nyers had earlier prescribed, after the decades-long experiment with central planning and allocations, the "socialist economy [would] become a market economy."[97] This would apparently mean opening Hungary's economy to the West, to the forces of international economic competition, and integration with Western Europe rather than with CEMA.[98] In turn, this would entail terminating price supports for bankrupt but powerful factories, indeed for whole sectors—leading to the actual closing of inefficient, outmoded firms, mines, and enterprises, rather than a mere threat to do so. It would also mean canceling production of most products currently exported to the USSR, and importing from the West—for hard currency—the raw materials and energy resources currently provided by the Soviet Union. Although the goal is a fully convertible Hungarian currency and prices on a level approximating those of Austria, wage levels would lag far behind.

On the surface, the program seemed promising, but it left a number of fundamental, critical political questions unanswered. At best, the economic process would move ahead, generating tremendous societal stresses: a further huge drop in living standards, continued inflation of some 20 percent a year, and growing unemployment at 2–4 percent of the active labor force (although upper limits of tolerable unemployment have yet to be established). The entrepreneurial few would thrive, the poor would become even poorer, and class antagonisms would reemerge with a vengeance—the battle to be waged largely between, on the one hand, the lumpenproletariat that had hitherto been the backbone of the regime, and on the other, what might be termed the "lumpencapitalists"[99] and the intellectual and technocratic elites that would lead the transition to a modern economy.

At worst, the process would be thwarted by the powerful lobbies' seeking and obtaining special treatment, special compromises, and special concessions. Indeed, the notion of "separate contracts" still seems to be the standard modus operandi, clearly eroding the basis of the approved reform program.[100] The regime's principal "clients"—the heavy industries, agriculture, participants in CEMA trade, and the defense and Warsaw Pact interest groups—are all ready to fight any reform that might jeopardize their privileged positions in the queue at the budgetary trough.

In either case, the issues surrounding the introduction of economic reform are essentially political. Will the existing political system bend adequately to permit the economic reforms to take effect? Will the populace called on to make further sacrifices have a voice in the decisions affecting it? Will its legal rights be reliably guaranteed?

For all his self-projection as a dynamic, energetic politician in possession of at least some of the answers—which he has repeatedly insisted are tough ones—Grósz appears at best ambivalent regarding the political reforms required to address the deeper roots of Hungary's crisis. For example, in a fairly informal interview given during his trip back from Moscow in July 1988, Grósz was asked to elaborate on his statement that journalists were free to write about anything and to write everything. He replied that that was only half of what he had said. The other half was that "maximum openness on the part of the leadership and readiness to support the work of the journalists [should be cou-

[95]See, inter alia, *Report on the Hungarian Economy*, prepared by the Finance Research Co. (Pénzügykutató Rt.), June 1988.

[96]*Népszabadság*, July 9, 1988.

[97]Reuters, Mar. 22, 1988; and *Figyelő*, July 21, 1988.

[98]Gál, loc. cit.

[99]The term "lumpen-capitalist" was coined by Béla Faragó of Paris at the Interdisciplinary Conference of Social Scientists in Eger, May 16–20, 1988.

[100]The expression "*külön alku*" (separate bargain or contract) was most effectively used by László Lengyel at the Hungarian Democratic Forum, a gathering of reform intellectuals on July 17, 1988.

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pled with] the necessary self-discipline on the part of the press." The limits of what the press might discuss could be widened, but only in accordance with the rules of the game.[101] The statement is characteristic of many of Grósz's public utterances: he has become a master of taking away with one hand what he has given with the other.

There is no doubt of his determination to retain control of as much of the political agenda as he can, hence his reference to "the rules of the game," which by implication are laid down by the party—after all, the MSzMP remains a vanguard party. Already in April, Grósz had stressed his commitment to "a lasting one-party system . . . a uniform trade union that is self-governing rather than independent, and not several trade unions . . . a uniform youth movement. . . ."[102] In June, he spoke in terms barely distinguishable from Kádár:

We cannot watch idly while [the enemy and the opposition] are organizing themselves, rallying their forces, working out and implementing political conceptions. Should the occasion arise, the leadership, aware of its responsibility, will resort to administrative measures. . . . With due tolerance, we must create unity in the movement and in public life against the enemy and the opposition.[103]

Grósz's cynical attitude regarding autonomous grass-roots political activity was manifest in the differing official reactions to two demonstrations held in Budapest in June. The first, on the 16th, marked the 30th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy; the second, on the 29th, protested the Romanian government's "systematization" project, which would destroy hundreds of ethnically Hungarian villages in Transylvania. Although both demonstrations were peaceful, the first was brutally broken up by the police, while the second enjoyed official neutrality, with the result that between 50,000 and 100,000 people took part. It was the largest public demonstration in Hungary since 1956.

The regime was glad to countenance a manifestation of nationalism in conformity with its own perceptions and intentions, but an "uncontrolled" attempt to rehabilitate Nagy threatened the party's ability to set its own political agenda and raised the specter of the eventual rehabilitation of the 1956 revolution itself. Grósz clearly had no intention of deviating from Kádár's line that 1956 had been a counterrevolution. To underline the point, Grósz quite gratuitously went further: he described the Nagy demonstration as "incitement toward fascist propaganda, chauvinism, and irredentism."[104]

Further confirmation of this perspective came in an interview with *l'Unità,* the Italian Communist Party's newspaper, in which Grósz ominously insisted that he took Kádár as his model (the message being that there would be no "de-Kádárization"). In answer to a question about the reconcilability of "socialist pluralism" and one-party rule, Grósz waffled, stressing that pluralism was not an organizational matter, but rather "the free circulation of ideas inside and outside the party . . . confrontations in which the ideas that best correspond to reality, best uphold the principles of justice, and envision the future most realistically are the ones that will conquer or prevail."[105] Contrary to the urgings of reformers to allow open confrontation of ideas and interests, Grósz evinced little sympathy for any far-reaching political change that would involve political activity outside party control or in any way at odds with the aims of the party. Grósz was clearly prepared to use the rhetoric of change to introduce greater or lesser modifications to the existing state of affairs, and to base his justification for this on a selective denial of the past—but that was as far as it went. At best, there was a verbal ambiguity that paid lip service to variety and did not insist on overt conformity.

Central Committee Secretary Lukács has also been less than enthusiastic about genuine political reform. In an interview printed in *Népszabadság* on July 8, he asserted, without proof, that the May party conference had halted the erosion of confidence in the party, because the membership recognized the leadership's willingness to change. But the picture he drew of the evolution of democracy within the MSzMP was conservative, to say the least. He still envisaged a rather hierarchical organization, though one with a slight easing of democratic centralism at the lower levels. "As far as basic issues are concerned," he stated, "we regard the debate as closed, but with the rider that an adopted standpoint is not necessarily valid for everyone." But,

[101] *Népszabadság,* July 9, 1988.

[102] From *Magyar Hirlap,* April 28, 1988, as translated in "Hungarian Party Conference: Mandate for Reform," p. 25.

[103] MTI, June 12, 1988, cited in "Hungarian Party Conference: Mandate for Reform," p. 27.

[104] *Newsweek,* July 18, 1988. This particular paragraph appeared in the European edition only, it was quite inexplicably omitted from the one that is published in the US, where Grósz was paying an official visit at the time of publication.

On the other hand, as further evidence of the authorities' oscillating attitudes, in September, the Council of Ministers announced an amnesty for all the participants of the 1956 Revolution. This explicitly meant that their criminal records would be expunged and that they would be entitled to passports. See "Legal Rehabilitation of the [Participants] of 1956?" *Heti Világgazdaság,* Sept. 7, 1988.

[105] Interview of June 18, 1988, as quoted by Kevin Devlin, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Report 114/88, June 24, 1988.

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elsewhere in the interview he said:

I think that socialist pluralism—much discussed here without our knowing its precise meaning or its implementation—is nothing more than the expression of the many-sidedness of society under socialist conditions, within the framework of a one-party system.

This circular argument was largely devoid of any readiness to reconsider the significance of inner-party democracy for the rest of the political system, let alone as a value in itself. Indeed, what Lukács said could have been said at any time in the long Kádár period.[106]

Reading the on-going debates in the Hungarian media in the summer of 1988, one is reminded that the crux of the problem—as ever in Soviet-type systems—is the issue of redistribution of power, of the party's acceptance of institutions operating independently of it, and of the emergence of a separate legal sphere. The orthodox view, as distilled from a variety of statements, including the ones already noted, appears to be that though some innovations in the political sphere are to be tolerated, redistribution of power and granting of genuine autonomy will not be conceded.

It is in this light that one should view the fate of the extensive proposals for constitutional reform now circulating in Hungary. The new minister of justice, Kálmán Kulcsár—a sociologist of international repute—and others have called for a complete revision of the Hungarian constitution.[107] Implicit in their discussions is the concept that Hungary's constitution should become a "real" document genuinely transcending and enfolding the political power of the MSzMP, and that the party should accept the superior power of the constitution. Asked what the constitution should contain, radical legal reformer Géza Kilényi replied:

It is typical of our existing constitution that it lacks much that should not be lacking from the constitution of a civilized state. For example, the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle; it is not absent from the legal system, but is from the constitution. But I could also mention a ban on the retroactiveness of legal regulation, which was repeatedly breached in our practice until very recently. In a civilized country this is inconceivable. It is unacceptable that, like the Sword of Damocles, citizens are threatened by the possibility that what is legal today might be illegal tomorrow and, for that reason, they might suffer damage.[108]

Kilényi went on to condemn the discretionary quality of Hungarian political life, in which fine-sounding constitutional principles are undermined by ad hoc powers given to administrative organs in excess of their proper competence. He argued that the national legislature must become the pinnacle of state power, that—to this end—its sessions should last far longer than the current eight days a year, that the powers of the Presidential Council to enact legislation by decree must be curtailed, and that deputies must become more independent. "I can summarize the essence this way—not everything that exists is bad. But nothing is good as it exists."

The implications of the reform proposals are momentous. If the new Hungarian constitution really were to transcend the party, then one would be dealing with an entirely different conception of the party's leading role. The party would at most be primus inter pares, the single most important political actor, but no longer the self-styled omniscient and omnipotent organization that encompasses the entire polity. In a word, the last link with the Leninist model of organization would be severed.

Acceptance of constitutionality would imply toleration of competitive politics, something that Hungarian reformers have been urging on a reluctant elite for the better part of two decades.[109] This would signify that legally recognized institutions, with their own autonomous source of legitimacy and forms of representation, would compete for power with the party and would seek to influence policy-making in a thousand and one ways. And most significantly, it would point ineluctably toward a return to multi-party democracy in the medium or long term.

Such a vision differs from the concept—encountered in Hungary and elsewhere in the socialist bloc—of "one-party pluralism."[110] According to this conception, a single party, with high standards of informal democracy and accessibility, would take the broad, strategic

[106]His statement bears a curious similarity to a definition of socialist realism by his namesake, the philosopher György Lukács, who stated in the late 1960's that socialist realism consisted of writing about events in a realistic way from a socialist standpoint. *A Hét* (Subotica), Oct. 19, 1969.

[107]See, e.g., interviews in *Népszabadság*, Aug. 20, 1988; *Népszava*, Aug. 20, 1988; *Ország-Világ* (Budapest), Aug. 17, 1988; and Budapest Radio, Aug. 31, 1988. See also Géza Kilényi, *Magyar Nemzet*, Aug. 20, 1988; and the interview with György Marosán, Jr., the newly appointed government spokesman, in *Magyar Hirlap*, Aug. 12, 1988, where it was formally announced that the revision process had been started.

[108]Loc. cit.

[109]See Nyers's interview on why the 1968 reforms went awry, "Looking Back at the 1968 Reforms," *Valóság*, Aug. 1988, pp. 9–25.

[110]Among others, András Hegedus, the former Stalinist prime minister of Hungary and later reformer, adopted this standpoint, as did Nyers. They were in the minority among reformers, many of whom recognized the value of one-party pluralism as a tactical device, but not as a transitional stage toward multi-party democracy. This latter point of view may be inferred from Mihály Bihari, *Reform és Demokrácia* (Reform and Democracy), Budapest, Sociological Institute, 1988.

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decisions in politics, partly as a result of its own internal debates and partly in response to the activities of other independent groups. However, sovereignty and power would be perpetually vested in the party. Other groups could lobby to their heart's content, but should never aspire to take power from the party.

The differences between multi-party democracy and one-party socialism are enormous. Democracy, of course, implies that no one body would enjoy a permanent claim to power, that competitiveness of politics extends to the possibility of a change of governments, and that sovereignty rests with the people and their elected representatives. In a democracy, a party is a competing agency of political power subject to others, whereas the single ruling party exists solely for the purpose of exercising power and rejects competition.

All the evidence during Grósz's first 100 days indicated that the top party leadership was distinctly cool even toward the idea of one-party pluralism, let alone multi-party democracy, and was looking for yet another way to square the circle, i.e., to open up the political system to new political forces without redistributing power.[111] This is highly evocative of the Kádárist legacy, which perfected the skill of reforming without reforming, of muddying the situation so that no clear reform line emerged.[112] But without a clear line, it is hardly possible to launch change.

The new leadership has, to put it mildly, been hesitant to define such a line. The two Central Committee meetings in June and July were long on words and declarations of intent and short on concrete regulation. The plenum of June 23 discussed party electoral reform and promised to carry out the work of the party with greater attention to "openness." The July plenum, in addition to discussing the economy (see above), issued guidelines for projected laws on freedom of assembly and freedom of association. The stated aim was to establish a legal environment within which citizens would feel it worth their while to launch initiatives in an organized way.

Much, of course, would depend on how the party, especially at the lower levels, interpreted the idea of a secure legal environment. The Kádárist tradition of discretionary politics was not a promising precedent. Thus, although Central Committee Secretary Fejti, in introducing the report on the new legislation, stressed the importance of creating predictability, reestablishing trust, and allowing discontent to emerge,[113] subsequent commentary indicated that the new law on associations would be drafted in a more, rather than a less, restrictive spirit. The new associations apparently would be required to register with the authorities, who would determine whether an organization had aims "conforming to the law." If not, the authorities would retain the power to dissolve the organization, although this decision could be challenged in the courts.[114] Once again, the autonomy of the legal sphere—constitutionality—was the pivotal issue, and the authorities tried to retain the right to make the decisions regarding which institutions were "proper."

In the meantime, a wide variety of organizations, several of them overtly political, have come into being on an informal basis. Informal practice has, for the moment, greatly widened the scope of political action, although continuation of the organizations' activity remains at the sufferance of the ruling party. For now, the authorities are holding back from acting against the informal groups out of *political* not *legal* considerations.

Despite its precarious existence, this informal activity deserves notice for what it says about the real aspirations of Hungarian society, or at any rate about the views of its politically articulate segments. Among the informal groups is the first independent trade union to be set up in Eastern Europe since Solidarity—the Democratic Union of Scientific Workers (TDDSZ). Another is the Association of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), a highly energetic and sophisticated youth movement (for those under 35, though there have been moves to raise the upper age limit to 40), that has increasingly acted as a political party. The draft statutes of FIDESZ uncompromisingly commit the organization to democracy. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, a loose grouping that encompasses the Populist wing of the intelligentsia, formally constituted itself in September and, although denying this, looked very much like a political party—with its own alternative program and vision of the political future.[115]

Meanwhile, the Urbanists, many of whom had been heavily involved in the June 16 demonstration com-

[111]In response to a question about the possibility of setting up a Social Democratic party, Jenő Andics, head of the CC Agitation and Propaganda Department, said that because the question of workers' unity had already been settled in 1948, the establishment of a new Social Democratic party would not be the formation of a new party, but the splitting of a party that had already been united. See Budapest Television, Sept. 4, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 7, 1988, p. 25.

[112]Éva Voszka, *Reform és átszervezés a nyolcvanas években* (Reform and Reorganization in the Eighties), Budapest, Közgasdaság és Jogi Kiadó, 1988, gives an excellent account of how various reform proposals were eviscerated by the political process.

[113]*Népszabadság*, July 15, 1988.

[114]To date, the law has not yet been passed by the National Assembly. On the draft law, see *Népszabadság*, Aug. 27, 1988.

[115]See the report on the founding meeting of the Forum, Budapest Radio, Sept. 3, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 6, 1988, p. 27; and the interview with two leading Forum figures, Zoltán Biró and Sándor Csóri, Budapest Radio, Sept. 5, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 7, 1988, pp. 23–24.

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memorating Imre Nagy,[116] tended to cluster around the Network of Free Initiatives. In addition, there are environmentalist groups; the Committee for Historical Justice, seeking justice for political prisoners; the Republican Circle; the Libertas group, the Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Circle (named after a radical politician of the prewar and wartime eras); a number of Social Democratic discussion circles; and several other groups, all pursuing broadly democratic political objectives. It remains an open question whether these groups are really felt by the MSzMP to be reconcilable with its definition of "democratic."

Similar ambiguity attaches to the issue of "openness" or "the public sphere."[117] The ferment in the Hungarian media predated the "coup of the apparat" by about one year, and indeed contributed mightily to the collapse of the Kádárist consensus. After the May conference, control over the media, and thus censorship over the style and content of public discourse, came under Imre Pozsgay, who evidently gave the green light for the lifting of existing restraints. The result was a very wide-ranging, open interpretation of what could be said, in tone as well as in content. Yet none of this was, as such, institutionalized. If the brakes could be taken off, they could arguably be put back on, as was painfully learned in the aftermath of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia.

A deeper assessment of the state of affairs and more serious remedies were needed in this sector. True, no one can argue with the observation of one contributor to *Mozgó Világ*'s round table on the "public sphere," that all problems in this sector can be laid to the supervision exercised by the party over what reaches the public.[118] But that proposition only scratches the surface. The issue involves legal-constitutional considerations, political praxis, and the psychological habits of deference and self-censorship that have grown up over many years. All the same, change was in the air, so the debate for now was at least about the *limits* rather than the mere *possibility* of change.

The authorities appear far from ready to give up their control of the media. Much is tolerated, sometimes grudgingly, but there is nothing to suggest that the leading role of the party might be withdrawn sufficiently to allow entirely free discussion, without any direct party supervision.[119] For the time being, those in charge of the media support greater freedom, but more—it seems—as a matter of their personal prerogative than as an implementation of a well-defined public policy. Thus, Jenő Andics, head of the CC Agitation and Propaganda Department, declared on television in answer to a question about the current forms of press direction:

It cannot be directed in the old way, indeed it is not even necessary [to do so]. The traditional methods of press direction have to be replaced by political work in the press. We must divide the press in two—the party press and the remaining mass media. The party press is obviously run directly by the party. The direction of the non-party press, whether print or electronic media, will in the future be the task of the media managers. They will be responsible for their organ from the political standpoint.[120]

The trouble with such ambiguity is that it is in dangerous contrast to the seriousness and urgency of the crisis that has overtaken Hungary. Neither the current tolerance of greater diversity in the media nor the new-fangled political reforms—more open elections and the new significance accorded the parliament—really provide concrete answers to the problems of the economy and polity discussed earlier.

Prospects

What, then, are the prospects for Hungary under Károly Grósz? What reform is possible, and what could it achieve?

At the outset, it is useful to dispel the impression that the regime is constrained from taking any serious reform steps because of Moscow's potential veto. First, so long as Hungary maintains the myth of the leading role of the party, so long as it does not opt for the end of "communist rule"—whatever that term means—and does not seek to disengage from the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev's USSR, at the present time, is not likely to intervene. The Soviet leadership, currently preoccupied with rebuilding "socialism in one country," is in a semi-isolationist mood, disengaging itself from distant ventures not perceived to be in its primary national interest. Mainly, it seeks to secure peace and stability among its Eastern allies. Moreover, Moscow itself is

[116]The Urbanists reflect a more Western, liberal democratic strain of reformist opinion in Hungary than the Populists. They are largely concentrated in Budapest and stress universal concepts of reform rather than emphasizing their traditional Hungarian roots.

[117]The Hungarian term "nyilvánosság" can be translated either way.

[118]"Debate on the Public Sphere," *Mozgó Világ*, June 1988. The participants were Lászó Antal, Géza Kilényi, Iván Berend, József Csikós (head of a CC department), and György Baló for the journal.

[119]Richárd Hirschler's analysis of control of the media to the Hungarian Democratic Forum, May 15, 1988, provided an excellent account. The authors attended this gathering.

[120]Budapest TV, Sept. 4, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 7, 1988, p. 24.

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seeking to place its economy on a "more rational" trading basis—and trade within CEMA is today anything but rational. Finally, to have an East European state that he can emulate, or work in tandem with, would be of immeasurable benefit to Gorbachev as he faces the fossilized Stalinist central systems that are still characteristic of most of the countries of the Soviet bloc.

Thus, reforms are not externally precluded. But what can they be expected to accomplish? If we restrict ourselves to the economic measures approved in July—and even they were only an outline and not a detailed blueprint—one can at best expect Hungary to stabilize or prevent a further widening of the technological gap of 5, 10, 20 years that has opened between it and the advanced countries of the West. Closing the gap is only a dream at present.[121]

Absorption of technology from the West can only take place after the country's decrepit infrastructure—water, sewer, electricity, telephone, and road networks—is at least patched up. The limitations imposed by the current infrastructure can be illustrated by the example of Hungary's telephone network. It is simply unable to accommodate any computer-based communications system, yet the microchip and computer industries are expected to be the standard-bearers of Hungary's economic renewal. To make the absurd appear even more ridiculous, Hungary in 1988 signed an agreement with the USSR to rebuild the Hungarian computer chip industry—clearly a case of compounded backwardness.[122]

As for correcting the ills of society, the chances are even slimmer. Even though education and medical delivery have been targeted as priority investment categories, the net amounts spent on these areas—as on state housing services—will be still lower than minimally acceptable under anticipated austerity budgets. One can reasonably predict continued deterioration of the quality of air and water, little or no improvement in medical service, and rising rates of suicide, alcoholism, divorce, and crime.

Critical to any attempt at real change will be whether Hungary's population will (or even should) give the leadership the benefit of the doubt, as Pozsgay put it.[123] To be sure, the regime can try to gain that trust through a variety of means other than "economic gains." It can "play" the nationalist card in regard to the tragedy of Hungarians living under the monomaniacal despotic rule of Romania's Nicolae Ceauşescu. It can cautiously move toward rehabilitating Imre Nagy and the failed revolution of 1956. And it can even try to negotiate the partial withdrawal of the 60,000 or so Soviet troops that have been "temporarily stationed" on Hungarian territory for more than four decades.

Ultimately, however, the trust of the people of Hungary will be given only to a government that they understand to be working in their interests—national, human, and civic. In the end, the aspirations of the people are clear: to live in a decent, democratic, Western, European-oriented system. For that chance, they might accept setbacks, a drop in their standard of living, even a bit of poverty. But, one cannot confidently predict that the leadership of the consummate apparatchik Károly Grósz will make convincing moves in that direction. Barring such a move, the only question that remains is how long Hungarians will have to suffer before the tottering communist edifice collapses or is torn down.

[121]See László Lengyel's discussion in *Uj Tükör*, July 10, 1988.

[122]Pál Réti, "Microelectronics: Traps of an R & D Strategy," *Figyelö*, May, 19, 1988, p. 5.

[123]Radio Budapest, July 19, 1988.

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The New Logic in Soviet-GDR Relations

A. James McAdams

In September 1987, Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), paid his first state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The four-day visit (September 7–11) was an unprecedented event for the two German states, since Honecker was received by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl with all the diplomatic protocol accorded a visiting head of state.

Beyond its impact on the inter-German relationship, the trip was important for what it suggested about the state of relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union in the Gorbachev era. In 1983 and 1984, Soviet-GDR ties had undergone enormous strains when, in response to NATO's deployment of intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles, Moscow had called on its East European allies to freeze relations with the West. Reluctantly, Honecker acceded to Soviet pressure and put off plans to visit the FRG at that time. Yet by 1987, with the Soviets introducing a new pro-détente line and East German–Soviet relations apparently improving, he was evidently able to find a more receptive audience in the Kremlin for his *Westpolitik*.

East German leaders have been quick to underline that Honecker's 1987 trip was not an attempt to mimic the new trend in Soviet foreign policy, but a historic step that resulted from an improved East-West climate (epitomized by the US-Soviet decision of that year to eliminate all European intermediate-range nuclear forces) for which the GDR could take partial credit. Honecker, they have pointed out, has conducted a détente-minded policy toward the West throughout the 1980's. In their view, the success of that policy and the trip are proof that, in taking controversial policy stands—even at the risk of occasionally irritating their superpower patrons—non-superpower states in Europe can play a positive role in the area of foreign policy.

While differences over foreign policy priorities within the Warsaw Pact are hardly a new phenomenon, what appears to be new—as exemplified by East Germany's *Westpolitik* in recent years—is the stubborness with which some East European states now assert themselves, as well as their apparent success, at times at least, in getting Moscow to live up to the Pact's much-vaunted norms of "cooperation" and "mutual respect," terms which were little more than empty slogans in the past.[1]

To see just what has happened to the East German–Soviet relationship to effect this change, it is instructive to compare Honecker's conflict with Moscow over

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[1]For a typical Soviet enunciation of the ideal image of cooperative intra-bloc relations, consider: "The all-embracing form of unity of all the countries of the world socialist system does not require them to pursue identical foreign policies, nor to hold identical views, approaches, and assessments of certain international events and inter-state relations." USSR Academy of Sciences, *Consolidation of the Socialist Countries' Unity*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 50.

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appropriate policy toward West Germany with a similar, equally important episode involving his immediate predecessor, Walter Ulbricht. The different outcome of Honecker's dispute suggests that a great deal has changed in the GDR's position within the bloc, and that as Mikhail Gorbachev confronts the management of his country's relationship with Eastern Europe in the years to come, he will face challenges considerably more complicated than those faced by his predecessors.

Symmetric Disputes

As is the case with all East European leaderships, East Germany's leaders have had more differences with the Soviet Union in the past than clichéd images of subservience to Moscow would allow. Thus, although Erich Honecker's altercation with the Soviet Union in 1983–84 may seem unusual, an equally serious conflict took place in the years 1970–71. At that earlier time, Soviet leaders ran up against a wall of East German hostility when they attempted to normalize relations with West Germany and open up an era of East-West détente. Indeed, the issues at the heart of that particular dispute between Moscow and the GDR's then party chief, Walter Ulbricht, bear a greater resemblance to the 1983–84 conflict than may seem evident at first glance. In both cases, the East German leaders shared a similar problem: they were each fighting for a conception of East German priorities that they found to be jeopardized by an abrupt and, in their view, unwarranted shift in Soviet policy.

The most prominent of Ulbricht's many differences with Moscow was over the search for a negotiated solution to the Berlin question, easily one of the greatest sources of postwar European instability. In the fall of 1970, Soviet authorities first began to drop hints to the West that they were finally interested in seeking a compromise settlement on the status of Berlin and on the city's tenuous transit links to West Germany. For Moscow, such a settlement was a vital component of the USSR's détente initiatives of the late 1960's; it would secure ratification of a renunciation-of-force pact with the FRG and eventually open the way for a pan-European security conference. Yet, at the time, Ulbricht opposed any concessions on Berlin, insisting that there could be no special ties between the city and West Germany.

As I have shown elsewhere,[2] Ulbricht's inflexibility was hardly as obtuse as it may now seem in retrospect. Far from being arcane debating points, his demands for the city's neutrality and for East German control over its access routes were linked directly to the SED's

[2]A. James McAdams, *East Germany and Détente: Building Authority After the Wall*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 110–15.

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and East German chief of state and party leader Erich Honecker review an honor guard upon Honecker's arrival in Bonn, West Germany, on September 7, 1987, for an official visit.

—Eastfoto.

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Walter Ulbricht, left, and Leonid Brezhnev at Berlin-Schönefeld Airport on October 5, 1969.

—Eastfoto.

claims that the GDR enjoyed total sovereignty over its territory. The only way to stabilize the country internally, so Ulbricht and others in the party leadership reasoned, was to convince its skeptical citizenry that there were no other legitimate pretenders to control over eastern Germany. Ulbricht had good reason to think that he enjoyed Moscow's complete support on this issue. In previous years, Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders had repeatedly assured the SED that there would be no compromise with the West on Berlin. Thus, in Ulbricht's eyes, Moscow's new course in 1970 showed an incomprehensible disregard for the GDR's interests.

Accordingly, the East German party chief responded to the Soviet about-face by invoking rhetorical principles of fraternal cooperation long used by the USSR to justify in ideological terms its control over the Eastern bloc. "Still more use could be made," Ulbricht insisted in mid-November 1970, of "opportunities for joint meetings . . . or at least consultations over certain basic questions."[3] Applying some muscle to his plea, Ulbricht then turned to an old tactic of disrupting the transit routes between West Berlin and the FRG.

The Soviet leadership must have been impressed, if only by the East German leader's ability to upset the Berlin talks. For, when Ulbricht and Brezhnev finally confronted each other at a Warsaw Pact gathering in early December, the result of their discussions was (in the words of one analyst) clearly a "compromise" for both sides.[4] Ulbricht agreed to lessen pressure on the traffic routes, and the Soviets backed off on the Berlin issue, appearing to throw themselves wholeheartedly behind the East German position. As we shall see, this compromise was not to last, since the Soviets chose to renew their initiatives to the West only a few months later, in April 1971.

Significantly, Honecker's clash with Moscow in 1983 and 1984 occurred over very similar issues. To be sure, unlike the earlier Berlin episode, which eventually led to an opening to the West, the new source of controversy in the fall of 1983 centered upon the Soviets' apparent inclination to put East-West détente on hold. But here again, the real issue for Soviet-GDR relations was the effect that Soviet actions, in this case punitive, vis-à-vis the West would have on the SED's priorities. Despite earlier fears, détente with West Germany had proved to be an unexpected bargain for the East Germans. Over the preceding decade, the GDR's leaders had not only learned to live with the idea of increased contacts with their old adversaries, but they had also found that greater ties with the FRG could be profitable as well, both economically and politically. Honecker, in particular, had become expert in using contacts with his counterparts in Bonn to enhance his country's image abroad, and for all appearances, his pro-détente stance had made him a popular figure among the East German populace.[5]

The Soviets could be given credit for much of the East Germans' confidence. Not only had Moscow pushed East Berlin into breaking down the barriers to its relations with the FRG in the first place, but throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's, Soviet leaders had elevated the GDR to the level of a "junior partner" in bloc affairs.[6] After years of having to put up with a second-class status in the alliance, the East German regime was naturally inclined to relish the chance to act as Moscow's loyal agent; this exuberance was clearly seen at the 1976 meeting of world communist parties in East Berlin, in which the SED took on the role of a cheerleader for Soviet interests, defending the Kremlin's domestic and foreign policies against attacks from Euro-

[3]*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Nov. 15, 1970.

[4]Robin Remington, *The Warsaw Pact*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1971, p. 161.

[5]McAdams, op. cit., pp. 197–98.

[6]See, for example, Melvin Croan, *East Germany: The Soviet Connection*, Washington Papers, No. 36, Beverly Hills, CA, SAGE, 1976, p. 10.

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communist parties and other critics.[7]

This partnership was not confined to communist affairs alone, for particularly at the beginning of the 1980's, the Soviets also deliberately sought to use their ally's greater access to the FRG to influence West European politics, most notably in the campaign against NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Again, East Berlin benefited. During Yuriy Andropov's short reign, the Soviet General Secretary took a marked interest in the GDR, both publicly and privately encouraging Honecker to think that East Germany had a special role to play in maintaining peace in central Europe.[8] Gradually, given the virtual identity of Moscow's and East Berlin's interests, East German enthusiasm for the Soviet Union and for the cause of East-West détente became inseparable.

Against this background, it is not hard to understand why Moscow's shift on the priority of détente in 1983 should have put Honecker in a position very similar to Ulbricht's in 1971. Like his predecessor, Honecker immediately sought to safeguard what he perceived to be the GDR's interests by calling for a continuation of the policy lines that had already served his country well. Speaking in late November 1983, just days after West Germany had agreed to accept the new missiles, he urged the Kremlin to recognize that although some countermeasures might be necessary in order to maintain military parity between the alliances (i.e., the deployment of a new Soviet tactical nuclear missile on the GDR's soil, which Honecker later indelicately labelled the "*Teufelszeug*," "the Devil's tool"[9]), the escalation of



East German party and state leader Erich Honecker, right, talks with French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson in East Berlin in January 1984.

—Eastfoto.

international tensions now made inter-bloc dialogue all the more necessary. "As genuine advocates of peace," Honecker declared, "we are always guided by the popular wisdom that ten times more negotiations are in any case better than one shot."[10] In fact, this emphasis on "damage limitation" (to use Honecker's own phrase) continued to color East German actions into 1984. In the early months of the year, the GDR's leaders hosted a number of Western visitors in East Berlin—Claude Cheysson, Elliot Trudeau, and Richard Burt—and Honecker himself used Andropov's funeral in February to discuss plans with Helmut Kohl for a trip to West Germany.

The new Moscow government of Konstantin Chernenko was quick to show its displeasure with such attempts to influence the Soviet line on East-West relations. In a curious exchange in which two other East European states, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, took the place of the USSR and the GDR in spelling out the latter two's differences, the Soviets let it be known that their understanding of bloc unity meant unquestioned uniformity on all basic points. The Czechoslovak newspaper *Rudé Právo* lectured: "All elements of particularism in our community, any and all weakening of the socialist countries' *uniform* [my emphasis] foreign policy strategy . . . merely harm the prestige of socialism in the eyes of the world, to say nothing of the fact that [these

[7]At that time, interestingly, it was the SED—perhaps reflecting its own feelings of insecurity in the early years of intensified contacts with the FRG and, hence, its greater sense of dependence on the USSR—that uncritically acclaimed the Soviet Union's achievements; in contrast, the task of defending sovereign socialist initiatives—albeit from outside the bloc—was left up to the Yugoslavs and to the Italian and Spanish communist Parties. See James P. McGregor, "The 1976 European Communist Parties Conference," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Berkely, CA), Winter 1978, pp. 346–48.

Despite the SED's "conformist" stand at this time, East German officials involved in arranging the conference have subsequently told me that the event was also a learning experience for them; it not only exposed them to other, innovative notions of communist international relations, but because the conference proceedings were all published in *Neues Deutschland*, it compelled them to recognize that innovative stands were legitimate, too.

[8]East German officials now confirm this perception of the Soviet General Secretary's interest in the GDR, particularly in contrast to the lack of concern displayed by his successor, Konstantin Chernenko. On Andropov and Eastern Europe, note the emphasis in his first major address as general secretary (on November 22, 1982) on making "comradely cooperation and socialist mutual assistance among the fraternal countries deeper and more effective. . . ." *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 23, 1982, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Dec. 22, 1982, p. 6.

[9]The term "*Teufelszeug*" seems to have acquired a generic significance for the East Germans, to be applied to all European INF systems. But I have been told that the term was particularly used to send the Soviets a pointed signal about the "welcome" their own missiles would receive in the GDR.

[10]*Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), Nov. 30, 1983, pp. 257–60. In places, Honecker seemed to direct his words more to Moscow than to the FRG. Consider his cryptic remark: "Whoever thinks he can treat the GDR other than as a sovereign state in the face of the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, whoever thinks he can unilaterally make null and void the provision in the Basic Treaty that stipulates that both German states decide themselves on their internal and external affairs, is on the wrong track."

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factions] actually harm the long-term interests of those who act in this way." In response, the Hungarian party leadership rushed to defend the East Germans. Mátyás Szürös, an outspoken Central Committee secretary and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, pointedly noted that "the alliance system of the socialist countries [does] not, of course, prevent any member from undertaking individual initiatives toward strengthening the peace." Indeed, Szürös cautioned, only an interpretation of "common goals" that included both "the most basic national interests of the cooperating socialist countries and efforts toward the creation of international conditions necessary for their implementation" was justified in the current crisis situation. Notably, the Soviet press chose to ignore Szürös's comments, while reprinting the *Rudé Právo* article, whereas the East Germans published the Hungarian's remarks, but passed over the Czechoslovak item in silence.[11]

For the moment, however, as in Ulbricht's confrontation, this esoteric debate seemed to end in a standoff. When the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) foreign ministers' conference met in Budapest in late April, its delegates reached a compromise between the more confrontational Soviet position and that of its critics. Although the pact ministers did decry the "new, particularly perilous" conditions created by the West's actions, they also confirmed, in line with East German hopes, that what was "needed for reestablishing a healthy situation and returning to détente [was] dialogue between states about the basic requirements of preserving and strengthening peace." Interestingly, the meeting concluded not with the customary declarations of bloc unanimity but only with an acknowledgment that discussions had been conducted in "an atmosphere of comradely mutual understanding."[12]

Different Outcomes

Ulbricht's and Honecker's apparent ability to strike compromises with Moscow was illuminating testimony to the influence that small states may occasionally have over larger powers.[13] In each case, we can only speculate as to why the Soviets were apparently willing to accommodate East Berlin. Perhaps Moscow recognized the legitimacy of the East Germans' claims in both instances, and reluctantly (if temporarily) bowed to the needs of an ally? Or perhaps the Soviets were unwilling to risk the outbreak of bloc controversy at a time when the appearance of agreement served their interests in negotiating with the West? It is one thing for a small state to strike a compromise, however, and quite another to maintain it—that is, to influence the outcome of a debate. Here, the differences between Ulbricht's fortunes and Honecker's today appear most enlightening.

In Ulbricht's case, despite what amounted to a temporary accommodation, the limits of any East German leverage soon became manifest. Consider the fate both of Ulbricht personally and of his policy. In early May 1971, Ulbricht himself was forced to step down as party first secretary as a direct result of pressure from Moscow.[14] Even more consequential, though, was the fate experienced by what he understood to be East Germany's distinctive priority concerns. Within the next few months, the Soviets successfully negotiated a Berlin treaty that subordinated the cause of East German sovereignty to that of East-West détente. The GDR government was not granted the right to supervise traffic to Berlin (this prerogative was instead assumed by the USSR), nor was the neutrality of Berlin's western sectors guaranteed.[15]

When it comes to an assessment of Honecker's fortunes, matters depend on what standards we use to judge success and failure. If we arbitrarily choose Honecker's postponement of his September 1984 visit to the FRG as the measure, as seems to have been the case in most Western reportage, then our evaluation of his fortunes will have to be negative. But, if we contrast the longer-term outcome to the fate of Ulbricht and his priorities, we get a very different picture.

First, despite an acerbic exchange between Moscow and East Berlin in the summer of 1984, Honecker appears to have had little trouble retaining his position as head of the SED. If anything, his hold on the party leadership may have become stronger in the period when the dispute was hottest. This was evidenced by his abil-

[11]For these articles, see the useful compilation by Ronald D. Asmus, "East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of a Dispute," Radio Free Europe–Radio Liberty, *RFE Occasional Papers* (Munich), No. 1, 1985, pp. 25–30. I have learned that the Czechoslovak party leadership was so eager to support Moscow that it passed an "anti-dialogue" resolution, barring further talks with countries supporting the NATO missile deployments. However, it is hard to determine whether Prague really followed through on the decision.

[12]*Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1984, pp. 97–99. Apparently, this compromise was sustained at the Moscow meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in June. See Fred Oldenburg, "Are Moscow's Shadows Becoming Longer?" *Deutschland Archiv* (Köln), August 1984, p. 834. For a very different conclusion of a WTO gathering, which ended in "complete mutual agreement," see the description of the Pact's subsequent meeting in December 1984, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, Dec. 7, 1984, pp. 273–75.

[13]On the power of small states, see Astri Suhrke, "Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1973, pp. 508–32;and Robert Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy* (Philadelphia), Spring 1971, pp. 161–82.

[14]McAdams, op. cit., pp. 110–15.

[15]On these negotiations, see N. Edwina Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978; and Gerhard Wettig, *Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp*, London, C. Hurst and Co., 1975.

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ity to appoint several key supporters to the Politburo, including one charged exclusively with the task of supervising GDR-FRG relations.[16]

More crucial still, Honecker's pro-détente policy appears to have been preserved despite the differences, a fact that remains true up to the present date. Officials in East Berlin emphasized that the General Secretary had only *postponed* his trip; it would take place eventually.[17] Then, only a day after the announcement, Honecker conspicuously received a visiting West German delegation for an exchange of views.

Finally, evidence of East Berlin's success was confirmed at a key meeting between the East German leader and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in early October 1984, a gathering notable in part because Gromyko and his associate, Boris Ponomarev, now appear to have been among the principal behind-the-scenes critics of the GDR.[18] The conferees both agreed to pursue an essentially two-track policy toward the West. They acknowledged that the USSR and the GDR would "continue to repel energetically the machinations of the enemies of European security," but simultaneously—quite saliently for East German purposes—they also reaffirmed the readiness of both sides "to conduct a serious and sincere dialogue with all forces who are genuinely interested in a healthy international situation."[19]

What Has Changed?

It is tempting to attribute Honecker's greater success in dealing with the Soviets to the general state of disarray that existed within the CPSU leadership throughout 1983 and 1984. One could say that Ulbricht had bad luck in the timing of his challenge to Moscow; in the early 1970's, Leonid Brezhnev was finally consolidating his power, and judging from his central presence at the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, he could have easily quashed any "anti-détente" forces inclined to support Ulbricht's position. In contrast, by 1984, with Andropov dead after a long period of uncertain health and with the rise of an ineffectual administration under Chernenko, the Soviets were in no position to challenge Honecker. However, at least three additional factors might account *independently* for the GDR's emergence as a more formidable negotiating partner by the 1980's. Exploration of these factors is important for assessing whether the GDR's success is more than a passing phenomenon.

Among the GDR's new bargaining strengths, consider first the degree of *internal* unity that its leaders were able to present to the Soviets. Ulbricht's domestic authority was clearly on the wane as early as 1970. His ambitious economic programs had petered out, and his increasingly erratic style of policy-making had alienated most of his old supporters in the SED Politburo. Under these circumstances, the Soviets could confidently exploit divisions within the East German elite and be assured that a more compliant replacement for Ulbricht (i.e., Honecker) could be found.

In contrast, the SED that Moscow faced in 1984 was able to present an almost undivided front. Honecker's success in making appointments to the Politburo was complemented by domestic and foreign policy achievements—the country's economy was in an upswing and inter-German relations were flourishing—that put the East German General Secretary at the height of his power. Even if the Soviets had wanted to conduct a campaign against Honecker, they could hardly have known for sure whom to rely upon to support their position, let alone whether they would really have had the power to replace the SED leader.

Historically speaking, the situation was fraught with irony. In 1971, a strong Soviet regime had had no problem facing down its weaker East German counterpart. But by 1984, with the Honecker government consolidated and the Soviet leadership in question, the positions of the two powers were in some ways reversed.

Second, the two cases apparently differed in the East German regime's ability to find *external* sources of support for its policy interests, that is, to redefine an essentially USSR-GDR conflict into one between the Soviets and a broader front of parties.[20] In late 1970 and early 1971, Ulbricht had tried to drum up support for his Berlin posture by appealing to other East European states to stand behind him. But, in every case, his efforts were

[16]Notably, in 1983, Honecker seems to have been able, with Andropov's tacit backing, to arrange the removal of the two-time Soviet ambassador, Petr Abrasimov, who had long conducted himself as though the GDR were his personal province. Then, in May 1984, at the 8th SED Central Committee Plenum, Honecker removed from the Politburo one of the principal skeptics regarding expansion of inter-German contacts, Paul Verner, while simultaneously arranging the appointment of four allies to full Politburo membership. Of these appointments, that of Herbert Häber, the Central Committee's chief expert on GDR-FRG relations, was particularly telling, for Häber had previously not even held candidate status.

[17]The Soviets admitted this. According to *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 7, 1984, the visit had only been "put off *[otlozhen]*."

[18]Author's personal sources, East Berlin.

[19]*Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, Oct. 19, 1984, p. 233.

[20]Along these lines, William Zimmerman has demonstrated how small states (like the GDR) can consistently improve their bargaining position by forming tacit coalitions with other like-minded states or parties. See "Hierarchical Regional Systems and the Politics of System Boundaries," *International Organization* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1972, p. 18.

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to little avail among party leaderships (particularly those in Czechoslovakia and Poland) whom he had alienated in the past.

Honecker was not faced with such isolation during his dispute with Moscow, because a number of other East European states—Hungary (as we have already seen), Bulgaria, and Romania—also were keen to nurture dialogue and especially economic exchanges with the FRG. The East Germans were only too glad to support such undertakings. Notably, in late August 1984, Honecker was the only bloc leader to attend the anniversary of Romania's liberation from fascism, a move that contrasted strikingly with past East German criticism of Bucharest's iconoclastic tradition of foreign policy-making.

The GDR's leader was also able to cultivate support for his policies from Western sources, particularly among West European social democratic parties. This strategy had its roots in a major April 1983 conference in East Berlin (which passed largely unnoticed in the West) on the legacy of Karl Marx, in which the SED argued that the cause of preserving international peace had assumed priority over the promotion of social change. Not only were communist parties of all orientations invited to send delegations to the conference, but so too were numerous social democratic parties, including the leading West German opposition party, the SPD.[21] Then, in 1984, the SED began a series of direct negotiations on common security concerns (first, on a proposed chemical weapons–free zone and later, on a European nuclear weapons–free corridor) with representatives of the SPD leadership. The Soviets found themselves in an undeniably uncomfortable position, facing not just one but a host of critics of the politics of confrontation, from both East and West.

Finally, Moscow's difficulties were undoubtedly compounded by another factor enhancing East Berlin's bargaining leverage: the growing *mutual dependence* between the two states. By the 1980's, the GDR was no longer the old "sick man" of Eastern Europe. Ulbricht's East Germany had been one-sidedly dependent upon the Soviet Union for its political and economic survival, and at the time of Ulbricht's crisis with Moscow, domestic uncertainties loomed large: no one at that juncture could have known how well the GDR would stand up under conditions of its new ties with the FRG.

However, by 1984, the East German elite had emerged as among the most self-assured in the region, and the GDR could look increasingly to its own resources, in addition to those of the USSR, to meet its evolving needs.[22] No one would deny, of course, that Honecker's GDR still depended on the Soviet Union. But as we have already seen, the new-found strength of East Germany made it useful to the USSR, both within the socialist bloc and in Moscow's dealings with the West Europeans. This Soviet reliance on the East Germans as tactical agents seems paradoxically to have transformed a once lopsided relationship into one of growing interdependence.[23] At a time when Moscow was calling for socialist unity on the missile question, how could it possibly criticize the GDR's leaders (at least overtly), who were supposed to be shining examples of bloc loyalty?[24] And in particular, given the Soviets' previous encouragement of a special inter-German détente, how could they now demand that East Berlin abandon what had once been approved policy, especially when that policy had already flourished throughout the early 1980's during conditions of heightened superpower tension?

Under these circumstances, the East Germans cannot have failed to recognize how difficult it was for the Soviets to jettison their old priorities without allowing for an adequate discussion of the issue within the alliance. In this light, we can readily appreciate Honecker's optimism about making his own case for the bloc's policy toward the West.

The Limits of Autonomy

This brings us to a telling difference between Ulbricht's behavior in the early 1970's and Honecker's behavior in the most recent conflict with Moscow. For while the East Germans today may seem more inclined to challenge the Soviets on their own terms and to demand an open airing of bloc differences, it is not the Soviet Union's leadership of the bloc that they are questioning or the goal of an ultimate consensus, but only the idea that disagreement among socialist states is

[21] The equal inclusion of social democratic parties at an East German conference on Karl Marx's legacy was hard enough for many observers to comprehend, especially in the USSR. But when the SPD's representative hardly even mentioned Marx, preferring instead to stress international security concerns, these skeptics were dumbfounded. A high-placed Soviet official inquired of one of the conference's organizers: "What can this mean?" From author's sources in East Berlin.

[22] McAdams, op. cit., pp. 161–63.

[23] On the paradox of using others as agents, see the Ph.D dissertation by Barry M. Mitnick, "The Theory of Agency: The Concept of Fiduciary Rationality and Some Consequences," Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1974.

[24] Consider Suhrke's generalization (loc. cit., p. 512) about the exceptional power of *loyal* small states: "The weak government must be sufficiently loyal to the alliance to raise the costs of its own expendability."

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undesirable.[25]

By contrast, there is good reason to think that by 1971, Ulbricht was actually challenging Soviet hegemony in the alliance, at least after he recognized that Moscow was not willing to undertake any further sacrifices to secure what he conceived to be the GDR's interests. Certainly, this was how the Soviet leadership (and large sections of the SED leadership as well) chose to interpret the First Secretary's increasingly unrestrained attacks upon Moscow's authority. At the CPSU Congress in March 1971, when the Soviets signaled that they were prepared, once again, to make major concessions to the West on Berlin, Ulbricht was unwilling to cooperate. Instead, he showed his displeasure by refusing to go along with customary denunciations of the People's Republic of China, and, citing his personal acquaintance with Lenin, he contended that the Father of the Revolution had recognized that even "Russians" had "things to learn."[26] By identifying himself with Lenin, Ulbricht was implicitly placing himself above imperfect contemporary Soviet understandings of the requisites of bloc order. His view of the pursuit of East German (national) interests, it seemed, had precedence over the (international) unity of the bloc.

There can be little doubt that in 1984, some within the Soviet government feared that Honecker might be engaged in this same kind of challenge to Moscow's authority. This would account for the vitriolic campaign that the Moscow press suddenly launched in May 1984 against a purported reawakening of neo-revanchist sentiment in the FRG. Although it was the West Germans who were accused of wanting to drag the GDR out of the bloc, it became clear that the campaign, as it continued throughout the summer, was directed as much against East Berlin as against Bonn. Significantly, West Germany was attacked for espousing slogans that Honecker himself had articulated, and the whole idea of inter-German "damage limitation" was treated as if it were a crude attempt to pursue pan-German interests.[27]

We now know that these accusations disturbed the GDR leadership, particularly given its self-conception of loyally serving the socialist cause. But to understand East German thinking today, it is worth asking whether in 1984 the Honecker regime even conceived of taking up the kind of challenge to Soviet authority that Ulbricht had espoused. Did the GDR's leaders really think, like Ulbricht before them, that there was any point in trying to make policy independently of the Soviet Union?

Ulbricht's challenge in 1971 was defiant. Yet, he personally had little to lose in attempting to distance his country from its alliance commitments. In contrast, East Berlin faced in 1984 (and still faces today) a substantially different situation. The GDR's leaders may have been more self-assured. But, as we have seen, because this strength was derived largely from an interdependent relationship with Moscow, they also recognized that their prominent position in bloc affairs was guaranteed only so long as they agreed to operate according to consensual norms. If the GDR showed an unwillingness to compromise on this occasion, on what normative grounds could it possibly hope to influence subsequent debates within the alliance? And if it were true that much of East Berlin's newly-acquired bargaining strength came from its utility to Moscow, where would the regime be if it chose, for its own momentary purposes, to ignore the implications of Soviet hegemony? From the SED's perspective, it could not have made much sense to think about the GDR outside of its alliance context.[28]

In fact, if we read between the lines of the most bitter Soviet attacks at the time, Moscow was at pains to remind its allies of this central fact of life. In one of the earliest critiques of East German policies, a Soviet foreign policy expert noted that his government was indeed willing to recognize "the unique creative contribution" that "every fraternal party [could bring] into the treasure-house of collective experience." But, he added, particularistic national needs could never be incorporated into the alliance indiscriminately, since "any mistake in policy . . . could be used by the class adversary to weaken the position of socialism."[29] Similarly, in a

[25]Here, it is helpful to contrast the East German position with the well-known stands of the Romanians in their disputes with Moscow. The Romanians typically insisted that the "maturity" of individual parties in the bloc meant that alliance unanimity was not always to be preferred and that continuing fundamental disagreements among socialist states could even be healthy. In contradistinction, although the GDR's leaders did challenge particular aspects of Soviet policy, they were never eager to question the goal of a final bloc consensus on the form that policy should take. See Kenneth Jowitt, "The Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System," *World Politics*, October 1970, pp. 39–41.

[26]For his remarks, see *Neues Deutschland*, Apr. 1, 1971.

[27]For the strongest Soviet attacks, see *Pravda*, July 27 and Aug. 2, 1984.

[28]The reasons for East European loyalty to the Soviet Union are always less than obvious. For example, one often reads that the SED leadership relies on the presence of the Soviet military to guarantee regime stability. This is undeniable, but not only because Moscow can be counted upon to use force to defend the party. Another benefit of the Soviet presence is that the USSR can be blamed for those limitations that do exist on the GDR's foreign and domestic policy maneuverability. To see this, one has only to imagine how hard it would be to sell socialism in East Germany without this "Soviet excuse." Of course, this does not mean that the GDR's leaders would have any objections to a sizeable reduction of those troops, which—given the WTO's recent discussions in Warsaw about conventional force reductions—seems quite possible in the near future. The main objective for the SED is only a continuation of the Soviet presence in some form.

[29]See the article by O. B. Rakhmanin (the pseudonym of O. V. Borisov) in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), April 1984, cited in Asmus, loc. cit., pp. 30–31.

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statement not long after the conflict had died down, a rising Mikhail Gorbachev used only slightly less acrimonious terms to warn his allies about exposing themselves to the machinations of Western politicians; one should never forget, he reminded, that the socialist commonwealth was fighting for a "common cause that [required] joint and vigorous efforts."[30]

The East Germans immediately grasped the import of such signals. While on the one hand, in behind-the-scenes conversations with Moscow, the SED did underscore the existence of important tactical differences of opinion, on the other hand, the GDR's leaders, unlike Ulbricht in his last days in office, stressed that such views were perfectly natural and in no way challenged the USSR's authority. In fact, unlike the Czechoslovaks and the Hungarians, the East German leadership deliberately chose not to discuss the conflict in the official party press, hoping to avoid exacerbating tensions with Moscow.[31]

However, the SED's stand was at least indirectly confirmed in the August 1984 issue of the SED's foreign policy magazine, where a leading expert on the international relations of socialist states, Harald Neubert, noted that "occasional differences of opinion" among individual parties were really an integral part of the "dialectic of the national and the international," which, he argued, now defined "more than ever" the state of communist affairs. "The international communist movement," Neubert affirmed, invoking familiar Soviet rhetoric, "is and remains a voluntary combat community of equal and independent parties, whose effectiveness, influence, and successful struggle cannot be separated from its ability and readiness to bind national and international responsibility together organically."[32]

Honecker's own actions in the late summer of 1984 suggest that he was searching for just such an "organic" amalgamation of national and international interests. At this juncture, when Soviet–East German differences were at their peak, the GDR's party chief seemed to pursue not one but two policy courses simultaneously, apparently reflecting his appreciation for the tacit rules of appropriate alliance conduct.

The first course, a minimalist position, amounted to maintaining the policy lines to which the East Germans had subscribed since the initial deployment of the NATO missiles, i.e., the view that continued dialogue with the FRG was both compatible with and even a necessary complement to superpower politics, even at a time when tensions were escalating. Such dialogue had nothing to do with any pan-German aspirations, Honecker contended in an interview on August 12; quite the contrary—"the struggle for the successful development of the GDR has invariably been a struggle to restrain revanchism." It only made sense, given the current "substantially exacerbated and complicated" state of East-West relations, for the two Germanies to work together to "bring a beneficial influence to bear on the European climate."[33] As we have already seen, this minimalist position of maintaining contacts despite tensions appeared to be sustained two months later at Honecker's October meeting with Gromyko.

Honecker's other course, representing his maximal expectations, centered upon his planned trip to the FRG in September. It was one thing, after all, to argue in the abstract that inter-German détente should be preserved, but quite another for the GDR's leader to visit a country that had been among the principal supporters of the Euromissiles. For this reason, the East German leadership seemed particularly concerned to demonstrate to its allies that something positive would come of the visit. In his August interview, Honecker spoke optimistically about the existence of realistic forces in West Germany, who were acutely sensitive to public opinion which opposed "the new US missiles and [favored] peaceful relations with the socialist countries."[34]

This was not just a matter of glibly painting a positive picture of West Germany. We also know that in addition to these assertions, East Berlin attempted to pressure the FRG to guarantee that Honecker's trip would produce concrete and favorable results (e.g., the settlement of an old dispute over the division of the Elbe River or the expansion of inter-German security talks). And this was no easy task, since in 1984, official opinion in Bonn about the visit was at best mixed; given internal divisions within the government, it seemed unlikely that Chancellor Kohl would even receive Honecker in the West German capital or accord him the full diplomatic honors due a visiting head of state. The problem for the East Germans was thus largely one of creating a consensus in Moscow that this particular trip was advanta-

[30] *Pravda*, Sept. 9, 1984, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Oct. 3, 1984, pp. 12–13

[31] Author's interviews, East Berlin.

[32] *Horizont* (East Berlin), No. 8, 1984. I say this was only an indirect confirmation of the SED's position because Neubert wrote the article not as a direct response to the Soviet–East German dispute but in the form of a book review of a recent work by Vadim Zagladin, the CPSU Central Committee's chief West Europeanist and the first deputy head of its International Department. However, Neubert was in fact articulating the unpublished position of the SED at the time. Furthermore, Zagladin himself turns out to have been one of the principal supporters in the Central Committee of the GDR's position on the primacy of dialogue with the West.

[33] *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1984, p. 188.

[34] Ibid.

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geous at this particular time.[35]

Of course, the visit finally was postponed, a fact that most Western analysts have explained by arguing that the East Germans simply succumbed to Soviet pressure. Yet, if such considerations alone were relevant, why then did East Berlin not give in a lot earlier to what were months of negative signals from the Soviet Union? And if Honecker suffered such a serious defeat at Moscow's hands, why then was it possible for the SED confidently to seek a compromise with Moscow not long thereafter?

As we have seen, a more convincing argument for the visit's postponement has to take into account Honecker's and the SED's interpretation of the conflict, acknowledging not only their disinclination to challenge the alliance goal of socialist consensus, but also their conviction that continuing dialogue with the West was essential. Had Honecker visited the FRG without any chance of achieving breakthroughs in inter-German relations—which looked increasingly likely in the late summer of 1984—he would have, in effect, fallen into Ulbricht's position of going it alone. Such a position would have been unsustainable even from the SED's more confident perspective; quite likely, had Honecker attempted to sell it to his otherwise supportive Politburo, he might have found himself isolated. In postponing the trip until a time when concrete results were conceivable—"when there could be forward movement," as *Neues Deutschland* put it, quoting a West German spokesman[36]—Honecker clearly found an agreeable compromise between the principle of bloc loyalty and the pursuit of merely "national" concerns. This way, his minimal goal of maintaining the climate of inter-German détente was preserved, while the possibility of realizing his maximal expectations was only put off to a more appropriate future date.

Honecker's Visit to the FRG

As we know, Honecker did fulfill his maximal goal in September 1987 when he finally made his triumphal visit to West Germany. As East German officials stress today, in persevering, Honecker never lost sight of the GDR's interests. This is not to say, of course, that changes in Moscow's foreign policy since the March 1985 ascendency of Mikhail Gorbachev were not important in providing an appropriate context for the visit. As tensions between the superpowers decreased with the summit meetings in Geneva in November 1985 and Reykjavik in October 1986, and as the Kremlin simultaneously, albeit very gradually, began to upgrade its relations with West Germany in the summer of 1986, the grounds for Soviet–East German differences on the priority of East-West détente were eliminated.[37]

In fact, the East Germans were provided with a perfect pretext on February 28, 1987, when Gorbachev announced his readiness to engage the US in negotiations, without any preconditions, on the elimination of European intermediate-range nuclear forces. Just one day after Gorbachev's statement, Honecker dispatched a personal message to Helmut Kohl encouraging the FRG's chancellor to pressure the US to take the Soviet proposal seriously. This note must also have included Honecker's agreement to schedule his long-awaited visit, for shortly thereafter Kohl's minister for special tasks was dispatched to East Berlin to set up the trip.[38]

However, East Germans involved in the Honecker

[35]This position was conveyed to me repeatedly in discussions that I had in East Berlin in January 1985, not long after the postponement of Honecker's trip. And there certainly were supporters of the East German position in various key positions of influence in Moscow, apparently including Zagladin in the Central Committee; Aleksandr Bovin, the prominent foreign affairs commentator for *Izvestiya;* and the outspoken political scientist from the Institute of the World Socialist Economy, Anatoliy Butenko. For evidence of a more general debate about Soviet policy toward the bloc at this time, which suggested that a constituency existed for giving greater credence to the interests of the East Europeans, see the analyses of Elizabeth Teague, in Radio Free Europe–Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 262/85, Aug. 12, 1985; and RL 285/85, Aug. 29, 1985; also William Griffith, "Superpower Problems in Europe: A Comparative Assessment," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1986, pp. 735–53. For an extremely subtle treatment of Honecker's position between the Soviets and the West Germans, see A. Ross Johnson, *The Impact of Eastern Europe on Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe,* Santa Monica, CA, RAND Report R-3332-AF, March 1986, pp. 45–47.

[36]*Neues Deutschland,* Sept. 7, 1984.

[37]The reduction of tensions between East Berlin and Moscow was, of course, not something that happened overnight. For evidence that Honecker continued to insist on the rightness of his position, see his upbeat interview with the West German weekly *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Jan. 31, 1986. For evidence of continuing Soviet mixed feelings about the existence of divergent foreign policy positions within the socialist world, even after the postponement of the Honecker trip, see for example, "Communists and Contemporary Problems," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 15, October 1984, pp. 100–02; and O. Vladimirov,"The Leading Factor of the World Revolutionary Process," *Pravda,* June 21, 1985.

Honecker was able to counter any prevailing Soviet criticism, however, with continuing successes in his party appointments. At the 11th Central Committee Plenum of November 1985, he was able to remove Konrad Naumann, a scathing critic of the SED's *Westpolitik* and an unabashed contender for the party leadership, from the Politburo. Then, at the 11th SED Congress in April 1986, he not only presided over the appointment of four supporters to full Politburo membership, but also succeeded in arranging full Central Committee membership for three of his closest associates in the management of inter-German relations: Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, who arranged the General Secretary's visit to Bonn; Günter Rettner, head of the FRG department in the party secretariat; and Ewald Moldt, the GDR's Permanent Representative in Bonn at that time. Simultaneously, inner-party struggles within the CPSU were also being resolved to Honecker's advantage: among his critics, Gromyko had already been "demoted upwards" to the Soviet presidency by July 2, 1985, and in March 1986, Ponomarev was removed from the Politburo and from the party Secretariat.

[38]Private sources, Bonn.

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visit stress that this was not merely a matter of waiting for an approving Soviet nod in their direction. After all, they insist, it was the GDR's policy of continuing dialogue with the West that had now been vindicated. For that matter, it was the Soviet Union that had been forced to return to the path of détente. Honecker suggested as much in an annual address before the graduates of his country's military academies in late 1986 when he placed the GDR at the forefront of those campaigning for the cause of peace: "In times of speechlessness *[Sprachlosigkeit],*" he stressed, "we never broke off the dialogue."[39]

Part of the "forward movement" necessary for staging the visit, East German observers now emphasize, could be credited to the GDR's persistence in cultivating its relations with the FRG. If West German domestic conditions were not appropriate in 1984 to justify a Honecker trip, by 1987 they had improved immensely. Even at times of continuing difficulties between Bonn and Moscow, inter-German contacts had expanded at an unprecedented rate, through the exchange of high-level official delegations, burgeoning sister-city pacts, a cultural exchange agreement, and new economic ties.[40]

This progress was due in no small measure to weighty compromises made by the GDR's government on sensitive issues, which led by the end of 1984, to a quadrupling of the number of East German citizens allowed to emigrate to the West and in 1986, to over one-half million East Germans under retirement age being granted travel visas to the FRG. The consequence was that as Honecker's reputation in the West rose, many of those West German politicians who previously had mixed feelings about his visit rushed to receive him in September 1987.

Important for the GDR's purposes, discussions conducted during the visit were also not limited to specifically inter-German concerns—human rights, travel between the Germanies, and trade ties. Whereas in 1984, Kohl had told reporters that he was willing to talk about everything *except* for those issues that interested the East Germans most—arms control and disarmament—this time he and other key figures in the West German government freely exchanged views with the East German head of state on the upcoming INF agreement, strategic arms reductions, and the European balance of conventional weapons. Honecker's position within his own alliance was undoubtedly helped by the fact that Kohl's concession just weeks before on the dismantling of the FRG's Pershing I-A missiles had already cleared the way for successful Soviet-American negotiations.

Indeed, it is fascinating today to see how often GDR spokesman are prepared to take at least some credit for the coming into being of the INF treaty itself, not only because of their role in setting a good example for their allies, but also because their persistance in pursuing dialogue with the West compelled the Soviets to seek more constructive bases on which to ground Warsaw Pact unity. "Thanks to the jointly worked-out policy, and to coordination and constant political collaboration," the SED Central Committee observed on December 16, 1987—one week after Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan had initialed the INF accord—"[our] Soviet comrade could be sure in his negotiations of the support of all states of our alliance. . . . It is internationally recognized that the constructive position of our country furthered the conclusion of the treaty on intermediate weapons."[41] Honecker could only agree: "As is well known," he noted, "the GDR has in no small way contributed to the now agreed-upon elimination of the *Teufelszeug.*"[42]

Continuing Differences

Of course, future observers may be inclined to dispute the accuracy of such self-assessments of the GDR's role in bringing the Soviet Union back to the path of dialogue with the West and ultimately convincing Gorbachev of the viability of any arms control agree-

[39] *Neues Deutschland,* Sept. 25, 1986.

[40] See A. James McAdams, "Inter-German Détente: A New Balance," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Fall 1986, pp. 136–53. Quite logically, the East Germans stressed this improvement in inter-German relations in their discussions with the Soviets. While the Honecker visit was taking place, *Izvestiya* of Sept. 6, 1987, reported the following discussion with Hans Schindler, the deputy head of the GDR Foreign Affairs Ministry's department charged with the management of relations with the FRG: " 'Do you remember,' my interlocutor continued, 'that Comrade Honecker rejected a trip to the FRG in 1984? The Bonn authorities were behaving differently three years ago. For example, the Federal president intended to receive the head of the GDR not in his official residence but in a castle near Bonn . . . . That was unacceptable to us. Erich Honecker is now the guest not of the president but of the FRG chancellor, and he will meet with the head of the West German state on the very first day of the visit. The progress compared with the situation in 1984 is appreciable.' " Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Sept. 9, 1987, p. 28.

[41] *Neues Deutschland,* Dec. 17, 1987. The SED's high self-conception on this question was suggested even earlier when *Neues Deutschland* reprinted an article from the Hungarian press on March 24, 1987, assigning the GDR an "extremely important role" in maintaining an atmosphere of European détente at a time of rising superpower tensions: "Without [East Berlin's] presence of mind and flexibility," the account noted, "this wouldn't have been achieved." Cited in Ilse Spittmann, "Relations Powerfully Revived," *Deutschland Archiv,* April 1987, pp. 337–38.

[42] *Neues Deutschland,* Dec. 17, 1987.

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ment. For our purposes, though, the entire debate between the East Germans and the Soviets about the merits of Honecker's *Westpolitik* is more important for what it represents in general, that is, for the uncertainties in Moscow's relationship with its allies. For now, Soviet-GDR differences on one specific issue—policy toward the FRG—may be resolved. But as we have seen in the cases involving both Ulbricht and Honecker, one cannot assume an automatic convergence of the two countries' policy priorities. In addition, the Soviets now appear to be increasingly frustrated in their efforts to convince their allies that the way to resolve such differences is simply and uncritically to adopt the position of "Moscow centre."[43]

For example, it is no secret that although Gorbachev has now restored an appreciable measure of harmony on foreign policy issues to his country's relations with the GDR, his revolution in domestic policy in the USSR has, perhaps unwittingly, thrown the Soviet–East German relationship once again into turmoil. This became apparent enough during Gorbachev's visit to the SED's 11th Congress in April 1986, when Honecker politely rebuffed his guest's calls for social and economic reform, contending that the GDR was doing quite nicely following its own distinctive path.[44]

Since that time, the East Germans have been in the forefront of those states expressing doubt about the applicability of Gorbachev's now-famous trinity—*perestroyka, demokratsiya,* and *glasnost'*—to their own conditions. Why, many officials argue, should a state like the GDR, which first began to experiment with economic reforms in the 1960's and which has registered some of the most impressive rates of growth in the bloc into the 1980's now run the risks of large-scale reforms? Or why should East Germany feel compelled to undertake experiments with its media and information policy or with the election of its public officials, when the daily conditions under which its government operates—ideologically and politically exposed as it is on the boundary between socialism and capitalism—are so very different from those faced by the Soviet Union?

What is often missed in Western analyses of the East German critique of Soviet "new thinking," however, is that such stands are based upon the same line of rea-

[43]See the stimulating article by Ken Jowitt, "Moscow 'Centre'," *East European Politics and Societies* (Berkeley, CA), Fall 1987. I cannot agree more with Jowitt's contention that the East German position in 1984 was an important demonstration of the ability of East European states "to semi-publicly differ with and oppose a Soviet policy position." I only differ with his conclusion (p. 319) that the East Germans "lost."

[44]*Report of the Central Committee of the SED to the 11th Congress of the SED,* Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1986, p. 6.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Erich Honecker at the 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party, April 21, 1986.

—Eastfoto.

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soning that motivated Honecker in the 1984 dispute over policy toward the FRG. As he told Gorbachev at the 11th Congress, the fact that all socialist states shared a joint cause did not mean that the national interests of each could be ignored. Indeed, the "deepening international cooperation between communists today," Honecker insisted, appealing to a familiar logic, "is based on the independence and separate responsibility of each party for working out and implementing its own policies, for conducting its own creative search for solutions to specific tasks while taking the national and international situation into account."[45]

In private interviews in East Berlin, Gorbachev's sharpest critics now take this argument one step further, using the 1984 dispute as a model upon which future policy toward the Soviet Union might be built. "At that time," they say in effect, "many of our closest allies said that we were wrong and pressured us to abandon our positions. Nevertheless, we stuck to our convictions, and now look where we are—History has proved us right!"

In fact, what makes the analysis of the current Soviet-GDR relationship so complicated is that the East German government is neither simply for nor simply against the Gorbachev reforms.[46] Many of those who criticize the Soviet General Secretary's decentralizing economic strategies support him in other areas, for example, in his calls for more honesty in the discussion of political and social problems. Then, too, among the younger generation of East German mid- and lower-level officials there now seems to be growing agreement that Gorbachev is right in warning his allies about the dangers of overconfidence.[47] The sources of past success, they argue, may not be the best guides about where the GDR should go in the future. However, all of these party authorities—reformers and conservatives alike—are still united by a tacit consensus about the manner in which any emulation of the Soviet example must proceed: if the GDR is to follow the Soviet lead, it must do so on East German terms and as a response to its own specific challenges.

Significantly, East German officials are increasingly inclined to give Gorbachev good marks for at least regularly consulting with his allies on crucial matters of bloc policy, something which, they emphasize, no one could ever take for granted during the Brezhnev years. Following a couple of years of uncertainty, during which he sent mixed signals on bloc policy, Gorbachev has begun, first with an April 1987 visit to Prague, and then, with a March 1988 trip to Yugoslavia, to emphasize that he has no intention of forcing his country's developmental model on its allies and that, for all purposes, he is ready to learn from their examples as well.[48]

But, there are still many observers in East Berlin who are skeptical about the readiness of any Soviet leader, even Gorbachev, to institutionalize East European leeway in the making of foreign or domestic policy. Gorbachev, they insist, has too much personally invested in his own conception of socialist reform. And whatever policy choices he makes, as representatives of the leading state in the bloc, he and his colleagues will only feel comfortable when they are really *leading* the alliance and not simply responding to the initiatives of a coterie of theoretically co-equal allies. When, for example, in September 1987, the East Germans initialed a highly controversial document on common principles with the West German SPD, acknowledging the "*Friedensfähigkeit*," or "peaceful potential" of even imperialist states,[49] there were rumblings of discontent from Moscow that the SED should assume such initiative on fundamental ideological questions.[50]

Similarly, when from June 20 to 22, 1988, East Berlin played host to a massive conference on the creation of international nuclear weapons–free zones, attended by more than 1,000 delegates, representing most governments in the world, it was not until shortly before the meeting that East German officials were assured that they enjoyed full Soviet support for their endeavor.[51]

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[45]Ibid., p. 108.

[46]Evidence of more differentiated and even positive views on the Soviet reforms has recently appeared. See *Neue Deutsche Literatur* (East Berlin), No. 3, March 1988; and *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (East Berlin), No. 6, June 1988, and No. 7, July 1988.

[47]Anatoliy Dobrynin's thoughtful speech in mid-April 1988 in Prague, in which he admitted that the socialist world had still failed to present the Western working-class with an attractive alternative to capitalism, stirred considerable discussion within the SED, itself acutely aware of the problems of competing with West German capitalism. See *Neues Deutschland*, Apr. 15, 1988.

[48]See *Pravda*, Apr. 11, 1987, and Mar. 19, 1988. Stephen Sestanovich is right on the mark, however, in noting that the Soviets and especially Gorbachev have still not resolved their own ambivalence: "Gorbachev and his colleagues are in the odd position of urging *perestroyka*-style reforms on bloc governments, while at the same time proclaiming the right of all socialist states to make their own choices. The latter message has to date helped Eastern European leaderships to defy Gorbachev." See "Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1988, pp. 14–15.

[49]For a text of the remarkable document negotiated between the SED's Academy of Social Sciences and the SPD's Commission on Basic Values, see "The Contest of Ideology and Common Security," *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 28, 1987.

[50]Author's personal sources.

[51]For some time, there was uncertainty in East Berlin about whether the Soviets would send a high-level delegation to the conference. Ultimately, they did, dispatching Candidate Politburo Member Petr Demichev; Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov; and the director of the Institute for the USA and Canada, Georgiy Arbatov. Gorbachev sent a personal message, extending his best wishes to the conference participants, which one of the conference's organizers described to me as a "wonderful gift."

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Influencing Alliance Decisions

Given the natural tension between the Soviets' desire to be in charge of whatever goes on in their alliance and the East Germans' equally understandable inclination to assert themselves, the key issue to investigate in coming years will be how effectively governments like that of the GDR can convince the Soviet Union, as Honecker evidently did in the mid-1980's, to take seriously the role of cooperative norms within the alliance. As we have seen, this is not so much a matter of relying on Soviet good will as a question of the East Germans' ability to appeal to objective bargaining strengths in their negotiations with Moscow. Will the GDR's governments of the future be able to draw upon the same advantages that distinguished Erich Honecker's fortunes from those of his predecessor?

Certainly, one of Honecker's principal advantages has been his ability to present the Soviets with an almost uniquely undivided Politburo leadership in recent years. But Honecker's manifest success in this endeavor will be difficult to maintain. The SED is faced with the challenge of finding an attractive successor to Honecker who will be as capable as he has been in bridging all possible divisions within the party. Gorbachev's reforms in the USSR have already led to potentially divisive debates within the SED about issues as wide-ranging as desirable investment priorities, the political role of the country's Lutheran churches, and the rights of artists and writers to freer cultural expression. After years of steady growth, the East German economy is experiencing major bottlenecks, and there is rising doubt about the GDR's ability to compete effectively in the production of high technology. Apparently, Honecker has recently encountered difficulties convincing his colleagues that his personal choice to succeed him in the party leadership—fellow Politburo member, Egon Krenz—is the best available candidate.[52]

Then, too, East German governments of the future will also have to replicate Honecker's success in finding external sources of support for the GDR's policies. In recent years, the Hungarian government has proved to be East Germany's natural ally in the battle to preserve détente in Europe and to assure a voice on the continent for, what Budapest calls, the "small and medium-size states." But such coalitions are based at least in part on finding a common cause, and as the Hungarian government allies itself ever more intimately with the Gorbachev reforms, the SED may have to search for new grounds of commonality.

The same can be said for the GDR's future relations with the FRG, both with the governing coalition in Bonn and with the opposition social democrats. Whereas many of the inter-German bonds of past years were based upon a shared anxiety about the policies of the superpowers, better relations between the US and the USSR may now challenge the two Germanies to find new areas of agreement strong enough to overcome the abiding differences which still frustrate their daily relations.

Finally, future East German regimes will also have to find ways to continue manipulating the mutual dependence between East Berlin and Moscow to their benefit. Given its central geographic position, it is hard to doubt that the GDR will always play a role of some importance for the Soviet Union in European politics. But just how important will this role be? Gorbachev's unprecedented six-day visit to the East German party congress in 1986 was a definite sign of his interest in the country. But since that time, in part due to his differences with Honecker on the issue of domestic reform, the Soviet General Secretary has conspicuously directed his attentions elsewhere, at times suggesting that his country has the most to learn from the Hungarian rather than the East German economic experiments, and at other points showering personal attention on Poland's leader, Wojciech Jaruzelski. The East Germans' proper rejoinder may be that they are simply defending their national interests in showing reservations about Soviet initiatives. The risk is that they may thereby isolate themselves in the bloc.

Naturally, it is impossible to predict exactly what kinds of choices the GDR's leaders will make in coming years or how skillfully they will exploit the bargaining advantages that they do enjoy in disputes with the USSR. Nevertheless, based upon what we have seen of the changing relationship between East Berlin and Moscow from Ulbricht's to Honecker's time, it seems likely that even with a period of new uncertainty in the SED leadership, Gorbachev's readiness to take the demands of his allies seriously will be shaped as much by their own strengths within the bloc as by his personal inclinations.

[52]Krenz, age 51, is by no means out of the running as Honecker's successor, despite rumors that his health is not good. However, he will meet stiff competition from fellow Politburo member Günter Schabowski, 59, a former chief editor of *Neues Deutschland*, current first secretary of the SED Bezirk Berlin, and perhaps also from Siegfried Lorenz, first secretary of SED Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt. Hans Modrow, 60, a reputed Gorbachev enthusiast and currently first secretary of the SED Bezirk Dresden, may have an outside shot at the position, although his critics in Berlin have apparently prevented him from receiving a Politburo assignment.

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Note

The KGB and Soviet Reform

Amy W. Knight

THE extensive changes in the Soviet leadership announced at the September 1988 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) have been generally interpreted as a major breakthrough for Gorbachev in his effort to consolidate power and a sign that he now has the necessary consensus to proceed with his reform program. Gorbachev managed to get rid of several members of the Brezhnev old guard, including full Politburo members Andrey Gromyko and Mikhail Solomentsev, and he deprived Yegor Ligachev, long seen as his strongest conservative opponent, of responsibilities for foreign policy and ideology, and placed him in charge of agriculture. Moreover, on the day following the plenum, the USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously elected Gorbachev president. Gorbachev's success was marred, however, by some apparent failures. Not only was he unable to remove Ligachev from the party leadership, he also was unsuccessful in confronting another major source of opposition, the KGB, or Committee of State Security.[1] Indeed, these recent leadership changes may well have added to the political power of the KGB.

Viktor Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB since December 1982 and a member of that organization since 1967,[2] was promoted to the position of Central Committee Secretary, while retaining his full membership on the Politburo. Chebrikov heads the Central Committee's new Commission on Legal Policy, which is reportedly charged with overseeing the police and other law enforcement and judicial organs. Thus he will apparently be in charge of implementing party control over the KGB and will also oversee the preparation of proposed legal reforms.

If Gorbachev is sincere in saying that he intends to introduce changes in the legal system that will strengthen democracy, protect individual rights, and curtail arbitrary police powers, Chebrikov is hardly the ideal man to oversee these reforms. A much better choice for Gorbachev would have been his reform-minded ally, Anatoliy Luk'yanov, who since early 1987 had been the Central Committee secretary responsible for the Administrative Organs Department, which dealt with legal and police affairs.[3]

Judging from his public statements over the past two years, which have stressed the possible pitfalls of *perestroyka,* Chebrikov is far from enthusiastic about

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[1]Also detracting from Gorbachev's recent victory was the fact that Ukrainian Party chief Volodymyr Scherbytskyi, long assumed to be out of favor with Gorbachev, remains in his job and is still a full member of the Politburo. On Gorbachev and Shcherbytskyi, see Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1987, pp. 37–38.

[2]For a biography of Chebrikov, see *Deputaty verkhovnogo soveta SSSR. Odinnadtsatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation—hereafter, *Deputaty*), Moscow, Izvestiya, 1984, p. 470.

[3]Luk'yanov, who gained a candidate's seat on the Politburo at the September 1988 CC plenum, was transferred to the post of first vice-president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The fate of the Administrative Organs Department remains unclear. It may have been subsumed within the new Legal Policy Commission. On Luk'yanov and the Administrative Organs Department, see Amy Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union,* Boston, Unwin/Hyman, 1988, p. 142. Also see Hough, loc. cit., pp. 34–35.

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Gorbachev's domestic policies.[4] To be sure, as Ligachev reminded the delegates to the June 1988 Party Conference, Chebrikov initially supported Gorbachev, and his vote was crucial to the latter's election as general secretary in March 1985.[5] (Chebrikov was rewarded for his support by a promotion to full membership on the Politburo the following month.) But both Chebrikov and Ligachev have since become alienated from Gorbachev over what they see as his radical approach to *perestroyka*. Having initially thrown their weight behind Gorbachev and his reform program, these men now think that he has allowed things to go too far.

Although Ligachev may have suffered a setback in terms of his personal power, he and his allies can take solace in the fact that Chebrikov retains a hand over the KGB and might well use his new post to further their conservative cause. Chebrikov's position might conceivably be compared to that of Aleksandr Shelepin, who after serving as KGB chairman from 1958 to 1961, was promoted into the Secretariat, where he supervised police affairs. Shelepin's influence over the KGB was strengthened by his close connections with his successor as KGB chief, Vladimir Semichastnyi. Both men played key roles in Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, after which Shelepin was made a full member of the Politburo and became one of Brezhnev's most formidable rivals.[6] Similarly, Yuriy Andropov, appointed KGB chief in 1967, gained in power when he moved to the Secretariat in May 1982. In his new job, where he continued to wield influence over the KGB, he became a prime contender for the top party post, which he achieved just six months later.[7]

Gorbachev might be better able to control the KGB if Chebrikov's replacement as its chief were a party apparatchik, brought in from the outside. But the new KGB chairman, Col. Gen. Vladimir Kryuchkov, has been in the KGB for over 20 years and has worked directly under Chebrikov. He began his career in the Soviet Procuracy, or prosecutor's office, and joined the diplomatic corps in the early 1950's, serving in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest when Andropov was ambassador there. From 1959 to 1967, he worked under Andropov in the Central Committee Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries, where he was responsible for Hungary. Kryuchkov moved to the KGB with Andropov in 1967, rising to become head of the First Chief Directorate (which deals with KGB foreign operations) in 1974 and a deputy KGB chairman in 1978.[8]

The choice of Kryuchkov was somewhat unusual, given his background in foreign intelligence and the fact that two more senior officials, first deputy chairmen Nikolay Yemokhonov and Filipp Bobkov, were passed over.[9] Kryuchkov's appointment may reflect the continued political influence of the Andropovites, particularly those who worked under Andropov in the Central Committee during the 1960's.[10] Some Western observers have suggested that the designation of Kryuchkov means that the KGB will place greater emphasis on foreign operations and will curtail its domestic activities, but this is unlikely. The Soviet regime attaches such importance to *both* internal and external security that the question of priorities probably does not arise. Moreover, Kryuchkov is not unfamiliar with domestic security matters. In addition to his early career in the Procuracy and his legal training (he graduated from a juridical correspondence school), Kryuchkov's experience with Hungary during the time that economic reforms were being introduced there is relevant to dealing with the kinds of domestic problems the Soviet Union faces today in its attempts to overhaul its economy.

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[4]For an analysis of Chebrikov's views, see Amy Knight, "Viktor Chebrikov and the Politics of Perestroika", Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 252/88, June 21, 1988.

[5]See the Ligachev speech in *Pravda* (Moscow), July 2, 1988. Ligachev implied that as head of the Central Committee Department for Party Cadres, he, too, had backed Gorbachev in 1985. In making this unusual revelation, Ligachev was apparently warning Gorbachev and his allies that the views of those responsible for catapulting Gorbachev to power should not be disregarded. Ligachev also mentioned Gromyko and Solomentsev as backing Gorbachev's candidacy, but this did not save them from dismissal at the recent plenum. For an analysis of the conference, see Michel Tatu, "The 19th Party Conference," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-August 1988, pp. 1–15.

[6]On She epin and his rise in the Soviet leadership, see Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin*, trans. by Helen Katel, New York, Viking, 1970, pp. 190–98. A Soviet source has recently confirmed the hypothesis put forth by some Western experts that Shelepin and the KGB played an important role in Khrushchev's ouster. See Fedor Burlatskiy, "Brezhnev and the Crushing of the Thaw—Reflections on the Nature of Political Leadership," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 37, Sept. 14, 1988, pp. 13–14. According to Burlatskiy, it was Shelepin who engineered the plot to oust Khrushchev.

[7]Although he did not become a Central Committee secretary, Lavrentiy Beria, head of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD—the predecessor to the KGB) from 1938 to 1946, is another example of a security chief who retained influence over the police after he moved to another post. Beria became a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1946, but many of his supporters remained in the police apparatus. In 1953, he resumed leadership of the police.

[8]See the biography of Kryuchkov in *Deputaty*, p. 219; also Knight, *The KGB*, pp. 122–23.

[9]A background in intelligence is not unprecedented for a security police chief, however. Both Ivan Serov (KGB chief from 1958 to 1961) and Vitaliy Fedorchuk had lengthy careers in military counter-intelligence. It might be noted that Kryuchkov's career in the Procuracy, which serves as one source of KGB recruits, and his abrupt switch to the diplomatic corps suggest that he may have already had some connections with the KGB before 1967. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that Kryuchkov's official biography does not mention his stint as a diplomat.

[10]Among those who served in the Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries under Andropov are Gorbachev advisor Georgiy Shakhnazarov, political commentators Fedor Burlatskiy and Aleksandr Bovin, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov.

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Aside from his writings on Hungary and the Hungarian economy in the 1960's,[11] which reflect the standard Soviet line of cautious approval for economic reforms, we have little information about Kryuchkov's views and how they compare with those of Chebrikov. It is possible that Chebrikov, whose background was mainly in domestic affairs before he became KGB chief, does not see eye to eye with Kryuchkov, who has represented the more sophisticated and forward-looking overseas operatives of the KGB.[12] But, given what we know about his career, it is hard to imagine Kryuchkov as a strong supporter of political liberalization in the Soviet Union, even if he is not a strong ally of Chebrikov. As one of Andropov's closest protégés, he played an on-the-scenes role in the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. Later, in the KGB, Kryuchkov observed at first hand his mentor's ruthless policies of suppressing dissent, in particular the practice of incarcerating political dissenters in psychiatric hospitals. While Andropov is generally credited with having been against corruption and economic inefficiency and with having had a flexible approach to foreign policy problems, his brief tenure as general secretary offered no evidence of liberalism on internal security issues.

Of course, the KGB probably does favor some type of reform program for Soviet society. Its leaders no doubt realize that the economic stagnation and societal malaise wrought by Brezhnev's policies create long-term problems for the ensuring of political stability. Thus, they may welcome Gorbachev's efforts to achieve better economic performance and to encourage greater public participation in local government. (In fact, Chebrikov's statements, particularly those made in 1985–86, have reflected a positive attitude toward economic changes.)[13] Nonetheless, as this article will argue, Gorbachev's version of *perestroyka* has increasingly threatened the KGB's vested interests as an institution, and numerous KGB officials share Chebrikov's concerns about the negative consequences of political reform. In order to better understand the role of the KGB in the conflict over *perestroyka,* it is necessary to examine how Gorbachev's reforms have affected the KGB and how the KGB has responded to these challenges thus far.

The KGB Under Attack

In his first year and a half as party leader, Gorbachev confined his reforms mainly to the economic sphere, and the KGB retained the high political status and authority it had achieved during the Brezhnev era. It was not until late 1986, when Gorbachev launched his program of political reform in earnest, that *perestroyka*'s implications for the KGB began to emerge. A key aspect of the program has been so-called democratization, characterized by efforts to grant Soviet citizens greater freedom and to protect their individual rights.

As part of this process, the campaign against political dissent has been sharply curtailed. More than 300 political prisoners were released from prisons and camps, and 64 were released from psychiatric hospitals in 1987 alone.[14] Arrests for political crimes, which are investigated by the KGB, have all but ceased. For example, there have been no reports of the KGB enforcing the infamous Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (the Russian republic) since 1986. The regime has also (until recently, at least) exhibited greater tolerance of public demonstrations and protests.

Increasingly, the KGB has had to confine its struggle against dissent to threats and harassment. There have, of course, been curtailments of campaigns against dissent in the past, for example, between 1973 and 1979, when the rate of political arrests has dropped markedly. But the current apparent moratorium on political arrests has all but deprived KGB employees working in the area of domestic security of their main operational weapons of coercion.[15] The continued discussion in the media of proposed reforms of the legal codes no doubt adds to the disquiet at KGB offices, since it raises the specter of permanent, institutionalized restrictions on its methods of operation.

Glasnost', a key element in Gorbachev's domestic

[11]In the early to mid-1960's, Kryuchkov authored or co-authored several pieces on Hungary and on the socialist system. See, for example, *Ukrepleniye i razvitiye mirovoy sistemy sotsializma* (The Strengthening and Development of the World Socialist System), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1962, co-authored with D. Karaundzhev and L. Nikolayev; "On the Course Indicated by Lenin," *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), June 2, 1962; "A Source of Strength, a Guarantee of Success," ibid., Feb. 23, 1963, p. 31; and *Voploshcheniye mechty. K 20-letiyu osvobozhdeniya Vengrii* (Realizing the Dream: The 20th Anniversary of the Liberation of Hungary), Moscow, Znaniye, 1965, co-authored with K. Ivanov.

[12]Chebrikov is still Kryuchkov's superior, particularly since the latter, though a Central Committee member, does not have Politburo status. It should be noted that the status of the security police is not diminished by the fact that the person heading the KGB no longer holds a Politburo seat. First of all, it is unprecedented for a KGB chairman to gain full membership in the Politburo immediately upon his appointment. Second, it is almost inconceivable that the party leadership would give Politburo slots to two men from the KGB. One question that remains unanswered is whether or not Chebrikov will retain his seat on the Defense Council, the body that makes key national security decisions.

[13]See Knight, "Viktor Chebrikov and the Politics of Perestroika," loc. cit.

[14]See *Reform and Human Rights. Report Submitted to the US Congress by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, May 1988, p. 23.

[15]It should be noted, however, that dissenters are still being arrested on other, lesser charges, such as illegal religious activities or ordinary crimes, like hooliganism or disrupting public order.

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program, has also created problems for the KGB. Although to some extent it has offered a safety valve for expressing popular disapproval of the regime, it has also unleashed a wave of open public discontent that is unprecedented in its scope and intensity. The mounting ethnic demands in the national republics are the starkest example of how *glasnost'* has gained a momentum of its own and taken the expression of public opinion to unprecedented lengths.

As the organization chiefly responsible for suppressing such threats to internal stability, the KGB has good reason to be concerned. Indeed, KGB officials have, on more than one occasion, expressed their worry over ethnic problems, tying them to extremist elements among the advocates of *perestroyka*.[16] At the June Party Conference, the KGB reportedly proposed that guarantees be established which would "hinder arbitrary interpretations of socialist pluralism." According to the KGB: "This proposal is an imperative of the moment, since security police are often faced with expressions of pluralism (demonstrations, meetings, and such) which place them in a dilemma: how to react, with or without a club."[17]

Glasnost' has also fueled public attacks on Stalin's security police that are much more vehement and to the point than those that appeared during Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign. The media have been more forthright about the numbers of purge victims and have gone so far as to question the deeper causes of Stalinism. In March 1988, for example, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published the diary, written in 1941, of the late Soviet scientist Vladimir Vernadskiy. The diary contained a severe condemnation of the Stalinist police apparatus, noting that it was like a "cancer eating away at the party" and suggesting that Nikolay Yezhov, chief of the NKVD, had been either a madman or a traitor.[18] Letters to Soviet newspapers and periodicals from purge victims or their relatives appear frequently, describing experiences with the NKVD and demanding the punishment of NKVD officers still alive today.[19] Such demands must cause discomfort at the KGB, which still employs some veterans from Stalin's day.[20]

Even more disturbing for the KGB is the fact that *glasnost'* has led to public criticism of the KGB itself. Although the criticism has been fairly muted and selective, it is nonetheless tarnishing the KGB's hitherto sacrosanct public image as an essential defender of Soviet security staffed by incorruptible, dedicated servants of the party and state. The KGB Border Guards, who had in the past always been portrayed as morally pure, have been criticized in the press on several occasions over the past two years. In one story, a drunken border guard was reported to have organized a rifle attack on a World War II memorial; the article caused readers to send letters to the newspaper expressing their indignation over the desecration.[21] KGB border guards were later accused in the pages of *Izvestiya* of damaging Soviet automobiles destined for export during border inspections.[22] Border guards have also been criticized for confiscating videocasettes at the border.[23]

Probably the most damaging publicity has come from revelations about KGB violations of the law in two separate cases in Ukraine. In the so-called Berkhin affair, which came to light in early 1987, KGB officials in the Voroshilovgrad oblast ordered the illegal arrest of a journalist named Viktor Berkhin, who had been investigating corruption among local party officials (and who later died as a result of his "illegal arrest"). The exposure of the case led to an apology by Chebrikov in the pages of *Pravda*.[24]

More recently, in late 1987, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* exposed a case in Odessa, where KGB investigators had connived with employees of the Procurator's office to fabricate charges of bribery against the chief of the Odessa Department for Combatting Embezzlement and Speculation, Aleksandr Malyshev. Malyshev, who was held in prison for two years, was pressured by KGB investigator Yu. A. Bobovskiy to make a false confession and to implicate several other innocent persons.[25] Although *Pravda* announced on January 20, 1988, that

[16]See, for example, a speech by Kirgiz KGB chairman V. A. Ryabokon, who talked of the dangers of nationalist sentiments (in *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* [Frunze], Apr. 14, 1987).

[17]Reported by Tanjug (Belgrade) in English, June 30, 1988, as cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 1, 1988, Supplement, p. 80.

[18]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 11, Mar. 16, 1988.

[19]See, for example, *Moscow News*, May 8 and July 10, 1988.

[20]Although most of those who actually implemented the purges are dead or retired, some may remain. Also, many current KGB officials joined the police during the 1940's and 1950's. First Deputy USSR KGB Chairman Bobkov, for example, joined the NKVD in 1945 (it was in 1954, after several other changes of name, that the security police became the KGB).

[21]See *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Nov. 30 and Dec. 28, 1986. For a general discussion of press attacks on the KGB, see Viktor Yasman, "The KGB Under *Glasnost'*: Creating a New Image," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 198/88, May 11, 1988.

[22]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 10 and 27, 1987. These articles drew a response from the commander of the Border Guards Troops, V. Matrosov, and the chief of the Political Directorate of the Border Guards, N. Britvin, who denied that their men were at fault. *Izvestiya* remained dubious. See ibid., Mar. 4, 1988.

[23]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 6, Feb. 10, 1988; and Viktor Yasman, "Video Versus the KGB," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 160/88, Apr. 11, 1988.

[24]For details, see Knight, *The KGB*, pp. 101–02, 111; and Roman Solchanyk, "Kiev's Response to the Berkhin Affair: Too Little, Too Late," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 48/87, Jan. 28, 1987.

[25]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 2, 1987, and Feb. 3, 1988. At first, Bobovskiy was not identified as being in the KGB, this detail being revealed only later (see fn. 26).

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Bobovskiy had been expelled from the party and that his immediate superior had been reprimanded, the continued media revelations about his illegal activities make it likely that he and some of his colleagues will face criminal charges. Bobovskiy himself was said to have confiscated for his personal use 7,000 rubles in an earlier bribery case, and he and another investigator were accused by a group of Odessa officials of beating witnesses to extract false confessions.[26]

Other scandals have also impugned the integrity of KGB employees. In March 1988, *Izvestiya* cast aspersions on the chairman of the Turkmen KGB, Aleksey Boyko, by writing about the large luxurious homes that he and other leading officials in Turkmenistan occupied. This was followed by an announcement just two months later that Boyko had left his post, which suggested that he may have been involved in some wrongdoing.[27] More recently, the Azerbaijan Communist Party daily, *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, published a scathing attack on former Azerbaijan party chief Geydar Aliyev for covering up corruption and padding economic reports. Aliyev's name is closely linked to the KGB, since he spent his entire career in that organization prior to assuming the Azerbaijan party post in 1969.[28]

In April, the Soviet humor magazine *Krokodil* published a letter accusing the KGB of inspiring a smear campaign against the émigré writer Vassily Aksyonov.[29] Then in July, Moscow television broadcast a discussion on literature in which the writer Vladimir Dudinstev pointedly asked why the KGB should be allowed to interfere with literature.[30] In that same month, *Znamya* carried a sharp critique of a book of stories about the KGB, noting that the book glorified the security police and stirred up "spy mania."[31]

The KGB's overzealous protection of secrets has become another focal point for criticism. Several articles have appeared in the past year calling for a relaxation of the secrecy laws and for stricter criteria in determining what information should be classified as secret. In August 1988, *Pravda* carried a sardonic piece on how ridiculous and even harmful it is to classify too much information as secret. Although the author did not mention the KGB directly, he certainly had the KGB in mind when he referred to a certain "administrative command apparatus" that uses the regime of secrecy for its own purposes.[32]

An article appearing in *Argumenty i Fakty* was even more to the point.[33] The author, S. Pestov, complained about excessive and unnecessary preoccupation with secrets and questioned the need for employing such a large number of people to protect them. Noting how expensive it is to "maintain the apparatus of zealous guardians of secrets," he observed that, "like any bureaucratic distortion, the 'secrecy' apparatus seeks to extend its sphere of activity and draw in more and more people." Pestov was clearly referring to the KGB, the organization charged with protecting secrets. *Ogonek* published a letter from a reader that carried a similar message and even went so far as to suggest that the KGB should be subject to public oversight, like Western intelligence services.[34]

The timing of these articles was particularly significant, since they appeared just when the KGB was announcing the conviction of two Soviet government employees for passing economic secrets to a Western businessman. The defendants were convicted under article 76-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (divulgence of a professional secret to a foreigner), which was first introduced in 1984 and has been criticized by many as a reactionary law because of its vague definition of a professional secret.[35]

Glasnost', thus, seems to be now allowing criticism of the KGB to go beyond the occasional oblique swipe in the press and to touch on its very legitimacy. To be sure, the security police has suffered blows to its image in the past, for example, when the Soviet people learned, on July 10, 1953, that police chief Lavrentiy Beria had been dismissed from his post and, later, that he been executed for being an "enemy of the people." The revelations about NKVD crimes made during Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign further undermined the stature of the security police. But Khrushchev and his colleagues were careful not to let things go too far—i.e., not to allow the KGB itself to be criticized—and the people were continually reassured that the KGB had cleansed itself of criminal elements and was worthy of public trust. Indeed, Khrushchev made a

[26]See a letter from Odessa officials to *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 34, Aug. 24, 1988; and Viktor Yasman, "The KGB and Perestroika," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 382/88, Aug. 29, 1988.

[27]*Izvestiya*, Mar. 13, 1988; and *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (Ashkhabad), May 22, 1988.

[28]See *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* (Baku), Aug. 14, 1988. Aliyev was a protégé of former First Deputy USSR KGB Chairman Semen Tsvigun, who died mysteriously in 1982.

[29]*Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 11, April 1988. Also see Yasman, "The KGB Under Glasnost': Creating a New Image," loc. cit.

[30]*Radio Liberty Daily Report* (Munich), July 18, 1988.

[31]*Znamya* (Moscow), No. 2, July 1988.

[32]"And What Do You Have in the 'Drawer'?" *Pravda*, Aug. 6, 1988. Also see Amy Knight, "State and Official Secrets in the Soviet Union," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 113/88, Mar. 16, 1988.

[33]*Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 33, Aug. 13-19, 1988. Ironically, this is the same publication that has published a regular column about the KGB.

[34]*Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 33, August 13-20, 1988.

[35]See Amy Knight, "Convictions for Passing Economic Secrets Reported," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 359/88, Aug. 9, 1988.

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point of asking rhetorically at the 21st Party Congress in 1959: "How could we ever liquidate the organs that are charged with protecting the security of the Soviet state! It would be stupid and criminal!"[36]

Gorbachev has given no such reassurances and has talked instead about the need for restructuring in the KGB. Thus at the recent Party Conference, Gorbachev noted pointedly that no element of the Soviet system could remain outside the restructuring process and stressed that this applied in particular to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB, and the Ministry of Defense.[37]

The KGB Responds

In response to these attacks, the KGB has mounted an unprecedented propaganda offensive in its own defense, in the process portraying itself as a champion of *glasnost'*. In the spring of 1988, *Argumenty i Fakty* began publishing a regular column entitled "The KGB Informs and Comments" with the stated purpose of keeping readers abreast of KGB activities and programs.[38] As the column pointed out, this was a revival of an old tradition, established by Lenin's political police, the Cheka, which once had published its own weekly.[39] The column has provided accounts of KGB accomplishments in struggling against spies of the US Central Intelligence Agency, drug smugglers, sellers of economic secrets to the West, and other hostile forces. In addition, it has put forth KGB views on issues such as the theses of the 19th Party Conference.[40]

Other Soviet newspapers have also provided positive publicity for the KGB. *Moscow News* published a piece on how the KGB had retrieved valuable icons and other objets d'art which had been stolen for sale abroad.[41] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* related how KGB officials in the Siberian city of Chita had helped local residents in their efforts to establish a monument to victims of Stalin's purges by releasing archival documents.[42] Still another article recounted how many honest NKVD officials suffered during the purges, noting that over twenty thousand were victims of Stalin's evil.[43] And *Ogonek* recently cast a favorable light on the KGB by publishing an article on Soviet master spy Gordon Lonsdale.[44]

Another element of the publicity campaign has been a spate of speeches by and interviews with high-ranking KGB officials. Although these officials have endorsed *perestroyka* and *glasnost'*, they have made it clear that from the KGB's standpoint, the restructuring process is being carried too far. Their major objection is that *glasnost'* has made the USSR more vulnerable to the subversive designs of Western intelligence services, which encourage politically immature elements in the Soviet Union to undermine the socialist system by making extreme demands. As Chebrikov described it in a speech delivered in April 1988: "Unleashing a varied arsenal of methods of social demagogy and substituting bourgeois liberalism for the essential concept of socialist democracy, these people are attempting to nullify the party's great work of deepening *perestroyka* and renewing all aspects of our life."[45]

Other KGB officials have voiced similar warnings. The chairman of the Kazakhstan KGB, V. M. Miroshnik gave a speech accusing Western intelligence agencies of inciting the December 1986 riots in Kazakhstan by fomenting nationalist sentiments. He urged his audience to increase political vigilance.[46] The Ukrainian KGB chief, N. M. Holushko, in an August 1988 interview, warned that people are abusing democracy to the detriment of state interests. He also noted that the increase in the number of foreign visitors has resulted in heightened efforts to penetrate the country's defense and economic secrets and said that these efforts must be nipped in the bud.[47] Leningrad KGB chief V. M. Prilukov has noted that Soviet-American relations have im-

[36] As quoted in Knight, *The KGB*, p. 53. The closest the KGB came to disgrace before the Gorbachev era was in 1965, when Ivan Serov, who had served as KGB chairman from 1958 to 1961, was expelled from the party for crimes committed during the Stalin era. See ibid., p. 54.

[37] *Pravda*, June 29, 1988.

[38] The first column appeared in *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 14, Apr. 2–8, 1988.

[39] The Cheka published a weekly bulletin, *Yezhenedel'nik VChK*, briefly in the autumn of 1918, but the All-Russian Central Executive Committee closed it down for advocating torture as a means of extracting information from those under interrogation. See George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police*, Oxford, Claredon Press, 1986, pp. 130–31.

[40] The KGB claimed, for example, that it had called on legislators to speed up work on drafting the proposed law on state security. See *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 27, July 2–8, 1988.

[41] *Moscow News*, No. 8, Feb. 21, 1988.

[42] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 9, 1988.

[43] *Nedelya* (Moscow), No. 5, Feb. 1–7, 1988.

[44] *Ogonek*, No. 34, Aug. 20–27, 1988, pp. 18–21.

[45] *Pravda*, Apr. 14, 1988.

[46] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma-Ata), June 7, 1988.

[47] *Radyanska Ukraina* (Kiev), Aug. 9, 1988, as cited in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 22, 1988, pp. 51–55. Also see a Sept. 12, 1988, *Pravda* interview in which Col. Konstantin Vysotskiy of the Ukrainian KGB claimed he had documentary evidence that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was directly engaged in subversive activities against the USSR. This claim was repeated in an article in *Radyanska Ukraina*, Sept. 16, 1988, which was full of praise for the heroic efforts of the KGB in unmasking these hostile elements; the item was translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 21, 1988, pp. 70–72.

Ukraine is one area that stands out for its relatively harsh treatment of dissent, particularly in recent months. See, for example, Bohdan Nahaylo, "Independent Groups in the Ukraine Under Attack," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 417/88, Sept. 12, 1988, as carried by SOVSET. This might be attributed to Shcherbytskyi's continued control there. Another possible explanation is that Holushko, who has ties to Ligachev, is pushing a tougher policy.

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proved, but stressed that "imperialist circles" were doing everything possible to undermine Soviet foreign policy and distort *perestroyka*.[48]

The KGB scored a real public relations coup in September 1988 when a lengthy interview with Chebrikov was published in *Pravda* shortly before he was to leave his KGB post.[49] The front-page publication of an interview with a KGB chief was unprecedented and conveyed the impression that the KGB continues to be a powerful and influential institution, despite Gorbachev's reforms. It gave Chebrikov the opportunity to put forth the case for a strong security apparatus while at the same time portraying the KGB as a champion of *perestroyka*. Indeed, one of the interesting aspects of the interview was that, although Chebrikov was unusually frank and detailed on some aspects of KGB activity, he was basically repeating the same themes that security police officials have been stressing for the past three decades. He described recent spy operations carried out by Western intelligence agencies against the Soviet Union, including the installation by the United States of monitoring devices in the Sea of Okhotsk. He also noted that in the past two and a half years, the KGB has instituted criminal proceedings against more than 20 persons engaged in espionage on behalf of foreign intelligence services. Surprisingly, he acknowledged that KGB employees had been among those spies.

Chebrikov's main purpose in revealing this information was to bolster KGB claims that despite the relaxation of international tensions, Western countries are actually increasing their efforts to undermine the Soviet state by subversive means. This claim does little to accommodate Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy, which attributes more benevolent intentions to the West. Chebrikov also noted: "The capitalist countries' special services exist; no one has abolished them, and no one intends to abolish them: appropriations for their activity are not diminishing, in fact they are growing. It is perfectly clear against whom their activities are directed." The inference to be drawn was that the KGB must be strengthened in response to this threat, a perennial claim of KGB officials.

Chebrikov dwelt on the familiar theme of ideological sabotage, suggesting that it differs from straightforward subversive activities by the West in that it is a more subtle strategy, aimed at inspiring anti-Soviet sentiments among Soviet people and "nudging them onto the path of direct struggle against the Soviet state and social system." Interestingly, Chebrikov included among the objects of ideological sabotage "illegal, semilegal, and even legal formations," thus implying that the informal groups tacitly sanctioned by the Gorbachev regime have a subversive potential.

In response to a question about democratization of Soviet society, Chebrikov made the traditional claim that the KGB is engaged primarily in preventive, rather than punitive work and noted that KGB staffers devote much attention to strengthening ties with the masses. As his example, Chebrikov cited the existence of reception centers in KGB headquarters at all levels, where citizens can come "to report a planned or committed state crime or to submit proposals to improve the protection of state secrets." This "innovation,"[50] though, is hardly in the spirit of democratization, suggesting as it does that members of the public are encouraged to denounce their fellow citizens to the KGB.

On October 4, as if to dispel any doubts about Chebrikov's continued influence on the KGB, Leningrad KGB chief Prilukov gave yet another interview, in which he cited and strongly endorsed the views of his former boss.[51] Prilukov stated unreservedly that although *perestroyka* had made the job of the KGB more complex, the organization's main tasks remain unchanged. This implied that the KGB had no intention of moderating its stance toward political noncomformity in deference to *perestroyka*. Indeed, Prilukov noted that "in certain voluntary societies, to which we have attached the rather unfortunate term 'informal,' one can observe unhealthy and potentially dangerous trends." He went on to assert that "if extremist, antisocial activity hostile to *perestroyka* begins under the guise of *glasnost'*, it will be resolutely clamped down upon by the law enforcement organs."

The Balance Sheet

The message put forth by leading KGB officials underscores the fact that the KGB's program of *perestroyka* is very different from that promoted by Gorbachev and his supporters. Moreover, if we consider the record of *perestroyka* to date, it appears that the KGB and the conservative opposition have managed to water down many of the democratic proposals and to resist fundamental reform in the area of human rights. Although the Gorbachev leadership has curtailed political arrests and relaxed constraints on Soviet citizens, its accomplishments are far less dramatic than

[48] *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Aug. 20, 1988. Also see an interview with Lithuanian KGB Chairman E. Eismuntas in *Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), June 11, 1988.

[49] *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1988.

[50] The KGB has always had a special telephone line for citizens to call and report on criminal activities.

[51] *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Oct. 4, 1988.

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those of the Khrushchev regime when it comes to putting permanent and institutionalized limits on the powers of the police. (Of course, Khrushchev had further to go in doing away with some of the worst systemic features of Stalinism.) For example, the new law granting citizens the right to appeal illegal actions by officials explicitly states that no appeals are permitted with respect to official actions involving state security.[52] The legislation on psychiatric confinement, enacted in early 1988, eliminates some abuses, but it still leaves enough loopholes to enable the KGB to forcibly commit political dissenters, if this is deemed desirable by the Kremlin.[53]

In early 1987, the Central Committee authorized the drafting of new republic criminal codes. Purportedly, the revised codes will be more humane than the existing ones and give greater protection to individual rights, but it is not clear when they will be introduced. According to one legal expert, the process is slow and difficult, mainly because there is so much disagreement among those drafting the new laws,[54] which include representatives from the KGB.[55] There have been rumors that Articles 70 and 190-1 of the RSFSR code (which prohibit and severely punish political dissent) will be either eliminated or greatly revised. Although some Soviet legal experts have advocated such changes, the resolutions on legality approved by the 19th Party Conference did not mention them.[56] For the time being, these Articles remain on the books.

Every ministerial agency, including presumably the KGB, operates on the basis of a statute (*polozheniye*), which defines in legal terms its duties and rights.[57] Although the majority of ministerial statutes are published, that of the KGB has not been, and no timetable has been set for reforming or publicizing its statute. However, a new Law (*zakon*) on the State Security of the USSR is scheduled to be promulgated in 1990.[58] Because the Soviet concept of state security encompasses a range of diplomatic, military, and intelligence measures, this law could be quite broad, affecting not only the KGB, but also other organizations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense.[59] (This may be why, as stated in the resolution announcing the preparation of this law, all of these agencies are participating in the drafting.) It is possible, for example, that the Law on State Security will be similar in form to the Law on the USSR State Border, enacted in 1982.[60] This law sets forth the basic concepts of border policy, the procedures for carrying out these policies, and the rights and duties of both the KGB Border Guard Troops and the Air Defense Forces (the latter are under the Ministry of Defense). But it does not discuss the means by which these troops and forces are regulated, or the legal limitations on their authority.

Judging from the comments by Soviet legal experts, the Law on the State Security of the USSR could actually strengthen the basis upon which state security organs function. For example, one commentator, N. V. Raldugin, argues that the new law should reflect the stronger legal status and greater independence of the KGB, which has come about as a result of legislation passed over the past ten years.[61] In particular, Raldugin mentions the renaming of the KGB in 1978 to make it a state committee "of" the USSR Council of Ministers;[62] the conferring on the KGB of the right to conclude treaties; the granting to the KGB of broader powers in protecting state borders; and the changes in the legal codes that broadened the definition of certain state crimes subject to KGB investigation. Raldugin also urged that greater responsibility for ensuring state security be placed on Soviet citizens by means of legislation. The "democratic" idea of public participation in state security, as he presented it, is a legal obligation to inform on fellow citizens—something Chebrikov hinted at in his interview when he urged people to report crimes against the state to KGB "reception centers."

Another much talked-about reform involves secrecy regulations. In an apparent effort to seize the initiative

[52]For the text of the law, see *Izvestiya*, July 2, 1987.

[53]For the text of the decree, see *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), No. 2, Jan. 13, 1988, Item 19, pp. 22–27.

[54]See an interview with V. M. Savitskiy, chief of the Socialist Legality Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 28, July 9–15, 1988.

[55]Chebrikov noted in his *Pravda* interview that the KGB was actively involved in preparing the new legislation. This is not surprising, since several KGB officials are members of the Legislative Proposals Commissions of the two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[56]The resolution on legal reform was published in *Pravda*, July 5, 1988. For a discussion of the reforms, see N. F. Kuznetsova, "Problems of Improving Legislation. A Concept of Reform for the Fundamentals of the USSR Criminal Code," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Seriya 11, Pravo* (Moscow), No. 2, March-April 1988, pp. 3–9; and V. M. Kudryavtsev and Ye. A. Lukasheva, "The Socialist Legal State," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 11, July 1988, pp. 44–55. The *Kommunist* article advocated far-reaching changes in the legal system to protect individual rights.

[57]See Dietrich A. Loeber, "Statutes of Agencies with Ministerial Status in the USSR: List of Sources as of 1 July 1982," *Review of Socialist Law* (The Hague), No. 4, 1982, pp. 359–67.

[58]The resolution on the preparation of the draft law was published in *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 37, Sept. 10, 1986, Item 782.

[59]See, for example, Yu. M. Kozlov, Ed., *Sovetskoye administrativnoye pravo. Upravleniye v oblasti administrativno-politicheskoy deyatel'nosti* (Soviet Administrative Law. Management in the Area of Administrative-Political Activity), Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1979, p. 68.

[60]For the text of this law, see *Izvestiya*, Nov. 26, 1982.

[61]N. V. Raldugin, "Development of Legislation Guaranteeing the State Security of the USSR," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1988, pp. 23–29.

[62]Previously, the KGB was a state committee "attached to" (*pri*) the USSR Council of Ministers.

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on this issue, KGB officials have endorsed a relaxation of secrecy rules, and Chebrikov himself noted in his interview that many materials have already been declassified and that "a number of other restrictions that were a breeding ground for formalism have been lifted."[63] The KGB might actually benefit from declassifying certain categories of materials and loosening secrecy rules a bit. Not only does such *glasnost'* portray the KGB in a more favorable light; it also may raise the efficiency of KGB operations, since its employees will no longer devote energy to unnecessary procedures and will be able to focus on more serious security violations.

It is doubtful, however, that most KGB officials would agree with the far-reaching proposal made by the author of a recent *Kommunist* article, V. A. Rubanov (identified as a section head in the KGB's Scientific Research Institute), who advocated a complete overhaul of the secrecy rules.[64] The need for secrecy is, after all, a main justification for the KGB's existence. Most KGB officials, in their recent comments, have made a point of stressing that secrecy regulations remain a vital requirement for the security of the Soviet state.

Chebrikov made this clear: "I want to stress that the relaxation and simplification in the aforementioned measures by no means signifies that it is possible to relax vigilance and efforts to ensure the safety of state secrets. There must be no misunderstanding in this regard."[65] The recent convictions for passing professional secrets indicates that the KGB's vigilance in this area is still strong.[66]

The Kremlin's handling of political discontent in recent months further suggests an effort by conservative forces to resist political reform. Shortly after the 19th Party Conference, the KGB and other law enforcement agencies began clamping down on dissenters and protesters. On July 20, TASS announced that Armenian activist Paruir Hairikian had been stripped of his Soviet citizenship by a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The fact that he was expelled from the USSR without a trial stood in sharp contrast to Kremlin rhetoric about human rights.[67] More recently, the KGB announced in *Argumenty i Fakty* that at its request, the USSR Supreme Soviet revoked the citizenship of a Latvian for subversive activity.[68]

The July 1988 decree passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on the procedure for organizing meetings and demonstrations provided authorities with a legal justification for banning spontaneous public demonstrations and arresting their participants.[69] Although defended vigorously by Soviet officials as a democratic regulation for the exercise of the constitutional right to hold meetings, it has been used to suppress protests by ethnic minorities and groups like the Democratic Union, which advocate fundamental political change.[70] As then USSR Minister of the Interior (subsequently named chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian republic) Aleksandr Vlasov noted in July, "no pluralism of opinions can justify anarchic attacks on the socialist foundations of our life."[71] The decree was no doubt strongly backed by the KGB, which had urged a curb on public demonstrations in its proposals to the June 1988 Party Conference.

Future Implications for Gorbachev

In his *Pravda* interview, Chebrikov stated that the major focus of KGB restructuring has been on cadres policy. But as far as the Gorbachev leadership is concerned, the results are mixed. As part of the regime's general policy of renewing state and party personnel, six republic KGB chairmen have been replaced in the three and a half years since Gorbachev came to power. This is the same number of changes that Brezhnev achieved in his first three and half years as general secretary. In the case of Brezhnev, however, some of the new men were Brezhnev supporters. Although we do not yet have full biographical information on all of the recently appointed republic KGB chiefs, none has obvi-

[63] *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1988.

[64] V. A. Rubanov, "From the 'Cult of Secrecy' to an Information Culture," *Kommunist*, No. 13, September 1988, pp. 24–36. Rubanov was scathingly critical of the existing security regulations, which he said existed mainly to protect an obsolete bureaucracy. He proposed democratic safeguards to prevent the abuse of secrecy rules by bureaucratic agencies. The fact that Rubanov's views run counter to the standard KGB line suggests that he is at odds with most KGB officials on the issue and may have been enlisted by the more radical proponents of *perestroyka* to write this article.

[65] *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1988.

[66] Prilukov, in his more recent interview, indicated that the KGB would continue to enforce strictly the laws on professional secrets. "The information that foreign firms are forced to obtain by the methods of industrial espionage and at great expense are sometimes given away free by our representatives. And they pride themselves on their 'glasnost' ' too." *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Oct. 4, 1988.

[67] In fact, Article 18 of the Law on USSR Citizenship, enacted in December 1978, does state that a person can be deprived of citizenship by a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet if he commits acts defaming his citizenship or damaging the prestige or state security of the USSR. See *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 49, Dec. 1, 1978, Item 817. This law amounts to nothing more than a blanket excuse to expel troublemakers, and surely conflicts with other guarantees of individual rights provided for in Soviet law.

[68] *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 37, Sept. 10–16, 1988.

[69] For the text of the decree, see *Izvestiya*, July 29, 1988.

[70] See, for example, Bohdan Nahaylo, "Independent Group in Ukraine Under Attack," loc. cit.; and an article criticizing the repressive measures taken against the Democratic Union, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 21, 1988, p. 2.

[71] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 29, 1988.

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ous links with Gorbachev.[72]

At the national level, Gorbachev has also not fared as well as Brezhnev. When KGB chief Vladimir Semichastnyi was removed in May 1967, his replacement, Andropov, although not a Brezhnev protégé, was at least a neutral figure with a party background. Brezhnev managed at the same time to have Shelepin dismissed from the Secretariat and his oversight responsibilities for the police shifted to Brezhnev's long-time colleague Mikhail Suslov. Brezhnev also brought in two cronies to serve directly below Andropov: his brother-in-law, Semen Tsvigun, who became first deputy chairman, and Georgiy Tsinev, a state security official who hailed from Brezhnev's hometown of Dnipropetrovsk. Viktor Chebrikov, who came from Moscow to head the USSR KGB personnel department in 1967, was also from Dnipropetrovsk, although he had never worked with Brezhnev. (The fact that Chebrikov was not directly connected to Brezhnev may explain why he has been able to survive the extensive, ongoing purges of the Brezhnevites.)

Personal supporters within the KGB have traditionally been an important source of strength for any general secretary. Khrushchev made certain that he had his men in key positions within the KGB, although several of them were eventually dismissed and replaced with Shelepin allies.[73] Gorbachev's seeming failure to place personal allies within the KGB could make him vulnerable to KGB pressure as well as to efforts of opposition elements to enlist the KGB to their cause. He may also be less able to prevent independent KGB initiatives. Of course, Gorbachev may be looking to his plans to strengthen the state apparatus and to his new position as president of the Supreme Soviet to give him more direct power over the KGB and a better chance of making his views prevail.

It is, in any case, probably inaccurate to view the KGB and Gorbachev as completely at odds regarding *perestroyka*. As was noted earlier, the KGB has a stake in the success of some type of reform program, and Gorbachev may have gained the support of some of the younger, more forward-looking KGB professionals. In addition to Gorbachev's reform efforts to revitalize the economy, KGB officials may appreciate his innovative and dynamic approach to foreign policy, which offers them greater opportunity to expand their influence by means of propaganda and "active measures." Gorbachev, moreover, has shown himself capable of moderating his views when opposition has become too strident, retreating significantly from radical positions on various issues. Whether Gorbachev's flexibility represents a sincere rethinking or simply a tactical retreat is difficult to say. Whatever the case, Gorbachev is no doubt aware of the threat to his political survival, and that of the party as whole, should the KGB be undermined to the point where it could no longer contain dissent effectively.

Gorbachev's relationship with the KGB symbolizes the underlying dilemma the General Secretary faces in his efforts to reform the Soviet Union without challenging the dominant role of the Communist Party. His policy of *glasnost'* has led to unprecedented public criticism of the KGB and a great deal of lofty talk about reform and human rights. The KGB meanwhile has pursued a clever and effective strategy: it publicly expresses support for *perestroyka* and *glasnost'* while in practice it is doing its best to block meaningful political and legal reforms. But *glasnost'* without concrete results cannot suffice forever; the discrepancy between what is talked about and what actually occurs is bound to give rise to further public discontent, which could upset Gorbachev's balancing act between political control and real reform.

[72]Republics where new KGB chairmen have been appointed since March 1985 are: Kazakhstan (V. M. Mirosnik), Kirgiziya (V. A. Ryabakon), Ukraine (N. M. Holushko), Lithuania (E. Eismuntas), Azerbaijan (I. I. Gorelovskiy), and Turkmenistan (unidentified).

The only apparent career connection of any of these figures with the top party leadership is that of Holushko, who worked in the Tomsk KGB when Ligachev was party secretary in that oblast. For biographical information on Holushko, see *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), May 26, 1987. At least two of Brezhnev's KGB appointees at the republic level had close career ties with him: A. D. Beschastnov (appointed in Uzbekistan) and V. T. Shevchenko (Tadjikistan). Also, Geydar Aliyev, who became chairman of the Azerbaijan KGB in 1967, was a close ally of Brezhnev's brother-in-law Semen Tsvigun. For more on these men, see Knight, *The KGB*, p. 164.

[73]I. A. Serov was a close Khrushchev associate, as were K. F. Lunev (deputy and then first deputy KGB chairman from 1954 to 1959) and V. I. Ustinov (deputy chairman from 1954 to 1957).

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Books

Gorbachev and the Communist World: Collapse or *Perestroyka*?

Joan Barth Urban

ADRIANO GUERRA. *Il giorno che Chruscëv parlò: Dal XX Congresso alla rivolta ungherse* (The Day Khrushchev Spoke: From the 20th Congress to the Hungarian Revolt). Rome, Italy, Editori Riuniti, 1986.

LILLY MARCOU. *Les pieds d'argile: Le communisme mondial au présent, 1970–86* (Feet of Clay: World Communism to the Present, 1970–86). Paris, France, Editions Ramsay, 1986.

HEINZ TIMMERMANN. *The Decline of the World Communist Movement: Moscow, Beijing, and Communist Parties in the West.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1987.

AS students of communist affairs watch the startling pace of change in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and ponder its consequences for Eastern Europe as well as the USSR, scant attention is being paid to developments in the communist world beyond the Soviet empire (China excepted). Yet, historically, the international communist party system has been an important asset of Soviet foreign policy and a prime source of legitimacy for a Marxist-Leninist regime that claims to be part of a global revolutionary process. Moreover, there are numerous indications that the Gorbachev team continues to view the world communist movement in this light. It thus behooves us to explore the present state of affairs in the international communist party system and to ask what impact Gorbachev's policies may have upon it. This question is all the more important given the contradictory trends in the communist movement today: the dramatic slump in the electoral fortunes of the French and Italian communist parties, on the one hand, and the rapidly improving relationship between Moscow and Beijing on the other.

Two of the three European scholars whose books are reviewed in this essay, address the recent decline of the world communist movement beyond Moscow's East European empire. Lilly Marcou, a scholar at the National Foundation of Political Science in Paris, focuses on the stagnation that beset the international communist party system during the Brezhnev era in *Les pieds d'argile*, the final volume of a trilogy devoted to world communist developments since World War II. In *The Decline of the World Communist Movement,* Heinz Timmermann, a staff member of the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies in Cologne, covers a longer time frame. Timmermann begins with the Comintern era and includes chapters on the policies of Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping toward the communist world today before moving on to analyze the recent history and current state of the communist parties in the developed West. The Timmermann volume, superbly translated by Julius W. Friend, also includes a useful chronology of international communist developments from 1919 to 1986.

The third author, Adriano Guerra, former director of the Center for

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the Study and Documentation of Socialist Countries at the Italian Communist Party's Gramsci Institute in Rome, traces the roots of world communism's decline to Khrushchev's failure in 1956 to de-Stalinize the Soviet Union's relationship with its Warsaw Pact allies.

GUERRA'S book *Il giorno che Chruscëv parlò* is a work of historical revisionism, Eurocommunist style. As such, it is not simply a commentary on recent developments in the communist world; it is itself a protagonist in the ongoing drama.

The gist of Guerra's argument is that Nikita Khrushchev, despite his commitment to domestic reforms, refused during the critical months of 1956 to ease Soviet control over Eastern Europe even though conditions were then ripe for a process of "Finlandization" in Hungary, if not Poland. In a lively, balanced, and richly detailed account, Guerra reconstructs the interactions that year between Moscow and the restive non-Soviet communists, using the wealth of documentation (Czechoslovak party archives, Hungarian *samizdat* materials, countless memoirs by all manner of participants, and so forth) that has come to light over the past three decades. He describes the lengths to which the Kremlin went to prevent the contents of Khrushchev's "secret speech" against Stalin from being disseminated among East European and other foreign communists even while arranging for the entire speech to be read in full to a surprisingly wide Soviet audience.

He goes on to recount Khrushchev's intense mistrust of the Polish October and its hero, Władysław Gomułka. And he documents how the Hungarian "revolution within the revolution" in the autumn of 1956 had precious little to do with counterrevolution (even though supporters of the *ancien régime* did get involved) but rather was a movement to reform the Stalinist system and create a democratic and independent form of socialism in Hungary. In his view, Imre Nagy erred on the side of indecisiveness and caution, but the real culpability for the transformation of a movement peaceably seeking a Polish-type solution for Hungary into an uncontrollable popular explosion and bloodbath lay with Moscow and its decision to send in Soviet troops to restore order on the night of October 23, 1956.

Guerra implies, without quite spelling it out, that if Khrushchev, the domestic de-Stalinizer, could not see the anti-Stalinist forest for the occasional reactionary trees in Budapest, nothing better could be expected from the men who later ousted him. The contradiction between the promise of Khrushchev's "secret speech" and the slaughter in Hungary, moreover, sowed the seeds of doubt among Western (read Italian) communists that paved the way for their condemnation of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and their eventual wholesale rejection of the Soviet model of socialism. Guerra suggests, above all, that the "Finlandization" of Hungary in 1956 would have brought "definitive success to the line of the 20th Congress in the Soviet Union itself" (p. 210).

Guerra acknowledges that Khrushchev was under pressure from his conservative rivals in the Politburo throughout 1956. He also points out that the June 1953 uprising in East Berlin had played into the hands of those communist cadres, both Soviet and non-Soviet, who wanted to see as little change as possible in Moscow's post-Stalin policy toward Eastern Europe. Still, he concludes that the ambivalence of the Kremlin's conduct in this region was not just a matter of factional infighting; it was also a reflection of Khrushchev's own uncertainty as to what course of action to follow. Khrushchev stated to a French diplomat at an embassy reception before the outbreak of the Hungarian crisis: "If Hungary should become a second Finland, I would have no reason to object. . . . Finland offers us all the necessary guarantees" (p. 238, note 10). Yet he still blocked the return of Nagy to a leadership position in Budapest until the rush of events took the decision out of his hands. And as early as October 25, 1956, Khrushchev confided to the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow that it would be necessary for the Kremlin "to meet force with force" in Budapest (p. 207). Guerra maintains that not only the Hungarians but the world communist movement as a whole suffered from Khrushchev's flawed reformism during the East European crisis of 1956.

MARCOU brings this point home in her chronicle of developments in the international communist party system following Khrushchev's ouster and his successor's crushing of the reformist impulse in Czechoslovakia. She is at her best when she describes the organizational ossification of the Moscow-centered world communist movement under Leonid Brezhnev. She relates how the Soviet-sponsored journal, *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (*World Marxist Review* in its North American edition) became a vehicle for doctrinal shadow-boxing before a phantom audience under the editorship (from 1968 to 1982) of the arch sectarian Soviet publicist, Konstantin Zarodov. As the editions of this Prague-based review expanded from 16 in 1958 to 60 (in 37 different languages) by the 1980's (p. 274), its contents were reduced to ideological clichés, jargon-laden polemics, and glittering accounts of the achievements of

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"real existing socialism" and its nonruling communist partisans. Furthermore, the seminars and conferences regularly sponsored by the journal's editorial board lost what touch of intellectual vitality they had enjoyed during the Khrushchev years (under the editorship of Alexis M. Rumyantsev) and became either patchwork substitutes for a formal world communist organizational structure or forums for Soviet-orchestrated attacks on Chinese communism, Eurocommunism, and anti-Sovietism of any kind. Pale reflections of the massively organized meetings of the Comintern or even the Cominform in Stalin's day, their proceedings were barely noticed in the communist movement, let alone the world at large.

In a similar vein, Marcou documents how the Kremlin, unable to win support for a global communist conference after 1969, embarked upon the organization of regional communist conferences around the world, from Western Europe to Central America to the Middle East. In a perversion of the original Italian Communist notion of polycentrism, that is, of regional groupings of like-minded communist parties independent of Soviet tutelage, the Brezhnev Politburo developed an organizational mechanism that was regional in form but centralized in content. Granted, the 1976 pan-European communist summit in East Berlin proved to be an exception to this rule because of the coordinated maneuvers of the "Eurocommunist" Italian, French, and Spanish parties, and their Yugoslav and Romanian allies. Nevertheless, the inter-party squabbles that erupted during the preparations for the East Berlin conference were an anathema to Moscow, news of them was screened out by the Soviet media, and compliance with the Kremlin's will was restored at a subsequent rump meeting of European communist parties in 1980.

Marcou aptly portrays the organizational character of the international communist party system under Brezhnev as one of chimerical unity and actual decay, dubbing Prague the "capital of a phantom communist movement." Still, the tenacity with which the Kremlin strove over the years to contrive a public image of world communist unity begs for some explanation. Were the likes of Boris Ponomarev, head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras and chief overseer of the Prague review, simply unable to break the sectarian habits of thought and action they had absorbed during the Stalin years? Or did their persistent efforts to infuse some element of reality into the Marxist vision of proletarian internationalism bespeak a more enduring systemic need?

One indication that the latter is the case was Moscow's recent move to bring *perestroyka* and *glasnost'* to *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. At a conference held in Prague in April 1988 to celebrate the journal's 30th anniversary, the spokesman for the new Soviet approach was Anatoly Dobrynin, whose quarter-century stint as Soviet ambassador in Washington meant, among other things, that his only link with the closed mentality and sectarian ways of Ponomarev was the International Department post he inherited from him. Dobrynin's message to the representatives from more than 90 communist parties and organizations who attended was twofold. First, the communist movement was losing cohesion, electoral appeal, and international influence because it had underestimated the durability of capitalism, had failed to realize the full potential of socialism, and had let rifts and recriminations poison relations among the communist parties themselves. Second, a partial solution to these problems was to restructure the content and editorial operations of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. Specifically, Dobrynin exhorted the journal to become a medium for "alternative evaluations of questions," theoretical discussion and innovation, and the "clarification of the historical truth" about the communist movement's past.[1]

In apparent expectation of these directives, the April 1988 issue of *World Marxist Review* carried a debate between two Comintern veterans from the 1930's entitled, "What Part of the Past Is Valid?" in which many controversial themes were touched upon. For example, the Paraguayan participant clung to the Stalinist notion that one's "attitude to the USSR is the touchstone of proletarian internationalism," while his Spanish interlocutor complained about the negative impact that "Stalin's errors concerning the intentions of the Nazis . . . on the eve of Hitler's attack on the USSR" had upon the anti-fascist struggle.[2] Even before that, interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith and Henry Kissinger, were published in the January and February 1988 issues of the Prague review, carrying the presentation of "alternative evaluations" to an extreme unexpected even in the age of *glasnost'*.

Dobrynin's bearing in Prague suggests, in short, that a domestically oriented reform program such as Gorbachev's does not lessen the Soviet leadership's perceived stake in a viable international communist

[1]For a summary of Dobrynin's speech, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe*, (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Apr. 14, 1988, pp. 14–16.

[2]*World Marxist Review* (Toronto), April 1988, pp. 106–15.

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party system. The conduct of China's present leaders offers additional evidence that domestic reformism does not obviate a Marxist-Leninist regime's need to strengthen ties with other communist parties. Quite the contrary, it may intensify that need.

Almost a third of Marcou's book is devoted to the topic of "the return of China to the international communist movement." She recounts with verve the stages of this process: the rapprochement with Yugoslavia in 1977–78; the entente with the Italian Communist Party (PCI) beginning in April 1980; the accelerating normalization of state-to-state relations with the USSR and its East European allies after 1982, accompanied by the restoration of relations with numerous nonruling communist parties; and the resumption of party-to-party ties with the communist regimes of Poland and the GDR as of early autumn 1986 (and, we might add, with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria by mid-1987). She is right on target, moreover, when she remarks that "in working for an upsurge in the communist movement and calling for the development of Marxism-Leninism, [China] digresses from the Eurocommunists and converges with the Soviets" (p. 237).

One misses, however, a comprehensive explanation of just why China has made this concerted effort to re-enter the world communist movement. Marcou attributes Beijing's embrace of the erstwhile "modern revisionist" Tito to its interest in Yugoslavia's decentralized economic system and nonaligned foreign policy. But may it not also have been intended to counterbalance the PRC's concurrent political-economic overtures to Western Europe and the European Community in 1977–78?

Similarly, Marcou ascribes the privileged relationship China accorded the PCI from 1980 onward to their mutual condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in particular and superpower hegemony in general. But could not the reconciliation with the PCI, which actually began in early 1979, have also been viewed by Beijing as an ideological counterweight to the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States (no friend of the PCI, for sure) at that same time? As for the steady improvement in Sino-Soviet economic and cultural ties as well as political dialogue since 1982, it was certainly galvanized by the PRC's concern over the anti-communist rhetoric and pro-Taiwan leanings of the early Reagan administration.

What I am suggesting, in other words, is that there may be an ideological imperative at work in Beijing's search for links with other communist parties. Just as Mao Zedong cultivated an alliance with Stalinist Albania and urged the creation of radical anti-Soviet Marxist-Leninist sects all over the world during the 1960's, Deng Xiaoping and his protégés are reaching out to the Moscow-oriented regimes of Eastern Europe and to mainstream nonruling communist leaderships everywhere. Insofar as single-party rule is predicated upon the global historical validity of Marxism-Leninism, international ties with like-minded comrades are indispensable not only for Moscow—something that Western Sovietologists widely acknowledge—but for Beijing as well.

Indeed, the far-reaching nature of China's economic reforms and economic opening to the West would seem to require a political accommodation with the East, if only to keep the lid on the centrifugal political currents that have been swirling just below the surface of the Chinese polity for the past decade. Perhaps Marcou's inattention to this legitimating ideological dimension is what leads her to regard the prospect of a full Sino-Soviet reconciliation with somewhat the same skepticism she accorded to the organizational practices of the "international communist movement" in the Brezhnev era. In actuality, however, what began a decade ago as a move by Beijing's post-Mao leaders to buttress their ideological credentials at home by reestablishing ties with independent reformist forces in the communist world may soon conclude with the restoration of relations with the CPSU itself.

This is not to gainsay the powerful national security considerations that have divided the USSR and the PRC for decades or the continuing difficulties involved in Moscow's coming to terms with Beijing's three conditions for the normalization of party ties: Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and a Red Army pullback from China's border. It is to suggest that the reduction in mutual Sino-Soviet threat perceptions currently under way may well lead not just to an East-West–style détente but to a more overarching ideological accommodation.

Such a political settlement, we may safely surmise, would in no way be a throwback to the Sino-Soviet military alliance of the 1950's. Should it come to pass, it would instead be based upon a complete restructuring of the ground rules for international communist solidarity. As Marcou rightly emphasizes, Beijing has so far conditioned its restoration of ties with individual communist parties upon recognition by all concerned that absolute independence is nonnegotiable, political divergence on specific issues inevitable, and collective criticism of one or another communist party inadmissible. If such norms recall the 1960's Italian Communist slogan of "unity in diversity," they fall short of the present Eurocommunist search for

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unity with non-Marxist forces. Nevertheless, their general observance would be tantamount to a *perestroyka* of the international communist party system.

THE FIRST half of the Timmermann volume reviewed in this essay shows how far Gorbachev has come in agreeing to this type of *perestroyka*, as well as what a long way the Kremlin has had to travel to reach such a point. Timmermann leads the reader through Stalin's imposition of total Soviet diktat over the international communist party system, consummated at the time of the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 and reinvigorated with the founding of the Cominform in 1947, to the partly intentional yet ultimately uncontrollable "pluralization" of the world communist movement under Khrushchev, to the movement's decay under Brezhnev when, after 1969, not even a rump international communist conference could be convened. These early chapters offer a succinct historical overview for the uninitiated student. But they are also rich in insights for the specialist—for example, Timmermann underscores the relative insignificance of the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935, despite all the retrospective "legend-making" in its regard in recent years.

Under Gorbachev, however, Soviet attitudes toward the international communist party system appear to be undergoing a substantial change. In his report to the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, the new General Secretary affirmed that international communist unity "has nothing in common with uniformity, hierarchy," that it does not mean interference in the affairs of others or "one party's claim to monopolize the truth" (p. 8). In fact, Gorbachev had already begun to practice what he has preached by undertaking a virtual courtship of the PCI, whose leader he received in Moscow with unprecedented ceremony and attentiveness in January 1986,[3] on the fourth anniversary of the polemical breach in relations that had been triggered by the PCI's charge that Soviet communism had "exhausted its propulsive force." And in his much publicized speech in Vladivostok the following summer, the Soviet leader conveyed interest in a similar rapprochement with Beijing.

Timmermann also relates at some length how Gorbachev's foreign policy team is seeking closer contacts and areas of mutual agreement with the non-Marxist, social democratic "Euroleft." Still, the motive here is to rally the widest possible support for the Soviet "détente offensive" against the United States. As Timmermann points out, "Gorbachev does not intend to abandon the idea of the communist party as the vanguard of the process of radical societal change," and he remains committed to the concept of an "international communist movement" (p. 61). This is so much the case that in an interview he granted to the PCI daily newspaper after Timmermann's book had gone to press, Gorbachev voiced perplexity at the continuing opposition "in some parts of our movement" (the PCI, among others) to convening a new world communist conference.[4] Indeed, the Gorbachev team's traditionalism in this regard may be what prompted the PCI to sever all ties with *Problems of Peace and Socialism* at the April 1988 conference in Prague.[5]

As for the Deng-Zhao leadership's view on the international communist party system, Timmermann seems to place it closer to the PCI's than to Gorbachev's. Like Marcou, he stresses China's renewed interest in ties with both autonomist and Moscow-oriented members of the world communist movement, provided they are premised upon absolute independence and equality. He also discusses, however, Beijing's parallel efforts to promote contacts with social democratic parties. He notes that the Chinese Communist Party's "most active relations are indeed with the German Social Democrats —to whom Chinese representatives have expressed the wish to participate in some form in the work of the Socialist International" (p. 109). And he points out the convergence in this respect between Beijing's notion of a "new unity" and the PCI's "new internationalism."

All the same, we should bear in mind that the PRC's continuing commitment to a Marxist worldview as well as its attachment to the idea of an "international communist movement" do distinguish it in important ways from the PCI. For the Italian Communist leaders' ideological secularization has led them to discount Marxism as an obligatory frame of reference, as well as to reject the very notion of a world communist movement separate and distinct from a generic global Left.

It is precisely these elements of Chinese divergence from the Eurocommunist approach that leave open the prospect of a Sino-Soviet ideological rapprochement. In weighing the likelihood of such an eventuality, Timmermann does not come to any definitive conclusion. But, again like Marcou, he emphasizes the foreign policy and security dimensions of a move in this direction rather than its domestic legitimating potential. However, given the

[3]For details, see Joan Barth Urban, "The PCI's 17th Congress: A Triumph of the 'New Internationalism'," in Raffaella Nanetti, Robert Leonardi, and Piergiorgio Corbetta, Eds., *Italian Politics, A Review*, Vol. 2, London, Pinter Publishers, 1987, pp. 41–52 at p. 48.

[4]Text in *L'Unità* (Rome), May 20, 1987, pp. 13–16, at p. 16.

[5]*FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 18, 1988, p. 25.

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manifest concern in both Moscow and Beijing with preserving an international communist movement of some sort, the recent decline of the nonruling communist parties in the West could make the re-creation of a Sino-Soviet core all the more compelling.

BOTH Marcou and Timmermann address conditions in the Western communist movement over the past two decades or so. But whereas Marcou focuses on the rise and fall of Eurocommunism primarily from the vantage point of the French party, Timmermann devotes the second half of his book to a series of concise yet illuminating analyses of the recent histories of the communist parties in Italy, France, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Cyprus, Chile, and Japan.

Timmermann not only recounts the electoral downsliding and internal disarray that afflicted the French, Spanish, and Finnish parties in the 1980's, but he also offers convincing explanations for these developments. At the same time, he depicts the Italian and Portuguese (less so the Japanese) parties as more or less stable in their respective domestic contexts. And he tells the fascinating story of the transformation of the Chilean Communist Party from its traditional role of parliamentary actor seeking peaceful change, from the 1950's through the early 1970's, into a disciplined underground force advocating violence as a necessary lever against the Pinochet regime in the 1980's. He thus presents a picture of uneven development rather than unqualified decline.

His book was completed, however, before the setbacks suffered by the Western parties over the past year and a half: the Portuguese Communists' drop from 15.4 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections of 1985 to some 12 percent in the July 1987 contest; the French Communists' drop from some 15 percent of the vote in the 1981 presidential election to only 6.7 percent in the spring 1988 race (although it recovered slightly in the subsequent legislative elections in June, scoring 10.8 percent in the first round); finally, the PCI's drop from 29.9 percent in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 1983 to 26.6 percent in the June 1987 contest, and its further decline to under 22 percent of the votes cast in the municipal elections of May 1988.

FOR the reasons noted above, this decline of the nonruling communist parties may increase the pressure on Gorbachev to reach an accommodation with Beijing. A Sino-Soviet reconciliation would also strengthen Gorbachev's hand against his conservative rivals at home. They would be hard put to stigmatize him as ideologically unorthodox in the face of such a dramatic revival of international communist solidarity. It could not help but have, moreover, a positive effect on the PCI's attitude toward the international communist movement, for in recent years, the Italian Communist leadership has done much to encourage a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.[6] However, it is the changing nature of Soviet–East European relations perhaps even more than the PRC's familiar "three obstacles" that could well determine whether such an eventuality will actually come to pass.

It seems inconceivable that Beijing would agree to any settlement with Moscow that would not extend to Eastern Europe China's nonnegotiable conditions of equality, independence, and political diversity. Yet this would raise the specter of "Finlandization," the solution that Guerra argues was feasible as early as 1956 (and that the Italian Communists plainly support today). To be sure, the Chinese urged the suppression of the Hungarian uprising at that time, deeming it a counterrevolution rather than a national revolt. But as scholar-officials in Beijing readily conceded to this reviewer in 1987, Khrushchev's attempted encroachments upon the sovereign independence of the PRC in the late 1950's finally brought home to the Chinese leaders the reality of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. And this realization left its imprint upon all subsequent Chinese theoretical fulminations against Soviet hegemonism.

It could be that the recent diplomatic hints regarding a possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary[7] are actually related to the delicate process of Sino-Soviet reconciliation (as well, of course, as to East-West arms control bargaining). Such a step would also be greeted with enormous enthusiasm by most nonruling communists in the West, above all the Italians. It may be worth noting in this context, moreover, that PCI insiders report that recent Italian Communist histories of Soviet politics have been translated into Russian in limited editions and read by Gorbachev himself. Is it possible that the Soviet General Secretary has read Guerra's book, too?

Whatever the case, it seems clear that developments within Moscow's East European realm are crucial to whether or not the international communist party system beyond the empire will collapse or revive in a new form. The collapse or *perestroyka* of the international communist movement could, in turn, become part of the mix that determines the domestic political fate of Gorbachev.

[6]Urban, loc. cit., p. 51.

[7]See, for example, Don Oberdorfer, "Hungary Confirms Pullout Discussed," *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1988.

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The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Documents

Luba Fajfer

OVER the past 10 years a collection of documents relating to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) entitled *Litopys Ukrains'koyi Povstans'koyi Armiyi* (The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) is being published in the West. The purpose of this review is to draw the attention of students of contemporary Soviet and East European history to this remarkable collection. With this in mind, the review will describe what materials the *Litopys* contains, discuss what other documentary collections exist that shed light on the activities of the UPA, and assess the scholarly value of this fundamental work. Before proceeding with the discussion of the *Litopys,* it seemed useful to provide a brief factual outline on the UPA, since the activities of anti-Soviet insurgencies in the USSR during and after World War II are relatively unfamiliar to the Western reader.

As the Soviet army continued its westward advance in the spring of 1944, the Kremlin faced the task of reimposing Soviet control over large areas that had been under German occupation since June 1941. Some of these areas—the three Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, as well as parts of Ukraine and Belorussia—had been incorporated into the Soviet Union only as late as 1939 and 1940 under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. The Soviets met with armed resistance in most of these territories. In Ukraine, there functioned a strong and well-organized resistance force known as the UPA. During the German occupation, UPA partisans had fought German forces and Soviet partisan detachments active on Ukrainian lands. With the return of the Red Army, the UPA undertook an all-out guerrilla war against the Soviet troops, a struggle that lasted into the 1950's.[1]

The origin of the UPA can be traced to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a movement for Ukrainian independence founded in 1929 and active in the Western Ukraine that came under Polish control after World War I.[2] Initially a small underground movement, it gained a large popular base in the 1930's.

Soviet annexation of eastern Polish territories—including Western Ukraine—under the terms of the Hitler-Stalin Pact caused most OUN leaders to flee to German occupied parts of Poland. Believing in the inevitability of a war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, they

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[1] For a history of the period see: John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1963; Yuriy Boshyk, *Ukraine During World War II,* Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1986. For a history of the UPA see: Yuriy Tys Krokhmaliuk, *UPA Warfare in Ukraine,* New York, Society of Veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1972; Petro Mirchuk, *Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya,1942–1950* (The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1942–1950), Munich, Cicero Publications, 1953; Lev Shankovsky, *UPA i Yiyi Pidpil'na Literatura* (The UPA and Its Underground Literature), Philadelphia, America Publishers, 1952; idem, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army," in Myron Levytsky, Ed., *Istoriya Ukrains'koho viys'ka* (The History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces), Winnipeg, Ukrainian Book Club, 1953; Mykola Lebed, *UPA. Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya* (UPA. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army), revised and enlarged ed., Munich, Sučasnist', 1987; Petro Sodol, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army" *Strategy and Tactics* (Lake Geneva, WI) September-October 1985, pp. 11–12.

[2] For a history of the OUN see John Armstrong, op. cit.; Lev Rebet, *Svitla i Tini OUN* (The Light and Dark Side of the OUN), Munich, 1964; Petro Mirchuk, *Narys Istoriyi Orhanizatsiyi Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv* (A Brief Outline of the History of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), Munich, Cicero Publishers, 1968. See also: Lev Shankovsky, *Pokhidni Hrupy OUN* (Expeditionary Groups of the OUN), Cicero Publishers, Munich, 1958; Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943–1951,* Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1986.

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made plans to use this war to establish an independent Ukraine. However, like many other political groups, they differed over issues of leadership and tactics. This quarrel led to a split of the OUN into two groups: the OUN-B led by Stepan Bandera and the OUN-M led by Andriy Melnyk.

Both factions hoped that when the German-Soviet war broke out they could seize power in Ukraine and establish their own administrative apparatus and army. However, their hopes for German recognition of an independent Ukrainian state were short-lived. During the first weeks of the war, Bandera and his followers were arrested and sent to concentration camps for proclaiming Ukrainian independence in Lviv on June 30, 1941.[3] In the aftermath of this debacle, the OUN-B leadership that escaped arrest went underground and prepared to oppose the Germans.

The Germans' ruthless treatment of the Ukrainian population (arrests, detentions, and executions of the political opposition; deportation of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to Germany as forced laborers; food requisitions, etc.) created a military resistance to the Germans. The first non-communist Ukrainian guerrilla detachments were formed in the northwestern territories (Polissya) already in autumn 1941. These groups often organized spontaneously and operated without any central military or political leadership. Both factions of the OUN recognized the need for a single military command and a united political front in order to mount an effective resistance, but competed for control over these forces.

YEVHEN SHTENDERA and PETRO J. POTICHNYJ, Series Editors, *Litopys Ukrains'koyi Povstans'koyi Armiyi,* (The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), Vols. 1–2, "Volyn' and Polissya (German Occupation)," Toronto, Litopys UPA Publications, 1978 and 1985 respectively.

IDEM, Vols. 3-4, "Chornyi Lis (1947-1950), Reprint of the UPA Underground Journal," Toronto, 1987; Vol. 4, " Chornyi Lis (1948–1950)," Toronto, 1979.

YEVHEN SHTENDERA, Ed., Vol. 5, "Volyn' and Polissya (German Occupation), Individual Accounts of the Underground Struggle," Toronto, 1984.

Vols. 6-7, "The UPA in Light of German Documents, 1942–June 1944, and June 1944–April 1945," Collected and compiled by Taras Hunczak, Toronto, 1983.

YEVHEN SHTENDERA and PETRO J. POTICHNYJ, Vols. 8–10, "The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, Documents, Official Publications, Papers, 1944–1945, 1946–1948, 1949–1952," Toronto, 1980, 1982, and 1984 respectively.

IDEM, Vol. 11, "An Underground Roll of UPA Partisans Killed Fighting the Soviet Occupiers in the Ternopil' Region, 1944–1948," Toronto, 1985.

IDEM, Vol. 13, "Peremyshl Region, Peremyshl Battalion, Journals of the 'Burlaka' Detachment'," Toronto, 1986; Vol. 14, "Journals of the 'Krylach' Detachment'," Toronto, 1987.

YEVHEN SHTENDERA, Ed., Vol. 15, "Memoirs of the Commander of a Special Task Force, 'UPA–East'," Toronto, 1987.

PETRO J. POTICHNYJ, Ed., Vol. 16, "Underground Journals From Ukraine East of the Curzon Line, 1945–47," Toronto, 1987.

During the spring and early summer of 1943, three major and separate non-communist insurgent groups operated on the territories of Ukraine: the two OUN groups and units headed by Taras Borovets' (code name "Taras Bulba"). Although both OUN groups cooperated at times in joint operations, their negotiations for unification were stalemated. Finally, in August 1943, a unified force called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was formed under OUN-B leadership.[4]

By the time Soviet troops were advancing into the western Ukraine in the spring of 1944, the UPA forces were operating in different parts of the country under a unified Supreme Command of the UPA headed by Roman Shukhevych (code name "Taras Chuprynka"). By July 1944, the UPA's activities were being coordinated by a new unified political leadership, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR). The council was open to all political parties that supporterd Ukrainian national independence.[5]

The reorganization in the political leadership of the UPA took place when the Ukrainian population was already feeling the effects of the So-

[3]Leaders of the Melnyk faction, who had planned in 1942 to establish in Kiev a Ukrainian National Committeee as the nucleus of a Ukrainian government, were also arrested and later sent to concentration camps. See Armstrong, op.cit., pp.104–17.

[4]See *Litopys UPA*, Vols. 1–2, especially "The UPA in Volyn' in the Year 1943," Vol. 1, pp. 19–40.

[5]See "The Provisional Organization of the Ukrainian Liberation Council," in *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 8, pp. 27–33.

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viet occupation: deportation of kulaks and other "undesirable" elements was being resumed; the Ukrainian Catholic Church was being repressed; members of the political opposition were being deported to Soviet labor camps.[6] The difficult situation was compounded when the communist regime of Poland began expelling Ukrainians on its territories to the Soviet Union. The UPA's situation steadily grew more difficult as Soviet forces were aided by Polish and Czechoslovak troops.

Despite the overwhelming advantages of the Soviet forces, the Soviets were not able to subdue the UPA easily and establish firm control over Western Ukraine. During the winter of 1945–46, the Soviet internal security forces (NKVD) organized a massive blockade of all villages and larger forested areas within the territory of UPA activity. The blockade did not achieve the desired effect, because UPA units reorganized into platoons, squads, or even smaller groups, and were able to survive by hiding in underground bunkers or among the general population. Nevertheless, there were serious casualties, and several units located in areas that lacked good forest cover were ordered to disband and join the armed underground.

It took a cooperative military effort on the part of Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovak forces (the so-called "Operation Wisła") and the deportation of nearly all Ukrainians living on territories where the UPA was still active to inflict a mortal blow on the Ukrainian insurgents.[7] During 1948–49, the only UPA units that remained intact were in the region of the Carpathian Mountains. On September 3, 1949, the UPA Supreme Command issued an order to the last units and command staffs of the UPA to disband and merge with the armed underground.[8] Thus, at the start of 1950, only one apparatus of resistance to the Soviets remained, an armed underground consisting mostly of OUN members, former UPA soldiers, and members of now defunct political parties. This underground movement functioned well into 1951.

FIFTEEN volumes of *Litopys UPA* have appeared so far. The materials cover the period 1942–51 and contain German and Ukrainian sources available in the West. They consist of military orders and instructions, various communications and official declarations, as well as diaries, photographs, and maps indicating large military operations or smaller skirmishes.

The Ukrainian documents fall into the following subcategories: (1) official documents of the UPA Supreme Command and of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, the political leadership of the Ukrainian insurgent movement; (2) underground Ukrainian periodicals, some of which continued to appear during the entire period of the Ukrainian national struggle in different areas of Ukraine; and (3) diaries, eyewitness reports, memoirs and recollections. The documents in the Ukrainian collection were gathered from the Archive of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (ZP UHVR) in New York; the Archive of the Missiya UPA (Mission of the UPA) at McMasters University in Hamilton, Canada; and from collections maintained by various Ukrainian political organizations like the external units of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (ZCh OUN), the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists, External (OUN,z), or found in private possession. Some of the materials are diaries of members of the insurgent movement published here for the first time (volumes 12 and 15); some are reminiscences solicited from participants still living in the West.

Volumes 8, 9, 10 are devoted to the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. These materials cover the period from approximately July 1944 to May 1951. In addition to the official documents of the UHVR, such as its appeals and resolutions, the collection contains theoretical and polemical articles about the nature and goals of the Ukrainian liberation movement, as well as so-called "information articles" chiefly devoted to an evaluation of the general situation in Ukraine and to short descriptions (2 to 10 lines) of UPA military actions against, and encounters with the NKVD and later the forces of the Ministry of Interior (MVD).

These three volumes also bring together materials from Ukrainian

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[6]For eyewitness accounts of the Soviet occupation, see Milena Rudnytska, Ed., *Zakhidnya Ukrayina pid Bolshevykamy* (Western Ukraine Under the Bolsheviks), New York, 1968. See also, Jan T. Gross, *Revolution From Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987; Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917–1957*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962; Robert Conquest, *The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*, London, 1960.

[7]Operation "Wisła" was set into motion in southeast Poland on April 20, 1947, and lasted until August 31, 1947. The primary aim of this operation was to liquidate the military units of the UPA active in this area. On "Operation Wisła" see, "To the Whole Civilized World: An Open Letter From Ukrainians Living Behind the Curzon Line," *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 9, pp. 133–34; Ignacy Blum, *Z Dziejów Wojska Polskiego w Latach 1945–1948* (From the History of the Polish Army in the Years 1945–1948), Warsaw, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1960; and Antoni B. Szcześniak and Wiesław Z. Szota, *Droga do nikąd. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Jej Likwidacja w Polsce*. (The Road to Nowhere. The Activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Liquidation in Poland), Warsaw, Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, 1973.

[8]See *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 10, p. 15.

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underground publications and brochures on the political and ideological concerns of the UPA. These materials are an invaluable source for studying the evolution of political thought within the movement, for they point to the wide-ranging discussion of political, social, and religious questions and to the marked preoccupation of the UHVR with social justice and democracy.[9] They are also an important source of information about Soviet policies and methods of struggle with the Ukrainian insurgent movement in different regions.

Some volumes print a single underground publication while others relate to insurgent activity in a specific region. For example, volumes 3 and 4 contain the journal *Chornyi Lis* (Black Forest) which was published in 1947–50 by the local command of the UPA in the Stanislaviv Military District (present-day Ivano-Frankivsk). The journal's value lies in the insight it offers into the views of lower-ranking UPA officers and soldiers, who constituted its main audience and who were also the main contributors to the journal. In addition, the periodical represents an interesting example of underground journalism.

Volumes 1 and 2, focus on military activities of the UPA in Volyn' and Polissya—contemporary provinces/oblasts of Volyn', Rivne, Zhytomir, northern parts of Khmelnitskyi and Ternopil', and several districts in southern Belorussia. Some materials in these volumes were originally in the various underground periodicals published at the time. They not only show how wide-ranging the underground publications and literary activities of the UPA on these territories were, but also provide descriptions of the political and economic life of the population, as well as of the peasant self-defense system, its organizational structure, and its ties with the UPA. Other materials detail Nazi occupation policies, activities of the Soviet partisan units operating in those provinces, including their encounters with the UPA, as well as conflicts with the Polish underground.

The German documents in the *Litopys* are found in volume 6 and 7, and they cover the period between 1942 and April 1945. Among them are communications among the many various German military units operating on Ukrainian territory, translations and/or abbreviations of various intercepted Ukrainian documents, as well as interrogations of Soviet soldiers captured by the Germans concerning the activities of the UPA units in various parts of Ukraine. The accounts of Soviet soldiers provide insights into Soviet attitudes toward the UPA as well as some information, albeit limited, regarding Soviet wartime countermeasures against UPA units. They also constitute by far the largest collection of materials dealing with UPA actions against the Soviet army and the NKVD units during this period.

These German documents are selections from the Bundesarchiv (The Federal Archives) in Koblenz, West Germany; the Militärarchiv (Military Archives) in Freiburg, West Germany; and the American State Archives Collection of German War Documents in Washington, DC. For the most part, these documents have not been published before and thus represent a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge readily available to scholars working on this particular period.

The issue of UPA-German relations during World War II is highly controversial and has received much attention in the West, but above all in the Soviet Union and Poland. While providing some insight into UPA-German relations, the *Litopys* volumes that have appeared so far do not offer a clear-cut picture of those relations. For example, the case of Taras Borovets' appears to be a fairly obvious example of collaboration with the Germans. Although he mostly cooperated with the Wehrmacht in fighting Soviet partisans, he also sought German support when forming his forces (Vol. 6, docs. 15, 16, 20). Ukrainian documents identify Borovets' as an independent. For example, a report on the situation in northern Ukraine written in 1943 states that he was "an anarchist," a leader of independent insurgent units in the area, who refused to recognize the OUN-B and had at one time sought cooperation with the Germans (Vol. 2, p. 44).[10] Although several German documents support the testimony of Ukrainian documents that units under the command of Borovets' were a separate entity (Vol. 6, doc. 18, 23, and 29), one document mentions several times that Borovets' had ties to the OUN-B and records a meeting with the Germans that Borovets' attended at which he identified himself as a representative of the OUN-B (Vol. 6, doc. 19). Since the document is neither cross-referenced to the Ukrainian documents reporting or commenting on OUN-B's and the emerging UPA's contacts with Borovets', nor is any explanatory note given about these contacts, a reader of the German documentation is left with some unanswered ques-

[9]See, for example, two essays by P. Poltava, "The Direct Aims of Our Struggle," and "Our Plan of Battle for the Liberation of Ukraine Under the Present Circumstances,"in *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 10, pp. 47–49 and 114–15, respectively; and Yosyp Pozychaniuk, "Our Tactics with Regard to the Russian People,"ibid., pp. 253–56.

[10]A somewhat different picture of Borovets' is presented by Jerzy Halbersztadt in his review of Szcześniak's and Szota's tendecious study of the UPA, *Droga do Nikąd*. The review appeared in *Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw), Vol. 68, 1977.

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tions as to the nature of these contacts and the degree—if any—to which Borovets' represented the OUN-B at the time.

Another example of the ambiguity of UPA-German relations in the German documents is in the area of UPA attitudes toward the formation in April 1943 of the SS "Galicia" Division, which was commanded by German officers and composed of Ukrainian volunteers.[11] One German document in the *Litopys*, a reconnaissance report written by a German agent and dated September 1944, reports that two recruits in the Galician division stated that they had joined that formation on orders of the UPA. According to that report, the recruits maintained that the UPA in Galicia wanted half of the Ukrainian youth in that region to join the division (in order to get military training which they could then use in fighting for an independent Ukraine) and the other half to join the UPA (Vol. 7, doc. 5). Another document, from the Reich Security Administration, Foreign Intelligence, mentions that an order was issued by the UPA to enter the ranks of the division. Yet, a report dated June 1944, records that the UPA tried to counter the formation of the SS "Galicia" by enjoining the youth to enter instead the ranks of the newly forming UPA units in Galicia (Vol. 7, doc. 1). The Ukrainian documents do not contain UPA orders to join the SS "Galicia," but neither do they include any papers indicating unequivocal opposition to the division.

What does exist is an essay on the origins of the UHVR, written by Taras Chuprynka, Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, that appeared in an 1948 issue of the bulletin of the Information Bureau of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. Writing about the polarization in Ukrainian political circles over the ways and means of achieving Ukrainian independence, and specifically over cooperation with the Germans, he notes that the question of whether or not to support the formation of the SS "Galicia" solidified the polarization. According to him, the OUN-B and the UPA leadership, who opposed all cooperation with the Germans, firmly opposed the formation of the "Galicia" Division, while the political leadership of OUN-M promoted or at least supported it in the hope that such a military unit could spearhead the fight for an independent Ukraine (Vol. 9, doc. 33). In light of this document, how does one explain German reports of UPA orders to join the division? While several hypotheses could be put forward to reconcile the discrepancies, the documentation in the two volumes does not offer a definitive explanation.

A slightly clearer picture of UPA-German relations emerges from the German documents for the year 1944. As German forces were retreating from Ukraine before the advancing Red Army, German army intelligence, the Abwehr, increased its efforts to obtain the UPA's cooperation in exchanging intelligence information regarding Soviet forces. Apparently, by summer of 1944, the UPA commanders made a tactical decision to work out a *modus vivendi* with the Germans so as to be able to concentrate on fighting the advancing Soviet forces—then perceived by the UPA as constituting its chief enemy (Vol. 6, doc. 50). For its part, the Wehrmacht expressed willingness to stop attacking UPA units, to intercede with the German administrative authorities to treat the Ukrainian civilian population better, and possibly to provide some weapons. Representatives of the UPA group involved in these negotiations, on the other hand, declared their readiness to stop attacking the Wehrmacht units stationed at the front, to stop disrupting lines of communications, and on occasion to provide some intelligence information on the movement of Soviet forces. The document containing these proposals stresses that the agreement was tactical and did not imply a broader political understanding and future cooperation (Vol. 6, doc. 54a–54b). The representatives from the UPA involved in negotiating this informal understanding are not identified.

Another report by German intelligence, issued in August 1944, gives information on similar negotiations between representatives of the UPA Army Command for Northern Ukraine (no names are given) and the Abwehr (Vol. 7, doc. 3).

To sum up, what one learns from the German documents is that various UPA units at times negotiated with the German military on matters of benefit to both sides. But the documents make clear that the UPA never reached a political agreement with the Germans. It is also clear from the German documents of 1944 that the UPA operated on the premise of facing two enemies and that it concentrated its efforts against the enemy perceived to be most dangerous at that time, namely the communists. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to know who the individual commanders negotiating with the Germans were, and whether they were acting on their own or with the knowledge of the

[11]The Germans first announced the formation of a "14th Waffen-SS Division Galizien" on April 28, 1943, and issued a call for recruits from Galicia. According to Volodymyr Kubijovyč, then head of the Ukrainian Central Committee, the Germans promised that the Galician Division would be used only for fighting Soviet troops. See his entry on the SS Galicia in *Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963, and his *Ukrayintsi v Heneral'ni Guberniyi, 1939–1941: Istoriya Ukrayins'koho Tsentral'noho Komitetu* (Ukrainians in the General Gouvernement: The History of the Ukrainian Central Committee), Chicago, Mykola Denysiuk Publications, 1975.

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top military and political leadership of the UPA.[12]

CURRENTLY the only accessible collections of sources pertaining to the UPA can be found in the *Litopys* and in West German archives. Although Polish archives have considerable holdings on this subject, including documents captured by Polish forces when they were fighting the UPA, these holdings are not really accessible.[13] We know of their existence because they are cited in books and articles on the UPA written by individuals to whom the Polish regime had given access to these sources, trusting them to write works that fell within the boundaries of the officially accepted interpretation of events.[14] In the Soviet Union, archives pertaining to the UPA remain indiscriminately closed to everyone, even trusted party historians. It is to be hoped that in the era of *glasnost'* and the filling-in of blank spots in Soviet history, some—if not all—of the wartime archives may be opened to researchers.

However, one collection in the West which without pertaining directly to the UPA nevertheless sheds some light on its history is a three-volume publication of Polish documents put out by Studium Polski Podziemniej in London and entitled *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, 1939–1945* (The Home Army in Documents, 1939–1945). This collection for the most part provides documentation on the Polish World War II resistance movement, the Home Army (AK). Yet, it provides some interesting insights into the Home Army's perception of Polish-Ukrainian relations, as well as documentation on initial hostility and later attempts at cooperation between the AK and the UPA.[15]

There is also a Soviet publication of materials pertaining to the activities of Soviet border troops, including those stationed in Ukraine, entitled *Pogranichnyye Voyska SSSR, May 1945–1950: Sbornik Dokumentov i Materialov* (Border Troops of the USSR, May 1945–1950: A Collection of Documents and Materials, Moscow, Nauka, 1975). Interestingly, the materials in this publication do not include anything on the UPA's strength and effectiveness, although some analysts have argued that the Soviets' initially limited success in countering the UPA was largely due to the fact that the regular Soviet army units first deployed against the UPA proved ineffective and had to be replaced by special NKVD forces.[16] These materials do, however, confirm that in May 1944 Soviet authorities organized border troops in the Ukrainian military district, whose primary task was to combat the UPA and help the local party and administrative bodies to carry out their tasks.[17]

While the reliability of regular army units in fighting the Ukrainian resistance is not mentioned, this Soviet publication states that, border troops were initially doing poorly in fighting the UPA. This is blamed primarily on the poor training received by these troops: only 10 percent of the non-commissioned officers and of the enlisted

[12]This question is particularly pertinent, because one account of the history of the UPA written by the acting head of the OUN-B while Bandera was incarcerated mentions that commanders of UPA units were forbidden to negotiate on their own or cooperate in any form with the Germans under penalty of death. See, Mykola Lebed', *UPA-Yiyi Geneza i Diyi v Vyzvolniy Borot'bi Ukrains'koho Narodu za Ukrains'ku Samostiynu Sobornu Derzhavu* (The UPA-Its Genesis and Participation in the Ukrainian Nation's Liberation Struggle for A Ukrainian Independent and Sovereign State), The UHVR Press Bureau, n.p., 1946, pp.73–74.

[13]The most extensive ones include *Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych, Zespół OUN-UPA* (Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, OUN-UPA Collection) in Warsaw; *Archiwum Komendy Wojewódzkiej MO-Lublin* (uncatalogued documents in the Archives of the Provincial Militia Headquarters-Lublin, OUN-UPA collection); *Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe* (Central Military Archives) in Warsaw; and *Archiwum Korpusu Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* (Archives of the Internal Security Corps) in Warsaw.

[14]Some of these books and articles are: Ignacy Blum, op. cit.; Blum, "The Role of the Polish Army in Fighting for Consolidation of the Rule of the People: Battles With the UPA Bands," in *Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw—henceforth cited as *WPH*), No. 1, 1959, pp. 3–29; Jan Gerhard, *Łuny w Bieszczadach* (*The Bieszczady on Fire*), Warsaw, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1958; Gerhard, "Additional Information Concerning Battles with the UPA Bands and 'Freedom and Independence' (WiN) on Southeastern Territories of Poland," *WPH*, Vol. IV, No. 4, 1959, pp. 304–35; Wiesław Szota, "A Brief Outline of the Growth of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army," *WPH*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1963, pp. 163–218; Jan Czapla, *Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego w Walce z Podziemiem Zbrojnym, 1944–1947* (The Corps of Internal Security in Its Fight With the Armed Underground), Warsaw, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1967; Leszek Grot, "The Operations of the Peoples' Army of Poland Against the Armed Underground in the Years 1944–1947," *WPH*, No. 3, 1973, pp. 471–496; Szcześniak and Szota, op. cit.; Mieczysław Jaworski, *Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 1945–1965* (The Corps of Internal Security, 1945–1965), Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, 1984. The article by Blum contains some interesting information about the organizational structure and personnel of both the UPA units in Galicia and the Polish forces fighting them. The book by Szcześniak and Szota makes extensive references to previously unknown archival holdings .

[15]For a discussion of this collection, particularly UPA-WiN and UPA-Armia Krajowa contacts, see John Micgiel, "Under the Spell of the Past: Polish-Ukrainian Relations According to Documents," *Sučasnist'* (Munich), Summer 1985, pp. 145–57; see also, Yevhen Shtendera, "In Search of Understanding: The Ukrainian and Polish Underground Movements, 1945 to 1947. Cooperation Between the UPA and the WiN," in Peter J. Potichnyj, Ed., *Poland and Ukraine Past and Present*, Edmonton and Toronto, The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980.

[16]See, for example, Oleh Martynovych, *Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*, Edinburg, The Scottish League for European Freedom, 1951, p. 130. A German report, dated January 1945 and based on interrogations of captured Soviet soldiers, relates that Soviet forces were reluctant to fight the UPA because they had grown tired of war. "Why should we fight now that the motherland is free?" was a frequently expressed sentiment. See, *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 7, doc. 45.

[17]See, *Pogranichnyye Voyska SSSR*, Nos. 200 and 206.

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men had any experience as border troops, while the remaining 90 percent came from other units of the MVD and the Soviet Red Army.[18]

In addition, there exist official Soviet and Polish eyewitness accounts written by participants in battles with the UPA.[19] However, they are mostly of very limited use because of their obviously propagandistic treatment of events. Nonetheless, on occasion, one can find here confirmation of some events in the *Litopys*. For example, the accounts by Dmitry Medvedev, a commander of a Soviet partisan detachment in Western Ukraine, and Mikołaj Kunicki, a commander of a Polish communist partisan detachment in Western Ukraine, include information that, as early as 1943–44, the Soviet military leadership had specifically designated partisan detachments to fight the Ukrainian insurgents.[20] Moreover, the author of the Polish account writes that, acting on instructions from N. Strokach—a NKVD general who during the war headed the Communist Partisan Staff in Ukraine—his unit not only fought the UPA, but, disguised as UPA partisans, terrorized villages in Volhynia and Galicia so as to turn the population against the UPA.[21]

[18]Ibid., No. 200.

[19]For Soviet accounts see: Sydir Kovpak, *Vid Putylya do Karpat* (From Putylya to the Carpathians), Kiev, 1946; Aleksey Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deystvuyet* (The Underground Obkom Functions), Moscow, 1950; Grigoriy Linkov (commander of partisan detachment in the Smolensk area), *Voyna v Tylu Vraga* (War Behind Enemy Lines), Moscow, 1951, 1959; Petro Vershygora (first served with General Kovpak's partisan forces, later became a commander of a partisan unit which operated in Volyn'), *Lyudi s chistoy sovest'yu* (People With a Clear Conscience), Moscow, 1951; also idem, "The Raid on San and Vistula," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1959, pp. 3–79, and *ibid.*, No. 3, March 1959, pp. 24–110; Dmitry Medvedev, *Sil'nyye dukhom* (Strong in Spirit), Moscow, 1952, 1957. For Polish accounts see: Mikołaj Kunicki, *Pamietnik "Muchy,"* Warsaw, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1959.

[20]Medvedev, op. cit.; and Kunicki, op. cit.

Compared to what exists elsewhere on the UPA, *Litopys UPA* is the largest accessible collection of primary sources not only on the history of the UPA as the military arm of the Ukrainian liberation movement, but also on Soviet military and political activities in Western Ukraine during and after the war. The editors of this collection undertook a monumental task of compiling the documents and materials from various sources, and thus documenting extremely complex areas of 20th-century Ukrainian history.

THE organization of the *Litopys* deserves great praise. The volumes are devoted to single topics or regions, so that each of them can stand alone. Most volumes have extensive introductions that discuss the provenance of the materials and give their historical context. Each volume includes short English summaries of the documents. Obviously, this presentation greatly facilitates the work of researchers.

The materials are apparently reprinted without omissions or deviations from the originals; any clarifications or changes introduced by the editors into the text are clearly indicated. Notations for each document give the original source as well as the archive where the original can be located.

By and large, the introductory essays to most of the volumes present a clear and balanced analysis of the subject. Nevertheless, though generalizations about such diverse and extensive documentation are unavoidable, one occasionally finds that they are either unnecessary or even misleading. The references to the "ubiquitousness" of Soviet terror or to the "unqualified" support for the UPA among the Ukrainian population are good examples. The editors should have indicated when and where this was the case. While no one questions that in the process of establishing control, Soviet forces resorted to terror tactics, it is necessary to differentiate between, for example, the behavior of Soviet partisans toward the local Ukrainian population in the areas that were under their firm control, and that of the NKVD/MVD counterinsurgency units after the war in the areas of active UPA opposition.

With regard to the "unqualified" support of the local Ukrainian population for the UPA, it appears to me that such assertations—without a specific reference to time and place—can be easily misread to mean that the UPA enjoyed unqualified support from the population in all parts of the Ukraine and throughout the entire period it fought the Soviet forces. This was hardly the case. Because different regions of Ukraine had very different historical experiences, the degree of support for the independence movement showed regional variations. For example, support was more forthcoming in the north than the south, and west of the Dnieper River than east of it. Furthermore, if we look, for example, at Volhynia, we see that despite the relatively wide support received by the UPA in the north, the Soviet authorities seemed able to establish an effective network of collaborators. To mention another variant, extremely strong indigenous solidarity with the UPA did exist in the southeastern parts of present-day Poland, where UPA activity in the post-war period was extensive.[22]

It is difficult to gauge how representative the *Litopys* collection is, both because its compilation is still an on-going process and because

[21]Kunicki, op. cit., p. 430–33.

[22]Shankovsky, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army," pp. 806–10.

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no single person could possibly master such extensive documentation. There is, however, one source that is minimally represented in the collection, namely, Soviet documents captured during World War II that are in the West. It may be that many of these documents are of peripheral value, but their inclusion would enhance the usefulness of the *Litopys* as a research tool.

The documents seized from the partisan detachments of General Sydir Kovpak, who in August 1942 undertook a military mission in German-controlled Western Ukraine, are of more than peripheral value, however.[23] Kovpak was defeated in the summer of 1943 by German forces, and most of his documents seized at that time are now in the West.[24] They have not been included in the *Litopys*. Since some Ukrainian leaders have argued that one of the main tasks of Soviet partisan detachments was to fight the UPA,[25] the Kovpak collection may shed light on the purpose and functioning of such Soviet detachments, and on their perception of the UPA and the situation in Ukraine.

Some of the Ukrainian materials included in the *Litopys* refer to various Soviet documents or secret orders dealing, among other things, with measures to be taken by the Soviet authorities in the process of reestablishing political and administrative control in the recovered territories. One could assume that some of these documents were once in the possession of the UPA, and if they did make their way to the West, it would be imperative to include them in the *Litopys*, or at the very least to note their existence.[26]

LOOKING back at the 15 volumes of the *Litopys*, one cannot help being impressed by the tremendous effort that has gone into producing the collection. In addition to the editors, much credit belongs to the various institutions involved in this project. The *Litopys* will certainly be welcomed by scholars and analysts of Soviet conduct in conflict situations involving Soviet nationalities.

But the *Litopys* is of interest not only to scholars of the Soviet Union, but also to students of national insurgencies and resistance movements generally. How the UPA managed to maintain itself for six years (1943–49) as a cohesive and active military force and then functioned for several more years as a strong underground resistance movement, is worthy of study. Whether its success was the result of its own skill and the firmness of its political goals or was due to mistakes committed by its adversaries remains to be analyzed and certainly constitutes a fascinating topic for research. Whatever the conclusions, the fact remains that the insurgency persisted without any real outside support for a long time.

One can only speculate what impact Soviet experience with the Ukrainian and other insurgent movements after World War II has had on Soviet strategy and tactics against the mujahedin in Afghanistan. It is always a risky undertaking to compare two seemingly similar phenomena, i.e., two anti-Soviet military insurgencies coupled with political resistance, particularly if they occurred in different international and geographic settings. Nonetheless, both insurgencies present opportunities for analyzing Soviet capacity to fight guerrilla movements. Even a cursory examination of Soviet tactics employed in Afghanistan shows striking parallels to Soviet counterinsurgency measures used against the UPA. The *Litopys*, therefore, is an important source on Soviet military and political behavior.

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[23]Kovpak, op. cit.

[24]A sample of them can be found in the Appendix to John A. Armstrong, Ed. *Soviet Partisans in World War II*, Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964

[25]See Lebed, *UPA: Yiyi Geneza i Diyi...*

[26]For example, it has recently come to my attention that a report issued in 1944 by I.I. Profatilov, the First Secretary of the Volyn' obkom, which lists various political, military, and intelligence measures to be taken by the internal security forces against the Ukrainian underground, exists in the Archives of Misya UPA, XIII, B-2. It has not as yet been included in *Litopys UPA*. Many of the Profatilov's measures closely correspond to those described in an essay in *Litopys* on Soviet policies toward the insurgent movement. See "The Disgrace of the 20th Century," *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 9, pp. 145–213. It should be noted that orders equivalent to those of Profatilov exist also for Lithuania. See the testimony of Grigoriy S. Burlitski, *Hearings Before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, Fourth Interim Report, US House of Representatives*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1954, pp. 1370–71. They were issued in 1944 by General S.N. Kruglov, Deputy Director of SMERSH (the Soviet counter-intelligence organization), to the regional NKVD commanders. This seems to indicate the existence of a uniform, coordinated Soviet policy aimed at counteracting national insurgent movements in the entire western part of the Soviet Union. If it were to be proven that such parallels at the central levels of decision-making indeed existed, then one could assume essentially similar measures were introduced at regional levels.

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